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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) help to reduce transaction costs in
several ways. The study of this phenomenon and the resulting economic consequences
are the underlying common theme in the four subsequent chapters of my dissertation.
Each of them is a self-contained paper that contributes to the field of Industrial
Organization. In particular, I contribute to the study of two important phenomena that
arose as a consequence of the ICT-enabled reduction in transaction costs, which modern
societies have seen over the last two decades: electronic commerce (E-Commerce,
in what follows) and (commons based) “peer production” (Benkler and Nissenbaum
(2006)). Both of these have gained importance, because ICT reduced the cost of
storing information and retrieving it at a later point in time. Thus it became easy
to search and find information once it was stored digitally. Moreover, ICT reduced
the cost of communication, which allows remotely located partners to coordinate and
jointly resolve complex tasks, be it a commercial transaction or the collaboration on a
complex joint project, such as writing a scientific paper or an encyclopedia.
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on a cost reduction that might have very drastic long-term
consequences: New digital media enable new communication platforms, where multiple
agents can interactively coordinate or contribute thoughts and ideas. They can split up
work that is necessary for achieving a large goal and perform tasks in an independent
and modular fashion Lerner and Tirole (2002). Under this new production regime,
called (commons based) “peer production” (Benkler and Nissenbaum (2006)), highly
valuable and complex services can be produced: Successful examples are Open Source
Software or Wikipedia. Chapters 2 and 3 of my thesis study the contribution flows to
Wikipedia, which is the most shining example of successful peer production.1 It has
been created by thousands of volunteers and is now world’s most important platform
for documenting and storing encyclopedic knowledge. Both chapters focus on the role
1Chapter 3 is coauthored with Marianne Saam, Iassen Halatchliyski and George Giorgidze.
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of the hyperlinked citation network between Wikipedia’s articles and shed light on how
it influences users’ search and contribution behavior.
The second part of my thesis (chapters 4 and 5) is related to electronic commerce.
This new form of retailing is a second phenomenon that was enabled by ICT-induced
reductions in search and coordination costs. In E-Commerce, several important
transaction costs that used to be borne by one of the two sides, are no longer important.
Shops do not have to maintain costly “brick and mortar” facilities any longer and they
can ship on demand, rather than anticipating where the customers will desire which
product. Moreover, they can create user profiles and tailor which offers specific clients
see to their previously revealed preferences. Customers, in return, can economize on
costly expeditions to the stores, by ordering from remote locations. Most importantly,
consumers can compare many prices much faster and more easily. This fact is the
main theme of the two papers focusing on E-Commerce (chapters 4 and 5), where
my coauthors and I study retailer behavior on Austria’s largest price comparison site,
www.geizhals.at. Both chapters are coauthored with Franz Hackl and Rudolf Winter-
Ebmer. Christine Zulehner coauthored chapter 4.
Additional materials for the chapters 2, 3 and 4, which were not included in the
main text (e.g. additional results, data descriptions, proofs or robustness checks) are
provided in separate appendices after the four main chapters. The bibliography with
the references of all four chapters can be found at the end.
1.1 Links, Search and Production in Networks of
User Generated Content.
This part of my dissertation (chapters 2 and 3) studies the production patterns on the
German Wikipedia, which is a production setting of (commons based)“peer production”
(Benkler and Nissenbaum (2006). This term refers to multiple agents coordinating via
an online platform to organize and distribute work, because they wish to achieve a
large goal. Under this new production regime highly valuable and complex services,
such as Open Source Software or Wikipedia have been produced.
Chapter 3 (coauthored with Marianne Saam, Iassen Halatchliyski and George
Giorgidze) focuses on the role of an article’s network position on contribution patterns.
This is motivated by the observation that producers of user-generated content have
to decide where to contribute, before they can contribute content to large and highly
structured online platforms like Wikipedia. This decision is expected to depend on
the way the content is organized. We analyse whether the hyperlinks on Wikipedia
channel the attention of producers towards more central articles. We observe a sample
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of 7, 635 articles belonging to the category economics on the German Wikipedia over a
period of 153 weeks and we measure their centrality both within this category and in
the network of over one million German Wikipedia articles. Our analysis reveals that
an additional link from the observed category is associated with around 140 bytes of
additional content and with an increase in the number of authors by 0.5. The relation
of links from outside the category to content creation is much weaker.
In chapter 2 I exploit exogenous shocks to the attention on individual articles
to precisely disentangle the effect of a link from other background factors that might
simultaneously influence both the network structure and the contributions to an article.
I ask how networks generate externalities, such as spillovers or peer effects and focus
on the challenge of quantifying these externalities in the face of endogenous network
formation. I tackle the problem by exploiting local exogenous shocks on a small
number of nodes in the network and investigate spillovers of attention on the German
Wikipedia. I show how the link network between articles influences the attention that
articles receive and how the additional attention is converted into content.
Exogenous variation is generated by natural and technical disasters or by articles
being advertised on the German Wikipedia’s start page. The effects on neighboring
pages are substantial: They generate an increase in views of almost 100 percent and
content generation is affected similarly. Aggregated over all neighbors, a view on a
treated article converts one for one into a view on a neighboring article. This approach
applies even if, absent network data, identification through partial overlaps in the
network structure fails and thus helps to bridge the gap between the experimental and
social network literatures on peer effects.
I conclude this section by pointing out that the importance of understanding
peer production in the context of knowledge production cannot be overstated, because
the process of building, documenting and transferring knowledge is characterized by
enormous frictions: Transmitting ideas has always been extremely costly, involving
face to face interaction or a media for storing knowledge and a lot of time. Moreover,
the successful transmission of knowledge is not guaranteed: New and even existing
knowledge can be inaccurately disfigured (and even lost), if it is not sufficiently well
documented or transmitted to following generations. However, despite all these frictions
a civilization’s knowledge and its innovations have always been a fundamental input to
its productivity. How well an economy can build new knowledge or transmit the existing
one to the public or to future generations is a central determinant for the success of
a culture. Thus, many resources have typically been devoted to the generation and
transfer of knowledge, often involving an entire sector of a civilization’s economy.
Peer produced Wikipedia was a first showcase, where thousands of volunteers took
only a decade to collect, digitize and document virtually all encyclopedic knowledge
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in unprecedented detail. This highlights how ICT-enabled reductions of transaction
costs could transform the societal process of knowledge generation, documentation and
transmission, and such developments are likely to have deep and long lasting effects on
education and innovation. However, given the importance of the knowledge generation
and knowledge conservation process for society, it is crucial to understand these long
run effects as early as possible. Each chapter in this part uncovers a relevant aspect of
peer produced content networks: Chapter 3 highlights the importance of local semantic
structures, such as links from articles that belong to the same category. In chapter 2 I
precisely quantify how much attention spills across links and point out the crucial role
of a high visiting frequency for the success of this type of public good production.
1.2 Firm Behavior on a Price Comparison Site
Price comparison sites offer a technology that allows to compare prices and immediately
find the cheapest offer with only a few clicks. This technology has the potential of
revolutionizing the market for retail and it seriously challenges the shops that advertise
online. The question arises, how shops can continue to make a profit on such a site,
and the shops’ owners might have to devise new strategies to do so. In two separate
chapters (4 and 5) we study firm behavior on Austria’s market dominating site for price
comparisons: www.geizhals.at.
In chapter 4 (coauthored with Franz Hackl, Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and Christine
Zulehner) we analyze the interaction between market structure and market performance
and how it varies over the product cycle. To account for the potential endogeneity
in this relation, we use a novel instrumental variable approach. We furthermore
investigate the relationship of market structure and price dispersion. We combine data
from geizhals.at with retail data on wholesale prices provided by a major hardware
producer for consumer electronics. We observe firms’ retail and input prices, and
all their moves in the entry and the pricing game over the whole product life cycle.
Our results show that instrumenting is important for estimating the empirical effect
of competition on the markup of the price leader. One more firm in the market
is associated with a reduction of the price leader’s markup which is equivalent to
competition between existing firms for an additional three weeks in the product
life cycle. Our results support search theoretic models and contradict models of
monopolistic competition. Moreover our results support the existence of price dynamics
over the product cycle. They also highlight the substitutability between newly
innovated and old expiring technologies and how it varies with respect to competitors’
and own brand innovations.
In chapter 5 (coauthored with Franz Hackl and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer) we analyze
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the phenomenon of quoting prices that end in a special ending, such as “.99c.” Setting
prices ending in nines is a common feature of many markets for consumer products.
Their prevalence has been explained either by a specific image of such price points or
by the exploitation of rational inattention on the part of the consumers who want to
economize on the cost of information processing. We use data from the largest Austrian
online market for price comparisons (www.geizhals.at), where any disproportionately
high frequency of such endings would be expected to disappear if marginal cost pricing
prevailed. We analyze how frequently special pricing patterns emerge and we explore
the impact of these price points on the consumers’ demand. We find a remarkable
prevalence of such prices. Moreover, prices ending with nine are also sticky: price-
setters change them with a significantly lower probability, rivals underbid these prices
more seldom if they represent the cheapest price on the market, and we observe higher
price jumps by price leaders for these price points.
Both chapters together show that certain phenomena, which would be expected to
disappear in online markets continue to exist. They have not disappeared even several
years since the site has been introduced. This suggests that shops might be able to
continue making small profits as a consequence of specific behavioral patterns, such as
rounding down a price that ends in “99c”.
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Chapter 2
Spillovers in Networks of User
Generated Content* -
Evidence from 23 Natural and 34 Pseudo-Experiments
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, it was surprising to witness how large numbers of volunteers
coordinated to produce Wikipedia. It is now the world’s most consulted reference
for encyclopedic information, highlighting the potential of collaborative production.2
Consequently, the amount and quality of voluntary contributions to online public goods
(“peer production”), such as Wikipedia or open source software, is of great economic
interest: Successfully leveraging this potential in other settings could be very beneficial
to society, but requires understanding how exactly peer production works. In this paper
I analyze spillovers of attention, transmitted through links in the German Wikipedia
and how attention affects contribution effort.
*I thank the selection committee of the IIIrd ICT Conference in Munich for awarding a very early
version of this paper the 2nd Prize in the “Best PhD Paper Award.” The author is grateful to the
Wikimedia Foundation and Fre´de´ric Schu¨tz for access to the Wikipedia data. Thanks to Thorsten
Doherr and Manfred Knobloch for support with data processing and to George Giorgidze for help
with DSH. I benefitted from discussions with Irene Bertschek, Christoph Breunig, Luis Cabral, Jo¨rg
Claussen, Ulrike Cress, Habiba Djebbari, Neil Gandal, Avi Goldfarb, Sanjeev Goyal, Shane Greenstein,
Thorsten Grohsjean, Maximilian Kasy, Francois Laisney, Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, Kathy Nosal,
Gal Oestreicher-Singer, Martin Peitz, Marianne Saam, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Olga Slivko, Yossi
Spiegel, Joel Waldfogel, Michael Ward and Andrea Weber. The participants in several seminars at
ZEW and U Mannheim, U Linz, U Kaiserslautern and WU Wien and of the 11th ICT-Conference
(ZEW, Mannheim), the EARIE 2013 (E´vora), the 11th conference of Media Economics (Tel Aviv)
and the IIIrd ICTCM (Munich) provided valuable input. James Binfield, Timo Scha¨ffer and Daniel
Bergman provided outstanding research assistance. Financial support from the WissenschaftsCampus
Tu¨bingen is gratefully acknowledged.
2Its quality is sufficient to almost completely drive previous incumbents out of existence:
Encyclopedia Britannica was the most prominent English encyclopedia and the“Brockhaus”dominated
in Germany. Both have suffered considerable losses in sales and market share.
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How much attention can be channeled by links and how much of this attention
is converted to action? These questions are key to understanding peer production and
matter in many other contexts, such as public decision making or advertisement, where
it is essential to channel attention. However, they cannot easily be analyzed empirically,
because most outcome variables of interest might themselves drive the network
structure.3 I circumvent this endogeneity problem by exploiting local exogenous
shocks in the attention to single nodes in Wikipedia’s article network. The resulting
attention spillovers to neighboring nodes generate exogenous variation to attention that
is independent of the production process. As initial shocks I use natural and technical
disasters or when a neighbor is advertised on Wikipedia’s start page for 24 hours. Both
are shown to affect traffic and allow applying difference-in-differences to measure direct
and indirect treatment effects. Moreover, I formally show how to relate these treatment
effects to the structural parameter that measures attention spillovers.
Considering the network formed by Wikipedia’s articles (as nodes) and the
hyperlinks between articles (as directed links), I obtain a dataset on 57 primary news
and attention shocks, which contains daily information on views and content generation
of almost 13,000 articles and more than 700,000 observations.4 I document a large
initial attention spillover, independent of whether the initial shock is generated by
a disaster or by advertisement on the start page. I find that the initial increase of
attention to neighboring pages of featured articles translates to substantial content
generation (= editing activity). Views of neighbors doubled on average, and editing
activity almost doubled. Furthermore, the number of authors increased, indicating
that new authors contributed.
Distinguishing articles by their length I find that the spillovers of attention do
not depend on the length of the link’s target, whereas content generation does. Like
the average article, short articles were visited 35 times more, on average, but these
additional visits resulted in substantially fewer new edits and a smaller increase in
length than in the full sample. In short, citation links matter for the attention that
nodes receive, but much less for the content that is generated on such nodes. This may
be justified given the maturity the German Wikipedia had reached by 2007.
To relate the measured effects to the structural spillover parameter, I extend a
3In my case the outcomes of interest are attention (= clicks) and new edits, but the problem
applies in general. Both processes, like supply and demand, may be driven by unobserved dynamics.
The resulting methodological issues are a constant obstacle in a wide range of applications that
try to measure peer effects or the role of social networks in generating externalities. Examples are
interpersonal connections and the take up of micro-finance, or peer effects in schooling, aid programs
or health interventions.
423 large-scale media events such as natural disasters and 34 articles that were advertised on
Wikipedia’s main page for 24 hours, and all their respective network neighbors. The information was
obtained 14 days before and after the events. Details are provided in Section 2.4 and Appendix 2.4.1.
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standard model of peer effects by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) to allow for the incorporation
of local exogenous shocks. I show how the spillover parameter can be uncovered in
two steps: (i) by applying a difference-in-differences strategy to obtain estimates for
the indirect treatment effect (as in Kuhn et al. (2011)) and (ii) by discounting for
higher order spillovers in the network. I also show that bounds can be derived if
the network information cannot be used to account for higher order spillovers. This
illustrates why the estimation strategy is robust to both endogenous network formation
and Manski’s (1993) reflection problem. The resulting model provides a notation to
nest approaches for identifying social effects that are based on exploiting exogenous
(pseudo-) experimental variation5 into a framework which considers network structure.
I apply these techniques to my data and obtain an interval estimator for the structural
spillover parameter of interest. I find that an average increase of ten views on the
neighboring pages results in an increase of 2.22 to 2.92 views on the page in the center.
These bounds are computed using extreme (benchmark) assumptions on the network,
and can be computed even when no information on the link structure is available. My
method for deriving these bounds is an additional contribution to the literature.
My findings allow for a more abstract reading. The hyperlink network between
articles can be interpreted as a citation network and Wikipedia as a peer production
tool for the documentation of human knowledge. Consequently the relevance of my
findings extends to other settings of peer production including open source software
or scientific research. While it is true that my strategy requires a lot from the data6,
recent advances in data handling techniques and the increasing availability of data on
social interactions will provide further applications for this strategy.
In the next section (2.2) I discuss the relevant literature and this paper’s
contributions. The methodological approach is discussed in Section 2.3, which extends
the linear peer effects model and describes identification through local treatments in
networks. Detailed derivations of the estimator and the bounds are in Appendix A.2.
Section 2.4 discusses the data collection and the relevant variables. The empirical
results and how to relate my reduced form estimates to the structural model are
described in Section 2.5. Concluding remarks, limitations and avenues for further
research are offered in Section 2.6. The appendices contains summary statistics,
robustness checks, additional figures and a discussion of why network neighbors should
not react to their neighbor’s treatment.
5Partial population treatments (Moffitt (2001)) or impact evaluation studies based on a two-stage
randomization over sub-populations (villages) and then individuals inside sub-populations.
6Exogenous treatments of individuals in in networks (or groups) could rarely be observed
in previous studies. Researchers often have the network structure and no exogenous source of
identification, or exogenous variation yet no information on the network structure. However, such
data are increasingly available from field experiments or online sources.
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2.2 Literature
Coase’s (1937) insight that production should either be organized in a free market if
market frictions are low, or in a firm if they are high, was fundamentally challenged by
the success of Open Source Software production and Wikipedia. The new coordinating
principle, by which large numbers of people distribute small modules of the total
workload via the web is referred to as commons-based peer production (Benkler 2002
and 2006). The extraordinary past achievements of this production mode illustrate the
deep impact its emergence might have on the economic process and even society as a
whole. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I document the
role of the network for spillovers of attention and for content production in a relevant
setting of peer production - the German Wikipedia. Second, I measure attention
spillovers and quantify how attention is converted into action (contributing content).
Finally, I analyze the heterogeneities in the spillovers in the network. In what follows,
I discuss the streams of the literature that each of these contributions add to.
By analyzing the role of the network for content production in Wikipedia, I add
to previous research, which has analyzed the correlation between a node’s position
in a network and the outcomes of interest (Fershtman and Gandal (2011), Claussen
et al. (2012) or Kummer et al. (2012)). Economists have asked how social networks
influence economic real world outcomes for (at least) two reasons: First, it is important
to understand how a network’s structure affects individuals’ outcomes and to quantify
the resulting overall value of a network and its links. Second, it matters whether the
outcome of our connections or peers influences us, be it positively or negatively. My
paper quantifies the causal effect of the average attention of a focal articles’s neighbors
on the attention of the focal article. Previous research has struggled with the following
empirical problems: The outcome variable might itself drive network position, thus
giving rise to the classic endogeneity problem. Moreover, the reflection problem laid
out by Manski (1993) applies, since nodes influence each other like peers (Bramoulle´
et al. (2009)). This paper circumvents both problems by exploiting local exogenous
treatments of single nodes in Wikipedia’s article network.
A second contribution to the literature is the econometric approach to quantifying
attention spillovers between Wikipedia articles. My formal framework combines
existing approaches and extends it in a novel way. I analyze treatments of neighbors in
a network, but instead of focusing on the effect of treatment I focus on the spillovers of
these treatments and use them as sources of exogenous variation in the attention to such
articles. Moreover, I use the fact that exogenous treatment sometimes affects only a
single node. Such local treatments are analogous to the Partial Population Treatment
that Moffitt (2001) suggested for the analysis of peer effects - not in the context of
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network analysis - to solve the reflection problem Manski (1993).7 There is also a close
relationship to studies that added a higher layer of randomization, which allows the
computation of indirect treatment effects.8 An example is Cre´pon et al. (2013), who
randomize over cities and vary the treatment intensity to study whether labor market
programs have a negative impact on the non-eligible. Studies that use exogenous local
shocks to single individuals could be called “Mini Population Treatments” and this
idea is used increasingly often in recent studies that use network information (Aral and
Walker (2011), Banerjee et al. (2012), Carmi et al. (2012)).
Following the analysis of attention spillovers, I analyze how attention translates
into action. I find a conversion rate of 1000 clicks for 1 edit. These findings highlight
the need of adding an important extra ingredient to modularity and strong leadership
(Benkler and Nissenbaum (2006), Lerner and Tirole (2002)), to guarantee the success
of peer production: If the individuals contribute infrequently, a high overall frequency
of visits is necessary. This reaffirms the potential of ICTs to enable peer production
through their ability to drastically reduce coordination costs. To guarantee that the
content production is exclusively due to attention, I exploit sudden exogenous spikes in
the attention to a neighbor, which affect not only the shocked nodes in a network, but
are also transmitted across links (Carmi et al. (2012)). Such spikes are generated by
large-scale events like natural disasters and accidents or the advertisement of featured
articles on Wikipedia’s start page. Little is known about how attention influences the
decision to contribute to a public good. Several papers show that attention through
blogs or reviews, even negative, can be positively related to purchase and investment
decisions (Barber and Odean (2008), Berger et al. (2010), Hu et al. (2013)). However,
it is typically impossible to measure the amount of attention generated by the publicity
and how it is converted to action.9
7Dahl et al. (2012) provide an example of such an experiment. An alternative approach is to
exogenously vary the composition of peer groups: Zhang and Zhu (2011) uses the fact almost all
Chinese Wikipedia users in mainland China were blocked by the government’s “Chinese fire wall”, to
measure the effect on the incentives to contribute. Also disasters or fatal accidents are frequently used
in similar settings. (Sacerdote (2001), Imberman et al. (2009)), Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004)).
Keegan et al. (2013), who analyze the structure and dynamics of Wikipedia’s coverage of breaking
news events.
8When social effects or spillovers are present, a violation of Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption (SUTVA) compromises the validity of the control group (Ferracci et al. (2012)).
Depending on the application, a second layer (classrooms, villages, districts etc.) can remedy the
issue. (Miguel and Kremer (2003), Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), Kuhn et al. (2011) and many
more).
9Altruism and social image concerns are important drivers of voluntary provision (non-monetary)
of a public good in offline contexts (Carpenter and Myers (2010)). Social effects and attention to
the individual contribution also matter in peer productivity (Shang and Croson (2009), Huberman
et al. (2009)). Yet, studies that precisely quantify how attention converts to contributions and that
disentangle this effect from the other relevant drivers of contributions are rare.
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The last contribution of this paper consists of analyzing whether attention spill
uniformly or whether there are large heterogeneities. I analyze the drivers of the
attention spillovers and subsequent content generation. Only a few papers study
what determines whether spillovers take place or not. Carmi et al. (2012) pioneering
analysis finds that the network structure does well in predicting spillovers on Amazon’s
recommendation network, but their findings are challenged by the fact that spillovers
are also an important driver of Amazon’s algorithm that places and sorts the links.10 I
distinguish articles by their length, by how they are generally linked, and by how closely
they are linked to the shocked articles. Concerning drivers of individual attention to an
item, only few studies have analyzed which items receive collective attention. (Hoffman
and Ocasio (2001), Wu and Huberman (2007)).11 I contribute by analyzing what users
choose, when presented with several options for a click and the subsequent conversion
of awareness to making a voluntary (non-monetary) contribution to a public good.
In conclusion, this paper provides new insights into the dynamics of user activity
in the world’s largest knowledge repository, measures how users allocate their attention,
and how these effects are mediated by node characteristics. It shows how treatments
diffuse across networks if the content items are linked and how attention is converted
into contributions of effort. To the best of my knowledge my results are the first to show
how a citation network influences users’ contributions through channeling attention.
2.3 The Empirical Model
In this section I discuss the empirical model. I first give a basic and informal intuition
of my estimation approach (Subsection 2.3.1). Next I discuss the assumptions made
to identify the effect of the exogenous treatments I use (Subsection 2.3.2) and the
reduced form estimation of the regressions (Subsection 2.3.3). The last and most
extensive subsection (2.3.4) describes the extended linear peer effects model: I discuss
how and under which assumptions the researcher can identify the structural parameter
that measures spillovers from the reduced form estimates if she observes the network
information. In the same section I also show how to compute an upper and a lower
bound for the coefficient when the network information is not available. An important
case where my arguments do not apply are situations where the neighbors of the treated
10Carmi et al. (2012) analyze the effect of the external shocks of recommendations by Oprah Winfrey
on the product network of books on Amazon. They find that a recommendation not only triggers
a spike in sales of the recommended book but also of books adjacent in Amazon’s recommendation
network.
11Viral Marketing studies are concerned with the diffusion of information in a social network,
i.e. mediated by social propagation, rather than repeated individual decisions.(e.g. Aral and Walker
(2011), Ho and Dempsey (2010), Hinz et al. (2011))
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nodes/individuals observe the treatment and adjust their outcome as a reaction.12
Appendix A.3 shows, how the model would have to be extended to include such
a possibility and which challenges to identification of the spillover parameter would
emerge as a result.
2.3.1 Basic Intuition - Throwing Stones into a Pond
This subsection provides an intuitive explanation of the data structure and the
estimation approach. The basic idea of the research approach can be imagined as
“throwing stones into a pond and tracing out the ripples”. The design of this paper
uses the fact that certain nodes were affected by a large increase of attention, that
this was exogeneous, and that ex-post it is known to the researcher when exactly the
pseudo-experiment occurred. Moreover, since the link structure is also known, it is
possible to observe what happens to the directly or indirectly neighboring nodes. As
in a pond, we would expect the largest effect on the directly hit node and a decreasing
amount of additional attention the further away an article is from the epicenter.
The schematic representation in Figure 2.1 shows how the data is structured.
Wikipedia articles are the nodes of the network. They are represented by a circle with
a letter inside. Each circle represents a different article in the German Wikipedia.
Articles are connected to each other via links, which are visible on Wikipedia as
highlighted blue text. Clicking on such text forwards the reader to the next article
and these links form the edges of my directed network. Such links are represented by
a line between two nodes. An important aspect of my identification strategy requires
the observation of two disconnected subnetworks at the same time. This is represented
by network L and network C shown facing each other. I maintain this notation in all
derivations that follow.
I focus on subnetworks around a start node. These start nodes are denoted by
subscript 0. Hence, the start node of the two networks are denoted by `0 and c0.
Consider “today’s featured articles” for a moment: start nodes `0 and c0 could both be
featured articles, so both are eligible for treatment. However, only one of them can be
selected to become “today’s featured article” on any given day. The nodes that receive
a direct link from a start node (direct neighbors) in network L form the set of direct
neighbors L1 and a focal node from that set is sometimes denoted as `1.
13 The set of
indirect neighbors14 in the network L forms L2 and so on. Analogously the set C1 is
12E.g. classmates, that react with protest to an unfair punishment of their peer.
13While the set L0 consists only of one node (L0 = {`0}), set L1 consists of multiple nodes.
14Indirect neighbors are defined as receiving at least one link from a node in set L1 without
themselves being in L1. Hence the shortest path from the start node to an indirect neighbor is
via two clicks.
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Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of a local treatment, which affects only one of the
two subnetworks and there only a single node directly.
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Notes: The figure illustrates the structure of the data. Wikipedia articles are the nodes of the network. Each circle with a
letter inside represents a different article in the German Wikipedia. The eye icons represent attention, while the pencil illustrate
a decision to contribute an edit. Articles are connected to each other via links, which are represented as lines. The design of
this paper uses the fact that certain nodes were affected by a large and exogenous increase of attention, and that it is known
to the researcher when the pseudo-experiment occurred. In this setting this is represented by the two subnetworks L and C.
Both, nodes in L0 and C0, could be hit by a disaster (or are featured articles). Hence they are eligible for treatment. Yet, only
one is actually hit (or becomes “today’s featured article”) at any given day. The coloring illustrates the effect of such a large
local shock on Wikipedia, which affects only subnetwork L. The shocked node is colored in dark blue, the direct neighbors are
colored in light blue and so on. If we observe a valid second network from which it is possible to infer what the outcomes would
have been if no treatment had taken place, we can use these outcomes for comparing the size of the outcomes layer by layer.
In general the network may be directed or undirected (Wikipedia articles are directed). The figure draws on a representation
in a working paper on network formation by Claussen, Engelstaetter and Ward.
the direct neighbors of the start node in network C, and C2 is the indirect neighbors
of node c0.
In a typical network in which the outcome of the individual nodes depends on the
outcome of their neighbors we would observe many correlations and cross influences.
However, it would be difficult to discern where they originate from or whether they
are due to underlying and unobserved background factors which merely affect the
nodes in similar ways. The coloring in Figure 2.1 illustrates the mechanism of local
exogenous shocks (“the stone in a pond”). The shocked node is colored in dark blue,
the direct neighbors are colored in light blue and so on. As I will show formally in
the next sections, identification of the spillover hinges on the ability to observe a valid
counterfactual from which to infer what the outcomes would have been if no treatment
had taken place. If this is possible, we can compare the outcomes layer by layer. More
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information about how the layers are identified and obtained is provided in Section
2.4.
2.3.2 Identifying Assumptions for the Treatment Effects
The spillover parameter will be evaluated by estimating difference-in-differences for
each layer separately. To clarify the assumptions in the reduced form estimation by
layer, I use the control-treatment notation from the impact evaluation literature (cf.
Angrist and Pischke (2008)). First, this highlights similarities to the Partial Population
Treatment (cf. Moffitt (2001)). Second, it aids the understanding of the assumptions
made here. Terminology and notation are inspired by Kuhn et al. (2011).15
Direct Effect of Treatment: Consider a node in network i ∈ {`, c} in period t.
The direct treatment effect measures the effect of treatment on the treated. We would
like to compare the observed outcome after treatment to the unobservable outcome of
the same individual if we had not treated them.
E[y1`0,t|d`0,t = 1]− E[y0`0,t|d`0,t = 1] (2.1)
` denotes the subnetwork which is treated in period t and c the subnetwork that is not.
di,t indicates if node i itself was directly treated. Superscript 1 denotes the outcome of
a treated observation and 0 the outcome of the untreated counterpart. E[y0`0,t|d`0,t = 1]
is the unobservable counterfactual.
We estimate this counterfactual term using a comparable node16 in a period where
it is not treated. I take two approaches to obtain such an estimate: (i) a simple approach
compares the observation “before and after” the treatment. It attributes all observed
changes in outcomes to the treatment.17
Assumption Direct Treatment Effect before-after:
E[y0`0,t|d`0,t = 1] = E[y0`0,t−1|d`0,t−1 = 0] (2.2)
The “before and after” counterfactual estimate maximizes the similarity between the
treated and untreated observations. However, it will fail to capture any period-
specific effects that would have affected all nodes even absent treatment. Any weekday
15Readers who know the estimation of direct and indirect treatment effects might wish to merely
browse the formulas or skip this subsection. The identifying assumption will be: Absent treatment,
the control observations have a similar rate of change across time to the treated subnetworks. They
must grow at similar rates and be affected similarly by any Wikipedia wide dynamics such as weekdays
etc.
16A node, which is believed to be affected by treatment in similar ways.
17If the object/individual was observed more than once before treatment it might be possible to
further improve this approach by accounting for trends in the outcomes etc.
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fluctuations, shocks etc. will be attributed to the treatment. (ii) Alternatively,
“difference-in-differences” uses individuals in the same populations, which were not
eligible for treatment, or here, eligible individuals in untreated subpopulations. The
unobservable counterfactual outcomes of the treated nodes are assumed to be the
treated nodes’ pre-treatment outcome plus the change of the non-treated control
observation.
Assumption Direct Treatment Effect-DiD:
E[y0`0,t|d`0,t = 1] = E[y0`0,t−1|d`0,t−1 = 0] + (2.3)
+ {E[y0c0,t|dc0,t = 0]− E[y0c0,t−1|dc0,t−1 = 0]}
Note that in the context of Wikipedia articles, the crucial assumption is not that articles
are very similar but that they evolve in a similar way. On average they have similar
growth in readership and edits and are subject to similar intertemporal fluctuations.
Indirect Treatment Effects: The ITE measures the spillover or externality
effect of treatment of eligibles on the outcomes of non-eligibles. As for the direct
treatment effect, we cannot observe the outcome of the non-eligibles had the eligibles
not been treated. Knowing the distance to the treatment’s epicenter, I can compare the
nodes of the subnetworks by layer. ITE1 refers to the effect on direct neighbors, ITE2
for indirect neighbors and so on.18 My dataset requires even more involved notation
because I differentiate nodes along four dimensions (treatment, time, distance and
subnetwork). I use Dxr,t as shorthand that takes the value 1 if both of the following
conditions are simultaneously satisfied: (i) subnetwork x was treated and (ii) there
exists a treated node exactly r steps away by the shortest route. For direct neighbors
we have:
ITE1 = E[y
1
`1,t|D1`1,t, d0i,t]− E[y0`1,t|D1`1,t, d0i,t] (2.4)
As before, d1i,t indicates if node i was directly treated in period t.
19 y1`r,t is now
the outcome if some neighbor in Dxr was treated in t, and y
0
`r,t denotes the outcome if
nobody in that set was treated.
18Well known papers that estimate ITE1s are Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), Kuhn et al. (2011)
or Cre´pon et al. (2013), to name a few. Miguel and Kremer (2003) include distance layers in the
estimation to incorporate a similar notion of distance to treatment in a real world setup.
19To save space treatment status is indicated by superscripts, d0i,t otherwise. Notation has to be
more involved here, because it is no longer possible to talk of a single node, as the treated nodes can
have many different neighbors.
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The object of interest is the ITEr, Generally, for any range r:
ITEr = E[y
1
`r,t|D1`r,t, d0i,t]− E[y0`r,t|D1`r,t, d0i,t] (2.5)
As in the direct treatment effect, I have to estimate the counterfactual outcome using
two methods: (i) a“before and after”comparison (ii) a difference-in-differences between
neighbors in the comparison subnetwork.
Assumption ITEr-before-after:
E[y0`r,t|D1`r,t, d0i,t] = E[y0`r,t−1|D0`r,t−1, d0i,t−1] (2.6)
Estimating an ITEr from a “before and after” estimation has the same advantages and
drawbacks as the direct treatment effect. Analogously, the drawbacks can be accounted
for by computing a difference-in-differences estimator. In the context of an ITE, we
need to observe comparable, but untreated, subpopulations.20
Assumption ITEr-DiD:
E[y0`r,t|D1`r,t, d0i,t] = E[y0`r,t−1|D0`r,t−1, d0i,t−1] + (2.7)
+ {E[y0cr,t|D0cr,t, d0i,t]− E[y0cr,t−1|D0cr,t−1, d0i,t−1]}
The counterfactual is estimated by last period’s value plus the comparison group’s rate
of change. The same assumptions apply as for the direct treatment effect difference-
in-differences. Before moving on to the econometric specification, I conclude this
section by summarizing the identification result in terms of the difference-in-differences
estimator:
Conclusion ITEr DiD: If Assumption ITEr-DiD holds, the difference below identifies
the ITEr.
ITEr = E[y
1
`r,t|D1`r,t, d0i,t]− {E[y0`r,t−1|D0`r,t−1, d0i,t−1] + (2.8)
+ (E[y0cr,t|D0cr,t, d0i,t]− E[y0cr,t−1|D0cr,t−1, d0i,t−1])}
Hence, our estimator of the ITE1 is based on the pre-treatment outcomes and
comparing the change in the outcomes of direct neighbors of the eligible nodes in
a treated subnetwork to the direct neighbors of the eligible nodes in the non-treated
subnetwork. Thus, (indirectly) treated and control observations must grow at similar
rates and be affected similarly by any dynamics that affect the entire Wikipedia
20 Ideally we would like to observe a random selection of the subpopulations in which any treatments
are to be administered, and in the second step we administer treatment to the eligible nodes. Moreover,
we observe both subpopulations before the treatment of one takes place.
18 CHAPTER 2. SPILLOVERS IN CONTENT NETWORKS
(weekday dynamics etc.). Note that this conclusion also applies to the direct treatment
effect, when setting r to 0.
2.3.3 Reduced Form Analysis
To obtain the ITEs for each layer, I apply reduced form regressions which allow the
understanding of the impact of the local treatment on both the treated pages and
their neighbors. These are very similar in spirit to the analysis in Carmi et al. (2012).
The idea is to compare pages grouped by their distance to the page which experiences
treatment to their analogue in the control group (L0 to C0, L1 to C1,...). I denote all
reduced form coefficients by φ. Furthermore, I define “treatment” for each set of pages
along the lines of the indirect treatment effects (ITEr) in the previous section.
21 I let s
indicate the day relative to day 0, the day when the treatment is administered. Hence s
runs from -14 to 14. λs is an indicator, which takes the value 1 if t = s and 0 otherwise.
Each set of pages that corresponds to one layer in the network is regressed seperately.
So if I focus on the treated nodes, the neighbors and the indirect neighbors, it results
in the following system of fixed effect regression equations, which all are based only on
dummy variables:
L0.) Difference in Differences specification at level L0
22:
yit = φ
L0
i +
∑
s∈S
φL01,sλs +
∑
s∈S
φL02,s(λs ∗ treatL0,i) + ξit (2.9)
...treatL0: treatment on the very page; S = {−14, ..., 14}
L1.) At level L1 (treatL1 means the shock is 1 click away):
yit = φ
L1
i +
∑
s∈S
φL11,sλs +
∑
s∈S
φL12,s(λs ∗ treatL1,i) + ξit (2.10)
L2.) At level L2 (treatL2 means the shock is 2 clicks away):
yit = φ
L2
i +
∑
s∈S
φL21,sλs +
∑
s∈S
φL22,s(λs ∗ treatL2,i) + ξit (2.11)
21The dummy in the regression for the neighbors (sets L1 and C1) takes the value 1, not if the
node was itself treated, but if the corresponding start node (`0) was treated in t (and 0 otherwise).
22The specifications I use are fairly standard“regression difference in differences”similar to Jacobson
et al. (1993) or as described in Angrist and Pischke (2008).
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In words, I run the same difference-in-differences on three levels (on L0, L1 and L2
(shown only for large events)). treatL0,i is an indicator variable for a page that is
(going to be) featured on Wikipedia’s main page, treatL2,i takes the value of 1 for
pages that are two clicks away from pages that are (going to be) affected by such a
shock. The cross terms correspond to this indicator variable multiplied with the time
dummies. Thus, a cross term captures whether treatment has occurred at a given point
in time or not. For an observation in the control-group this variable will always take a
value of 0, while for an observation in the treated group this variable will take a value
of 1 if it corresponds to the event time the time-dummy aims to capture. Hence, if the
treatment is effective, the coefficients of the cross terms are expected to be 0 before
treatment occurs and positive for the periods after the treatment. The ITEs from the
previous subsection are captured by the φ2 coefficient that corresponds to day 0 in the
regressions above. I look at φL12,0 for the ITE1, which corresponds to L1 and analogously
at φL02,0 for L0 and φ
L2
2,0 for L2.
Other than the cross terms I also include page fixed effects and another full set
of time dummies (event time) to control for general (e.g. weekday-specific) activity
patterns in Wikipedia. This procedure is crude because it does not consider several
important factors such as how well neighbors are linked among each other or how large
the peak of interest is on the originally shocked page. Yet, it is useful, since the results
from the reduced form analysis are based on minimal assumptions and provide guidance
as to whether attention spillovers exist at all. They also allow us to see how far they
carry over, and whether they result in increased production. Finally, they allow me to
provide a lower bound and an upper bound estimate of the aggregate spillover effects
to be expected.
2.3.4 Structural Form Analysis and Bounds
Beyond measuring the size of the ITE, I am interested in quantifying the size of the
spillovers of attention that exist between Wikipedia articles on normal days. In this
section, I augment the well known linear-in-means model for peer effects, as formulated
in Manski (1993), with exogenous shocks. Departing from the version that was used
by Bramoulle´ et al. (2009),23 I show how exogenous shocks can be exploited to identify
spillovers (or peer effects). This is possible in my modification of the model, even if
the nodes characteristics or the network structure are endogenous. In other words,
exogenous shocks are used as a focal lens to identify the spillovers, which is usually
very challenging. In this section I provide only the point of departure and the main
23They show how identification of peer effects can be achieved in social networks, using an IV-
strategy.
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results. The details and derivations can be found in Appendix A.2.24
Recall that the underlying relationship of interest is the role of links.25 How much
attention spills via links can be modeled using the well known linear-in-means model
of the type discussed in Manski (1993), who shows that the coefficient of interest is
generally very hard to identify. I start from the same form of model.26
yit = α
∑
j∈Pit yjt
NPit
+Xit−1β + γ
∑
j∈Pit Xjt−1
NPit
+ it
yit denotes the outcome of interest in period t and Xit−1 are i’s observed characteristics
at the end of period t− 1.27 Pit is the set of i’s peers and NPit the number of i’s peers.
The coefficient of interest is α: It captures the effect of the performance of i’s peers
and in the present context it measures how the views of an article are influenced by
the views of the adjacent articles. The coefficient vector β accounts for the impact of
i’s own characteristics and γ measures the effect of the peers’ average characteristics
on i’s performance. In the setting of this paper β accounts for how the page’s own
length or quality might affect how often it is viewed and γ captures how length and
quality of neighboring pages affect views of page i. Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) suggest a
more succinct representation based on vector and matrix notation:
yt = αGyt + βXt−1 + γGXt−1 + t E[t|Xt−1] = 0
A few remarks: G is a NxN matrix. Gij =
1
NPi−1
if i receives a link from j and Gij = 0
otherwise. Clearly this model and, specifically, measuring the social parameter α is of
interest to a very large literature. To incorporate exogeneous variation, I augment this
model by including a vector of treatments, which for simplicity, is assumed to take the
value of 1 for treated nodes and the value of 0 otherwise.
yt = αGyt + Xt−1β + γGXt−1 + δ1Dt + t E[t|Dt] = 0 (2.12)
For the treated side Dt is a vector consisting of zeros and ones that indicates
which nodes are treated. On the untreated subnetwork we have Dt = 0, a vector of
zeros. In some of the proofs and in my application I will assume a local treatment that
affects only a single node. This captures the notion of a local treatment condition,
24The derivations involve quite heavy notation, but are otherwise relatively straightforward.
25The mechanism we have in mind, is that attention from article A can be diverted to article B if
a link exists. This is interesting, since some of the users who get to see B might later start to edit it.
26Note that it is easy to add a fixed effect to the model, but that it will be eliminated when taking
differences. Consequently, I omit it for ease of notation.
27Note, that I can observe the current state of a Wikipedia article once a day at a fixed time.
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under which only one node is exposed to treatment (a “mini population treatment”).
Formally this is written as Dt = e`0; that is, a vector of zeros and a unique one in the
coordinate that corresponds to the treated node.
Note that I do not require that the structure of the network (G) to be the result
of an exogenous network formation process. Rather only the selection which of the
eligible node that gets treated must be exogenous.28 It is worth stressing that my
setup is fundamentally different from Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) because it will use an
entirely different source of identification. Moreover, there will be no requirements
needed concerning the linear independence of G and G2.
In this model, the reduced form expectation conditional on “treatment” is given
by:
E[yt|Dt] = (I− αG)−1[(β + γG)E[Xt−1|Dt] + δ1Dt] (2.13)
Define the set of observations in the subnetwork where treatment occurs in t by
the subscript ` and a comparison group in which no node is treated by the subscript c.
If these sets of nodes can also be observed one period earlier, a difference-in-differences
estimator can be computed.
Result 1: Denote the difference in differences estimator as
DiD := {E[y`,t|D`,t]− E[y`,t−1|D`,t−1]} − {E[yc,t|Dc,t]− E[yc,t−1|Dc,t−1]}
and assume that the treatment affects only the contemporary outcome of the treated
node and not its exogenous characteristics.29 Then the DiD contains the following
quantity:
DiD = δ1Dt(I + αG + α
2G2 + α3G3 + ...)
Proof: For a proof please refer to Appendix A.2.3.
In words, this result means that the node is affected by both treatment and second
and higher order spillovers, the positive feedback loop that ensues as the neighbors
increase their performance in sync with their peers. Instances of higher order effects30
28In the present application, all “eligible” nodes (featured articles) are equally likely to be treated.
They are the nodes in the group L0. Neighbors (in L1) are typically not featured. Hence they are not
eligible and naturally less likely to be themselves treated.
29The independent characteristics X should not be immediately affected by treatment because this
would threaten the identification of the spillover. However, they may adjust over time. As long as
we can observe one period where only the outcome is affected, but not the characteristics, the result
holds.
30Note that I am considering the homogeneous network, so all spillovers have the same magnitude.
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are α2δ1 in the second round or α
3δ1 in the third round and so on. The other important
factor is whether and how often spillovers of a given order q arrive. This depends on
the number of indirect paths of length q that go from the shocked node `0 to any focal
node j.31
Note the close relationship to the Bonacich centrality in the paper by Ballester
et al. (2006), who aim at identifying the “key player” of a network. Like in their
framework, the number of channels for indirect spillovers matters. Yet, for measuring
spillovers in a “mini population treatment” we care about the reverse direction, the
quantity that spills from the shocked node to any other node.
My result shows that the difference-in-differences approach alone will not directly
reveal α, the social parameter of interest, because nodes might have a feedback effect
on each other. The neighbor’s change in performance (due to the original impulse) will
affect the neighbors’ neighbors, but also feed back to the originally treated `0-node.
The estimator will observe all the changes in outcome at the end of this process, when
all higher order spills have taken place.
In some applications this will be the object of interest to the researcher. However,
in the present context, the research is motivated by the desire to know the effect of
the link structure and not of the treatment per se. Consequently it is warranted to dig
deeper in order to understand the structural parameters.
Computing the parameters is not necessarily feasible, because it requires
knowledge of the complete link structure. However, a closer look at the nodes
independently reveals that limited information about the link structure suffices to
acquire additional information about the parameters. In the following two subsections
I show how to get the point estimate for the peer effects coefficient if the network is
known and I show how to derive upper and lower bound estimates for the parameter
if no information about the network is available.
Estimator of the Peer Effects Parameter if the Network Structure can be
Observed
If the network structure can be observed, the peer effect parameter α can be backed out
by computing the higher orders of the network graph (G-matrix). To know how many
spillovers arrive in each round, it suffices to focus on the entries Gij,G
2
ij,G
3
ij, etc.(i =
`0) that document the number of paths via 1, 2, 3 and more links from the treated
node to the neighboring node in question. With this information it is straightforward to
31In the proof I need to assume that the network formation process is not affected by the treatment.
I checked this assumption in my “today’s featured article application” and verified, that link formation
remains on low levels. If anything, there is an increase by 0.2 in-links per article in sync with the peak
in edits, but not with clicks. I conclude that this is an acceptably small source of potential bias.
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compute by how much the observed effect at the node in question has to be discounted
and to use this information to compute the true average effect.
Upper and Lower Bound Estimates of the Peer Effects Parameter if the
Network Structure is Unobserved
If the network structure cannot be observed, it is still possible to obtain boundary
estimates for the peer effects based merely on two separate comparisons of (i) the
directly treated nodes and their counterparts (L0 vs. C0) in the control group and (ii)
their neighbors (L1 vs. C1). This is relevant in many empirical settings, because
randomization and information on the network together are rarely available. In
contrast, a separate comparison of eligible and non-eligible nodes in randomly treated
communities or networks (without network information) can frequently be observed.
Also with this restricted knowledge it is possible to obtain a lower bound estimate
for the coefficient α, if the researcher is willing to make more rigorous, but sensible,
assumptions. In what follows I briefly show how to obtain the bounds. The idea
behind this derivation is to select two specific “extreme” types of network which either
minimize or maximize second and higher order spillovers. These benchmark networks
are schematically represented in Figure 2.2. I use a directed network with only“outward
bound” links emanating from `0 to `1 ∈ L1 to obtain the upper bound estimate of the
social/spillover parameter α.32 The opposed benchmark is a fully connected network,
where every node is the direct neighbor of every one of its peers. From there I obtain
the lower bound estimate of the social parameter. A more detailed account is provided
in Appendix A.2.4.
Upper Bound: If we ignore higher order spillovers,33 we can obtain an upper
bound estimate for the direct treatment effect (δ1) by applying the difference-in-
differences estimator on the level of directly treated nodes (L0) and a suitable
comparison group (C0). After that I can move on to estimate the upper bound for
the parameters for spillovers (α) by combining it with a second difference-in-differences
estimator at the neighbor level. Let DiD(`a−ca) denote such a difference-in-differences,
(a ∈ {0, 1}), where the nodes are either in the center of the network (L0 or C0) or are
the neighbors of the start nodes (L1 vs. C1):
δˆ1 = D̂iD0 = ∆ˆ`0− ∆ˆc0 (2.14)
αˆ =
D̂iD1
D̂iD0
NP`1
32For this benchmark we ignore any existing links among L1 nodes.
33Or maintain the assumption that we can observe the nodes’ performance before any higher order
spillovers arrive at the treated node
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Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of the two extreme networks, used to compute
the upper and lower bound estimates of the parameters of interest.
Network A (outbound) Network B (fully connected)
Notes: The “ outbound network” (left) is used to obtain the upper bound estimate. It is a directed
network with only “outward bound” links. This implies ignoring any existing links among L1 nodes.
Holding the number of nodes and the observed ITEs fixed, the social parameter will be estimated to be
largest in this type of network. The fully connected network (right), is the benchmark case from which
the lower bound of the social parameter can be estimated.
 ∆ˆ`0 := 1
NP`0
∗∑i(yi,`0,t=1 − yi,`0,t=0)
 ∆ˆc0 := 1
NPc0
∗∑i(yi,c0,t=1 − yi,c0,t=0)
with D̂iD1 = ∆ˆ`1− ∆ˆc1 and the definitions of ∆ˆ`1 and ∆ˆc1 paralleling those of ∆ˆ`0
and ∆ˆc0. In my application’s reduced form estimations of the previous section DiD1
corresponds to φL12,0 and DiD0 is estimated by φ
L0
2,0. This upper bound estimator would
be suitable under the potentially quite strong assumption that higher order spillovers
are negligible. I proceed to show how to compute the lower bound estimates under the
assumption of maximal second order spillovers. The lower bound gives an idea of the
maximal size of the problem that might result from trusting the easily computed upper
bound estimates.
Lower Bound: It is also possible to compute a lower bound estimate for α and
δ1. This bound can be obtained by imagining that the network is fully connected, i.e.
every node links to every other node, assuming that all effects are of the same sign,
strictly ordered and (w.l.o.g) positive.34 Further computations in Appendix A.2 show
that in a network with N nodes, the lower bound of the estimator for α is characterized
34The precise assumption is DiD0 > DiD1 > HO
B > 0, as stated and explained in Lemma A.1
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by the solution to the following quadratic equation:
α2 − [DiD0
DiD1
+ (N − 1)]α + (N − 1) = 0 (2.15)
This equation has two solutions, one of which lies between 0 and 1. The closed
form solution for α is hence given by:
α =
1
2
[
DiD0
DiD1
+ (N − 1)]−
√
1
4
[
DiD0
DiD1
+ (N − 1)]2 − (N − 1) (2.16)
Recall that all the quantities required are readily available from the reduced form
estimations. DiD1 corresponds to φ
L1
2,0 and DiD0 is estimated by φ
L0
2,0. In Appendix
A.2.4 I provide a proof for my claims and explain how this bound is derived. Which of
the estimates is more accurate will depend on the size of the spillover effect, but to a
very large extent also on the real network structure and the number of nodes.
A closer examination of Result 1 reveals that the upper bound estimator would
be quite suitable if the researcher has reasons to make the (potentially quite strong)
assumption that higher order spillovers are negligible. It would also be appropriate in
networks with very sparse connections among its members. The lower bound estimator
might be more suitable if the researcher believes the network to be highly connected
and expects the spillover coefficient to be relatively large.35 The bounds have several
limitations (cf. Appendix A.2.4) and for some applications the bounds might turn out
to be too wide to be actually informative. Still, taken together, the bounds can provide
a useful first characterization of the spillover parameters in question.
2.4 Data
This section briefly surveys the data collection procedure in Subsection 2.4.1, and
describes the datasets used both for disasters (large events) and “today’s featured
article” (Subsection 2.4.2). A more detailed description of how the underlying database
was put together and the procedure I used to extract the dataset is provided in
Appendix A.1.
35So large that α2 and α3 are still sizeable.
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2.4.1 Data Preparation - Treated and Control Group
To obtain my dataset I augment the publicly available data dumps provided by the
Wikimedia Foundation36 with data on the link structure between articles, data on the
download frequency of pages and information on major media events which occurred
during our period of observation. The data I use are based on 153 weeks of the entire
German Wikipedia’s revision history between December 2007 and December 2010.37
I use 23 large-scale events, 34 articles that were featured on Wikipedia’s main
page, and all their respective network neighbors. “Featured articles” were found by
consulting the German Wikipedia’s archive of pages that were selected to be advertised
on Wikipedia’s main page (“Seite des Tages”). To identify major events, I consulted the
corresponding page on Wikipedia. I focus on the content provision that results from
attention spillovers and which is a consequence of the spike in interest and the resulting
improvements to the linked pages. Hence, I will not focus on the treated pages where
content generation might be related to the events directly. Instead I obtained data on
the direct and indirect network neighbors.
For each primary shock I obtain two sets of control observations. The first set is
based on pages which are similar but unlikely to be affected by the treatment. I selected
other featured articles and neighbors thereof that were advertised either later or earlier
in time. This gives me a set C1control which is similar in both size and characteristics
to the sampled pages (before the shock). The second set is obtained by extracting
the data based on treated pages a second time, but 42 days before the actual shock
occurred. I refer to the articles in this “placebo-treatment” as C1placebo.
The resulting dataset contains information on views and content generation
of almost 13,000 articles, 14 days before and after the events (more than 750,000
observations). Table 2.8 shows which events were included in the “today’s featured
article” dataset and the associated number of observations for each of the conditions.
Column 1 shows the number of articles that belong to each featured article. Columns
2-4 show the corresponding number of observations, separated by treatment status.38
Table 2.9 shows the information for the data on large events which includes both natural
disasters as well as technical or economic catastrophes. More details about the data
preparation and selection of the events are provided in Appendix A.1.
36I have access to a database that was put together in a joint effort of the University of Tu¨bingen,
the IWM Tuebingen and the ZEW Mannheim. It is based on data from the German project, which
currently has roughly 1.4M articles and thus provides us with a very large number of articles to
observe.
37The data were stored in a relational database (disk-based) and queried using Database Supported
Haskell (DSH) (Giorgidze et al. (2010)).
38Observations range from 2,088 to 33,872, covering various topics such as innovations (CCD-
sensor), art history (Carolingian book illustrations) or soccer clubs (Werder Bremen).
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2.4.2 A Closer Look at the Datasets
Summary statistics for the data on large events are shown in Table 2.7. The data
contains 425,981 observations from 7,379. From the table it can be seen that the average
page contains 5658 bytes of content and has undergone 84 revisions. However, the
median is substantially lower at 3885 bytes and only 40 revisions. Also, the summary
statistics of the first differences (variables starting with“Delta:”) reveal that on a typical
day nothing happens on a given page on Wikipedia. This highlights the necessity of
using major events as a focal lense for analyzing activity on Wikipedia,39 which is
confirmed by the visual inspection of the direct and indirect effect of treatments.
In Figure 2.3 I plot the average clicks (top row) and the average number of added
revisions (bottom) for the three groups of pages zero clicks away (left column), one
click away (middle column) and two clicks away (right column). Each of the plots
features four lines. The bold blue line represents the treated group or its neighbors
when they were actually treated, hence “treated in treatment phase”. The dashed red
line represents the same group but during the placebo treatment at an earlier point
in time. The thin green line (“not treated, treatment phase”) shows the control group
at the time when the real shock occurred and the thin dotted yellow line represents
the “unrelated” observations, which are never treated and observed in the placebo
period.40 The left column shows the control group and the article about the incident
(“event page”; L0), which are created only after the onset of the event. Most of these
23 pages did not exist at all before the onset of the event and therefore only a few
have a placebo condition available. The upper row shows that the directly affected
pages experience a very large spike of 8,500 clicks per day on average. The number of
additional revisions peaks on the first days of treatment, when the pages are created:
an average of almost forty revisions are added to a page on the first day. On the pages
that are to share a reciprocal a link from the treated page the effect is quite large: while
the clicks on the average L1 page increase by 2,500, the absolute value of the average
increase in revision activity is only five. When I look at pages that are two clicks away,
the effects are much smaller, especially for revisions, but quite pronounced. The clicks
on the average adjacent page go up by 35 and the absolute value of the average increase
in revision activity is already no more than 0.04.
A summary of the data from “featured articles” are shown in Table 2.6. The data
39Further descriptive analyses that compare treated and control groups before and during treatment
show that the groups are very similar in their activity levels before the shocks occurred and that the
control group did not change its behavior during treatment. These tables and their description were
omitted for reasons of brevity. They are available from the author upon request.
40For greater ease of representation I included a graphical representation of only two variables.
The summary statistics for these groups before and after treatment are also available as tables upon
request.
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Figure 2.4: “Today’s featured articles”: Comparing average clicks (new edits) of treated
pages (and neighbors) to three comparison groups.
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Notes: The figure shows the results for featured articles that were advertised for a full day on Wikipedia’s main
page. The left column shows the average outcome on the directly treated pages (set “L0” containing 63 pages total),
the lower row for the pages one click away (set “L1”, which contains 5,489 pages). The upper row shows the average
number of clicks the lower row shows the average number of edits.
contains 317,550 observations from 5,489 pages41 on the main variables. Note that this
corresponds to a much smaller number of pages per treatment, which is due to the fact
that I focus on the directly linked pages in this condition. The table shows that the
median page contains 4833 bytes of content and has undergone 48 revisions. In this
sample, the mean is substantially higher at 6794 bytes and 95 revisions. As before, the
summary statistics of the first differences show how little activity occurs on a normal
day on any given page on Wikipedia.
Figure 2.4 plots the aggregate dynamics around the day when the start node was
shown on Wikipedia’s main page and corresponds to Figure 2.3 for the large event
41Since pages were observed also in the placebo condition, each page is sampled twice, and hence
I observe 10,950 distinct time series.
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condition. I plot the average clicks (left column) and the average number of added
revisions (right columns), but now only for the treated pages and direct neighbors. As
before, each of the four figures contains four lines, one for each condition that can be
obtained by combining treatment (yes/no) and placebo (yes/no). The major difference
to the large events condition is the brevity of the treatment. Attention rises from typical
levels, below 50 views, to more than 4200 views on average, but immediately returns
to the old levels the day after treatment is administered. A very similar pattern can be
observed for the neighbors where attention is almost twice as high as on a usual day
and then falls back to the old levels. A similar pattern can be observed for the number
of revisions. Excepting large events, activity rises already before t = 0. Nevertheless,
on the day of treatment the spike of activity is also pronounced for the neighbors.42
2.5 Estimation Results
In what follows I present my estimation results and discuss their interpretation. Before
I proceed with the details of my estimations, it is worth recalling a few important
facts. The point of departure of the estimations in this paper is estimating Equation
2.11 (Section 2.3.3) for large events and Equation 2.10 for “featured articles” . This
is due to two reasons: first, the two conditions differ in how local the treatments are.
Second, only the“featured articles” exist at the time of treatment, while the page at the
center of a large event treatment typically does not exist and will instead be created
in the following days.
Moreover, I avoid potentially endogenous link formation during treatment by
considering only links that had been in place a week before the treatment. When a
page is found to lie in both the treatment and control groups it is excluded from the
estimation, because including such pages will bias the estimated coefficients towards
zero. Extremely broad pages with a very large number of links (e.g. pages that
correspond to years) were excluded from estimation to avoid biases from oversampling.
Finally, I use the seven observations from two weeks before treatment (days -14 through
to -8) as the reference group in the estimations and I include only flow variables such
as views, new revisions, new authors etc. to guarantee that my results are not driven
42Note that I cannot cleanly estimate the direct treatment effect if the treatment drastically
increased the number of links. (cf. Comola and Prina (2013)). This may be a minor issue for
disasters and, if important, introduces noise in the quantification of the conversion rates. I checked
this for “today’s featured articles” and found that it is a minor issue. Link formation increases by 0.2
new in-links over 120 in-links per article on average on the day after treatment. It moves in sync with
the peak in edits, but not with clicks. This is a small source of potential bias resulting from the edit
activity, but is unlikely to affect viewership. Hence, the result from “today’s features articles” are my
preferred estimates.
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by any anticipation effects.43 The following two subsections report the results for both
conditions.
2.5.1 Large Events
Table 2.1: Large events: clicks/added revisions over time for indirect neighbors.
clicks new edits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
before after compare control compare placebo before after compare control compare placebo
t = -2 4.442 3.172 3.487 0.011 0.010 0.015
(4.372) (4.709) (4.545) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
t = -1 2.639 0.978 3.144 0.022*** 0.010 0.026***
(3.040) (3.993) (3.742) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
t = 0 33.661** 37.391** 36.047** 0.006 0.003 0.021*
(14.471) (14.421) (14.386) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
t = 1 32.794*** 35.020*** 35.397*** 0.055** 0.049** 0.062**
(11.075) (11.098) (11.113) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
t = 2 42.375*** 38.767*** 44.730*** 0.034*** 0.037** 0.043***
(13.671) (13.650) (13.589) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
t = 3 30.066*** 22.069** 30.895*** 0.027*** 0.021* 0.025**
(8.283) (9.168) (8.730) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
t = 4 22.871*** 17.601** 21.918*** 0.027** 0.026** 0.028**
(6.850) (7.065) (6.917) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Constant 30.795*** 29.900*** 29.994*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(2.296) (1.001) (1.289) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
All cross Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 52360 162338 104214 49980 154959 99477
Number of Pages 2380 7379 4737 2380 7379 4737
Adj. R2 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
Notes: The table shows the relationship of clicks/added revisions and time dummies for indirect neighbors of shocked articles
(2 clicks away from epicenter) in the large events condition. The reduced form regressions estimate the ITE . Columns (1)-(3)
show the results for clicks and Columns (4-6) for new edits to the articles. Specification (1) and (4) show a simple ’before
and after’; (2) and (5) contrast treated and comparison group; Columns (3) and (6) show the comparison of treated articles
with themselves but seven weeks earlier (placebo treatment). Fixed Effects Panel-Regressions with heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors. The unit of observations is the outcome of a page i on day t. The time variable is normalized and runs from
-14 to 14.; Only crossterms closer to treatment are shown, but all were included. Reference group t-14 to t-5; standard errors
in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; no. of obs. = 323158; no. of clusters = 44; no. of articles = 7379.
For this group the estimation concerns the set of L2 pages that are two clicks away
from the epicenter: the future page about the disaster. This is not because closer pages
43Anticipation effects are impossible for disasters but cannot be entirely ruled out in the “featured
articles” condition, where sophisticated users, who can obtain the information about pages that are
going to be presented soon. In fact the editors of the daily featured article, have to edit the article
in the week before it is advertised, to make sure it fits into the corresponding box on Wikipedia’s
main page. This alone results in increased activity during the week before treatment. After carefully
studying this process, I am not very concerned about this feature of the data, because the magnitude
of the day-0 effect suggests that the vast majority of attention influx is due to readers who do not
anticipate which page is to be advertised.
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are uninteresting, but because the shock of the analyzed events is very big and likely
to directly affect pages that will eventually be directly and bidirectionally linked. If,
for example, a city in the province under consideration was hit by the earthquake, the
added content on that page might simply cover this very fact. In such a case, this is not
an improvement that arose from the increased attention that results from the adjacent
event, but a change that is directly caused by the treatment. As explained above, this
is not the effect I am primarily interested in. Consequently I focus on pages that were
indirectly linked at the time of the shock and that never became directly linked. These
articles are no longer likely to be directly affected by the treatment on the page two
clicks away.44 Moreover, to ensure that my L2 pages are not directly related to the
event I checked whether a page that was in L2 when I evaluated the network a week
before the shock was going to be linked to the page of the disaster later. Since this
indicates a potential direct relationship, I eliminated such pages from the sample.
The results of the estimation of the model for L2 nodes are shown in Table 2.1.
The table shows the results for clicks in the first three columns and the results for the
number of added revisions in Columns 4,5 and 6. All the specifications are OLS panel
regressions which include a fixed effect for the page and standard errors are clustered
on the event level (23 clusters). Column (1) and (4) shows the results of a simple before
and after. Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 show the contrast in the difference-in-differences. Note
that I run each regression twice to take advantage of my two comparison groups: first
I contrast the treated pages against the control group and then I contrast it with the
placebo treatment, i.e. with the treated articles themselves, but simulating a (placebo)
treatment 42 days (i.e. 7 weeks) before the real shock.
For ease of representation the table only shows the coefficients for the cross terms
from two periods before the shock until four periods after the shock. Until the onset of
the event (periods -2 to -1), we would expect insignificant effects for the cross terms and
after the event has occurred a positive effect would imply that some form of spillover
is present. As in the visual evidence, the average increase in clicks relative to the
control group (Column 1) amounts to 35-38.7 more clicks on average. For the placebo
treatment (Column 2) this effect is almost equal, but a bit larger from the second day
onwards.
Does the spillover in attention also translate to additional content generation?
Obviously, this question matters for the relevance of the spillovers I find in this paper. If
it does, spillovers of attention have far-reaching implications for other peer production
44The results for the L1 group are included in the appendix. The effects are very large and
statistically significant. The estimated coefficients for the L0 group (not reported) are close to 4,500
for clicks and between 20 and 25 for revisions. However, due to the lack of sufficient observations,
even these very large coefficient estimates are not statistically different from zero.
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settings.45 Generally, the effects are somewhat different for the number of revisions
(in line with the graphical analysis), since the effects are much smaller. An effect is
consistently revealed from the first day after the treatment. It is small in absolute
terms, since roughly one in twenty-five pages gets an additional revision. Yet, given
the low levels in average activity on a given page and day, this is still a noteworthy
effect. Comparing the pages with the placebo treatment I observe a small increase
in editing activity before the onset of the event, which is however not confirmed by
comparison with the control group. The size of the effect still more than doubles after
day 1, at which point the comparison with the control group suggests a drastic increase
in editing activity.46
2.5.2 Neighbors of Featured Articles
Table 2.2 shows the results for the “featured articles”. For this reduced form estimation
I consider the model for L1 nodes (Equation 2.10) in Section 2.3.3. This is the relevant
group here because the treatment takes place entirely inside Wikipedia47 and it is
“completely local” since no two articles can be featured simultaneously. Hence, only the
treated page is directly affected and any variation in the neighbors is almost certainly
a result of the processes that take place inside Wikipedia.
The first three columns of the table show the results with clicks as the dependent
variable. The estimation is the same as in Table 2.1 and the clustering is implemented
on the level of events as before. The main insight of this table is that it confirms
the statistical significance of the effect in the graphical analysis and provides a
quantification of its size. The size of the effect is estimated to be 33.1 to 34.6 additional
clicks on the average neighbor page on the day of treatment. In Columns 4-6, I observe
an important effect of about 0.032 additional revisions one day after the treatment of
the neighbor page. Note two things here: First, the effect is very small in absolute
terms and corresponds to one additional edit per thirty pages. Second however, this is
45If more attention leads to better or more contributions, the importance of link networks for
channeling attention would have important implications for open source software, research activities
and innovation.
46I verified that the result is not driven by running a robustness check, where I exclude four events:
the event which was associated to most pages in my dataset, Tunisia and those where the starting
date or the most important page of the event was most difficult to identify: the bancrupcy of Lehman,
the eruption of Eyjafjallajykull and the plane crash in Smolensk. In this specification, the results are
confirmed. The most notable difference is the increased magnitude of the effect in the clicks, as for
the remaining events, the average increase is close to 15 additional clicks. Despite the fact, that there
are still more than 6,000 pages included in both comparisons, the effects for the number of revisions
are no longer significantly different from zero, except in the fourth period of one specification.
47Unlike in the disaster case, when an article is advertised on German Wikipedia’s start page this
is usually not covered by media or anything of the like.
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Table 2.2: ’Featured articles’: clicks/added revisions over time for direct neighbors.
clicks new edits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
before after compare control compare placebo before after compare control compare placebo
t = -2 -0.709 -5.064 -2.629 -0.010 -0.028** -0.018*
(2.644) (4.051) (3.477) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
t = -1 3.454 2.149 4.792 -0.006 -0.021* -0.004
(2.668) (3.082) (4.187) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008)
t = 0 32.888*** 33.128*** 34.638*** 0.004 -0.006 0.004
(9.073) (9.162) (9.294) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
t = 1 -0.572 -0.158 0.773 0.030** 0.032** 0.033**
(1.799) (2.266) (3.214) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
t = 2 -4.639* -2.523 -3.700 0.012 0.015* 0.017
(2.511) (2.965) (3.144) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
t = 3 -7.705** -8.373** -3.807 -0.005 -0.011 -0.012
(3.114) (3.371) (5.435) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
t = 4 -1.225 -2.557 2.038 -0.009 -0.016 -0.009
(2.178) (2.766) (5.615) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009)
Constant 34.421*** 31.982*** 35.354*** 0.051*** 0.043*** 0.046***
(1.060) (0.816) (0.768) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
All cross Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 83424 120758 166518 79632 115269 158949
Number of Pages 3792 5489 7569 3792 5489 7569
Adj. R2 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table shows the relationship of clicks/added revisions and time dummies for direct neighbors of shocked articles
in the ’featured articles’ condition. The reduced form regressions estimate the ITE . Columns (1)-(3) show the results for
clicks and Columns (4-6) for new edits to the articles. Specification (1) and (4) show a simple ’before and after’; (2) and (5)
contrast treated and comparison group; Columns (3) and (6) show the comparison of treated articles with themselves but seven
weeks earlier (placebo treatment). Fixed Effects Panel-Regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. The unit of
observations is the outcome of a page i on day t. The time variable is normalized and runs from -14 to 14.; Only crossterms
closer to treatment are shown, but all were included. Reference group t-14 to t-5; standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1; no. of obs. = 240900; no. of clusters = 63; no. of articles = 5489.
an increase in contribution activity of eighty to one hundred per cent.
Table 2.3 summarizes the results in view of the spillover. The first two columns
show the results of the difference-in-differences in views for the treated article in the
epicenter. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the before-after estimates from Columns 1 and
4 in Table 2.2 for the change in views and edits of the neighbors. In Column 5 I
add a new dependent variable, the change in the number of editors. This serves as
a robustness check of whether the shock’s effects on edits are some sort of artifact or
whether this actually brings in new knowledge. As can be seen in the first two columns,
the estimated direct effect of treatment is approximately 4200 views depending on the
comparison group. The number of authors, shown in Column 5, experiences a spike
paralleling the one for edits (Column 4). Usually less than 1 in 50 articles (on average)
is edited by an author, who never edited the article before. During treatment 1 in 30
of the neighbors are edited by a new author (a 72% increase).
2.5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 35
Table 2.3: Spillover of views and translation to edits.
epicenter (L0) direct neighbors (L1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
clicks clicks clicks new edits new authors
t = -2 -32.686 -25.611 -0.709 -0.010 -0.005**
(59.224) (58.298) (2.644) (0.007) (0.002)
t = -1 36.002 76.750 3.454 -0.006 -0.003
(85.090) (78.919) (2.668) (0.006) (0.002)
t = 0 4269.573*** 4121.472*** 32.888*** 0.004 -0.000
(1421.399) (1422.301) (9.073) (0.006) (0.003)
t = 1 206.540* 138.306 -0.572 0.030** 0.013***
(118.136) (132.641) (1.799) (0.011) (0.005)
t = 2 58.453 56.972 -4.639* 0.012 0.002
(68.899) (68.261) (2.511) (0.008) (0.003)
t = 3 -31.991 -50.944 -7.705** -0.005 -0.005*
(58.213) (54.872) (3.114) (0.008) (0.002)
t = 4 -7.338 -49.194 -1.225 -0.009 -0.003
(59.781) (63.384) (2.178) (0.007) (0.003)
Constant 80.235* 93.085** 34.421*** 0.051*** 0.018***
(41.869) (39.295) (1.060) (0.003) (0.001)
All cross Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes No No No
Observations 1474 1584 83424 79632 79632
Number of Pages 67 72 3792 3792 3792
Adj. R2 0.182 0.182 0.005 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table summarizes the results of the reduced form regressions to estimate the spillovers in clicks and edits. Columns
(1)-(2) show the results for the direct effect of treatment on clicks (ATE) and Columns (3) the spillover to direct neighbors
of the articles (ITE). and Columns (4) show the conversion of the spillover in clicks to new edits at the direct neighbors and
Column (5) shows the number of new author’s that contributed to the articles (at the neighbors). All Specifications are a
simple before-after comparison. Fixed Effects Panel-Regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. The unit of
observations is the outcome of a page i on day t. The time variable is normalized and runs from -14 to 14.; Only crossterms
closer to treatment are shown, but all were included. Reference group t-14 to t-5; standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
I further test the robustness of my difference-in-differences results by excluding
the first third of the “featured articles”. Results are shown in Table 2.10 and reveal the
same patterns as Table 2.1, but at lower significance levels.48 The number of authors
moves largely in parallel with the number of revisions, indicating that twice as many
new authors as usual edit the article due to the treatment of its neighbor. On the
one hand this is a large effect in relative terms, on the other hand it means that only
one in seventy articles is edited by a new author. More robustness checks included
regressing against all comparison groups simultaneously and using different samples
48The coefficients are not significant for the placebo-condition, but note that I apply extremely
rigorous clustering and further note that all surrounding point estimates are negative, while the one
at t = 1 is positive.
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or resolutions. They do not convey additional insight and are available in the online
appendix.49
2.5.3 Bounds for the Structural Estimator
Unfortunately I cannot compute the precise structural estimator because the full matrix
G formed by the German Wikipedia is too large to be computed in memory. Hence
I cannot solve for G2 and higher orders of the link matrix.50 However, it is possible
to present upper and lower bound estimates of the structural parameters that are
discussed in Subsection 2.3.4 and derived formally in Appendix A.2.
To compute these values the researcher has to decide where to evaluate the number
of peers. I choose to evaluate the coefficients at the median which is 31 for indirect
neighbors of disaster pages and 36 for neighbors of “featured articles”. This is a
crude first evaluation which primarily serves to highlight how easy it is to retrieve
the structural parameters once this decision is made. The rest reduces to a back of
the envelope calculation for the upper bound of the social/spillover parameter α and
the shock δ1. I use Equation A.22: δ1 is directly estimated to be 4,190 (2,440 in the
disaster condition). The estimate of α is 0.292 based on “featured articles” (and based
on disasters, 0.483).51
Computing the lower bound estimates is not much more involved: It suffices to
plug the estimates and the number of nodes into the closed form solution given in
Equation A.28. This gives the point estimator for the lower bound of α, which is
estimated to be αˆ = 0.222 for “featured articles” and αˆ = 0.320 for disasters.
To conclude this section I attempt to quantify the meaning of these results:
literally they mean that if the average clicks on the neighboring pages are increased by
ten, this alone would result in an increase of 2.215 to 2.92 clicks on the page, which
all come from the neighbors. Even though caution is needed to make the following
claim, the results suggest that placing links has an effect, but that it is small. Provided
this out of equilibrium thought experiment is warranted, creating additional links from
neighbors that increase aggregate viewership of the neighbors by 200 is predicted to
result in 1.61 additional views on the target page.52 While this absolute effect in clicks
49https://sites.google.com/site/kummersworkingpapers/spilloversonlineappendix
50Ongoing work is attempting to solve this issue. If these efforts are fruitful, the results might be
included in a revised version of this paper.
51I briefly illustrate how simple this computation is: merely divide the estimated effect on the
neighbors (34) by the estimated effect on the treated (4,190) and multiply by the median in-degres
(36). For disasters the analogous computation is (38/2,440*N=31).
52As before I use the median number of neighbors for these thought experiments. Consequently 200
aggregate view correspond to five more views on average. The quantification is based on the upper
bound estimates of α in the “featured article” condition (and would be 3.31 for disasters).
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is very small, the conversion to content is even smaller than that since even huge
shocks did not generate many revisions on neighboring articles. This suggests that
placing links strategically will only generate large effects if the pages that link out are
very frequented. However, for the normal traffic on a typical Wikipedia page we would
expect very small effects.
2.5.4 Aggregate Effects and Heterogeneities in the Spillover.
In this subsection I first discuss the aggregate spillover effects. Second, I offer the results
of a first analysis of how article and network characteristics mediate the spillovers of
attention and the associated conversion into content generation. This serves as a test of
the assumption that attention spillovers are homogeneous, as is assumed in my model.
Moreover, it is interesting for understanding the factors that mediate how attention
spills across links and also how attention is converted into content.
First I aggregate the changes in clicks and revisions over all neighboring articles
and then average over the 34 different“featured article”clusters. This is done in Figures
2.5 and 2.6 in order to summarize and illustrate the insights from the“featured articles”
condition. I find that on average there are 4000 clicks on all neighbors taken together
(Figure 2.5). Given that the average treated articles received an additional 4000 clicks
this corresponds to a one to one conversion of clicks on the treated page to clicks on
one of the neighbors. In other words, the average visitor clicks on exactly one of the
links. The total number of revisions on the neighboring pages (Figure 2.6) increases
approximately from 4.5 to 8.5. This means that the 4000 initial additional clicks are
converted into 4000 additional clicks on neighbors and four new revisions or a ratio of
1000:1000:1. On the level of the individual article, where usually one in 30 gets an edit,
it is still only one in 15 on the day of treatment. Note that these findings are in line
with the average “facebook-engagement rate”, which is typically just below 0.01.53
Second, I analyze how article characteristics influence the spillovers. I add
additional control variables that account for differences in the articles’ characteristics.
The results of this analysis are shown in the first three columns of Table 2.4, where I
added variables that account for an article’s length, how well it is generally linked and
how closely they are linked to the shocked articles (by counting closed triads with other
neighbors). Columns 4-6 show the results of an analysis that considers short articles
(“stubs”) seperately. A word of caution is in place here: The explanatory variables at
hand are subject to many unobserved influences, such as relevance, challenging topics,
etc. Hence, these regressions might introduce endogeneity problems. Nevertheless these
53http://www.michaelleander.me/blog/facebook-engagement-rate-benchmark/. The benchmark
measures, how many of a user’s friends and followers react to their posts.
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Table 2.4: Clicks/added revisions over time, when including article heterogeneity.
joint estimation short articles only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
clicks revisions length clicks revisions length
t = -2 -5.064 -0.028** -2.484 -2.241 0.004 -0.105
(4.051) (0.011) (3.012) (1.564) (0.006) (0.202)
t = -1 2.177 -0.022* 7.659 5.178* 0.006 0.204
(3.278) (0.012) (6.390) (3.014) (0.005) (0.283)
t = 0 38.770*** -0.017* 0.419 35.748*** 0.002 0.009
(11.776) (0.009) (2.756) (12.929) (0.007) (0.197)
t = 1 -0.675 0.041** 1.972 1.559 0.017* 1.151
(2.781) (0.018) (1.681) (2.571) (0.010) (1.210)
t = 2 -2.523 0.015* 6.698* -0.134 0.003 -0.089
(2.965) (0.008) (3.957) (2.136) (0.002) (0.198)
t = 3 -8.373** -0.011 -2.057 -0.813 0.005 -0.744
(3.371) (0.012) (1.370) (2.258) (0.009) (0.541)
t = 4 -2.557 -0.016 -2.308 7.067 -0.005 0.927
(2.766) (0.014) (1.722) (4.435) (0.007) (1.027)
short article on t = 0 -2.631 0.003 -1.386
(5.745) (0.008) (2.343)
short article on t = 1 -0.962 -0.037** -0.159
(2.726) (0.017) (1.029)
many L1 links article on t = 0 24.027 0.009 19.834
(19.759) (0.025) (18.849)
many L1 links article on t = 1 -6.963 -0.020 -3.385
(7.463) (0.024) (2.825)
long article on t = 0 -8.770 -0.001 -4.732
(10.807) (0.016) (3.983)
long article on t = 1 3.164 -0.000 10.428
(4.333) (0.029) (6.505)
well linked article on t = 0 -15.565 0.030** 2.261
(14.763) (0.014) (5.132)
well linked article on t = 1 1.484 -0.003 -3.044
(4.648) (0.023) (4.871)
Constant 31.982*** 0.043*** 2.959*** 10.297*** 0.003*** 0.137*
(0.823) (0.002) (0.524) (0.994) (0.001) (0.071)
All cross Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 120758 115269 115269 19932 19026 19026
Number of Pages 5489 5489 5489 906 906 906
Notes: The table shows the results of the reduced form regressions estimating the ITE for neighbors. Columns (1)-(3) show
additional control variables that provide a deeper characterization of the articles to analyze if spillovers vary across these
groups. Columns (4-6) analyze the reduced sample that only contains articles that were shorter than 1500 bytes (“stubs”).
Specification (1) and (4) show the results for clicks, (2) and (5) for new edits, and Columns (3) and (6) show added content.
All estimations contrast the treated with both comparison groups (based on other featured articles and the same articles but
seven weeks earlier (placebo treatment)). Fixed Effects Panel-Regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. The
unit of observations is the outcome of a page i on day t. The time variable is normalized and runs from -14 to 14.; Only
crossterms closer to treatment are shown, but all were included. Reference group t-14 to t-5; standard errors in parentheses:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; no. of obs. = 120758; no. of clusters = 63; no. of articles = 5489.
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Table 2.5: Conversion of attention to action: Content vs. money contributions.
donations contributions
donations high donations low all articles short articles
click-through 0.024 0.002 0.008 0.008
conversion to action 0.124 0.004 0.001 0.0005
Notes: As the click-through rate for donations I used the “Banner-Klick pro Impressions”-statistic, which
measures the ratio of how often the banner was shown, vs. how often it was clicked on. As analogue to the
conversion to an edit (action) I used “Anzahl pro Banner Klick”, which measures the ratio of actually completed
donations to banner-clicks. I report the minimum (25% quartile attention: 0.004, action: 0.01) and the maximum
(75% quartile attention: 0.009, action: 0.019) of the 2011 campaign. Source: 2011 Wikipedia campaign tests
and own calculations.
questions deserve to be studied further, so I report the results with the caveat that they
are correlations that they cannot necessarily afford a causal interpretation.
Splitting the sample into well-connected articles with many links and poorly
connected ones with few, I do not find a significant difference between the two groups.
The same is true for a variable that captures whether a page is very long or not. I get a
positive but insignificant point estimate for page views. By the same token, there is no
statistically significant effect for nodes that show high clustering relative to the shocked
node (neighbors, that get many links also from other neighbors). The point estimate
seems to indicate a higher click-through rate onto those articles, but these clicks might
be indirect click-throughs (forwarded from neighbors of the shocked node). Generally,
no effect on clicks in Column 1 is statistically significant which indicates that the
spillovers do not vary systematically by the four mentioned properties.
An interesting pattern emerges, when I consider only “stubs”, i.e. pages that do
not exceed a length of 1500 bytes. I find that the increase is the same as on average,
but that attention is less likely to convert into edits (Columns 4-6 of Table 2.4). Short
articles are viewed 32 times more often than on an average day, but in absolute terms
the increase in edits is smaller (.017 vs. .034, in separate estimation). A remark is
in order: Since stubs generally have a much lower probability to be viewed or edited,
these increases are larger in relative terms than for normal articles.54 Finally I report
results of an extended analysis which is omitted here, for reasons of brevity.55 I include
the number of clicks on the treated page in the regression and, as expected, the number
of links on the neighboring pages is positively related to that value.
It is exciting to contrast my findings for the contribution of content with the
54The probability of being viewed increases by 300% (vis a vis 100%) for the average neighbor.
The chances for an edit increases by 500% vis a vis an 80% increase over baseline levels. This much
stronger relative effect in the number of edits indicates that contributors do make a greater effort (in
comparative terms) to contribute to pages where the existing content is limited.
55Available online at https://sites.google.com/site/kummersworkingpapers/spilloversonlineappendix.
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donations of money during Wikipedia’s annual campaign for donations.56 I do so in
Table 2.5, which shows my main results for content contributions and contrasts them
with the click-through rates during the campaign. When doing so I find a striking
similarity in the size of the click-through rates between content items and the click-
through to the donation banners during the campaign. In other words, it turns out
that the spillover of attention is almost the same between articles and from articles
to the donations-banner. However, the conversion into action, once on the donating
page, is even higher for monetary donations than for making an edit on the new page.
Even though the intention behind clicking on a banner is certainly different from the
one behind clicking on any link, this fact gives an idea of just how costly it is for most
visitors to make an edit.
2.6 Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research
This paper investigates how the network of links between articles on the German
Wikipedia influences the attention and subsequent content generation individual
articles receive. To the best of my knowledge my results are the first to provide a causal
quantification of how the link network influences users’ contributions in an important
online network of content pages. By studying exogenous short term shocks to attention
I can measure attention spillovers. I find substantial spillovers in terms of both views
and editing activity. Articles in the neighborhood of shocked articles received 35 more
visits on average - an increase of almost 100 percent.
Moreover, I am able to isolate the effect of attention from other determinants of
public good contribution such as reputation, social image and altruism. I find that
on average 1000 views are needed before a Wikipedia edit occurs, before additional
content is generated. I also find that this rate is lower than the conversion rate from
clicks on funding campaign banners to donations, indicating that it is less costly to
donate money than to contribute content. Taken together, my findings suggest that
(i) making an edit is very costly and (ii) that contributions due to attention alone
will ensure sufficient provision of public goods only, whenever large amounts of traffic
are available, which can be the case online. Offline or with platforms that lack many
visitors, other important drivers of public goods contributions, such as social image
and altruism may be needed. (cf. Carpenter and Myers (2010))
Even though my design allows a causal interpretation of the reduced form
estimates of the spillover, I incorporate exogenous treatments of individual nodes in
networks into a workhorse model to formalize peer effects (or spillovers) in networks
56Available at http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Fundraiser 2011/Tests (last: Feb. 27, 2014)
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(Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), De Giorgi et al. (2010)). Exogenous treatments can serve as a
new and complementary source of identification of the structural spillover effect, which
does not depend on assuming an exogenous network structure. The model I suggest
is quite general and nests also two-layered randomized control settings that rely on
exogenous variation over subpopulations.57
My structural estimates suggest that an article will receive 30 percent of the
number of average views on neighboring articles. Hence, by placing links to oft
frequented nodes and thus increasing the average daily views on their neighbors by
ten, one could obtain three additional daily visits to an article. I show that upper and
lower bounds for the structural parameters can be computed even if the underlying
network structure is unknown. The bounds are easily computed for settings where
only one node is treated in each subpopulation. I conjecture that they can easily be
generalized to treatments that affect more than one node. It is thus no longer necessary
to neglect the network structure in an experiment that aims at identifying social effects,
merely because the information on links is not available. Finally, the basic modeling
approach of exploiting open triads in the network structure is formally similar to spatial
Durbin models in spatial econometrics (cf. LeSage (2008)).
So what do we learn for advertising on the web, setting up a firm wiki or for
realizing the Wikimedia Foundation’s vision?58 Additional views translate one for
one into additional views on a neighbor. The significance of this result deserves
emphasis: On average, every visitor of “today’s featured article” clicks on one of
the links to acquire further information. The click-through rates I find are very
similar to the clicks-throughs to the donation banner. Moreover, the spillover does
not depend on the targets’ characteristics - all contents have a fair chance of getting
some attention. However, what happens once the attention is there does depend on
the items’ characteristics - much less content is generated shorter pages.
My findings highlight the importance of citation networks for channeling human
attention, but suggest that using the link network is an expensive and inefficient
strategy for channeling contribution flows. My results also indicate that many users
only look up information. I cannot say whether the low levels of conversion from
attention to an action are the same for Wikipedia (editing) and adverts (purchase), but
the similarities of the click-through rates to donations are striking. Further research
could study if similar results apply to and to young wikis with less content.
There are some limitations to the presented approach. Most importantly, the
strategy of exploiting local exogenous treatments will not allow the identification of
57Moffitt (2001), Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), Kuhn et al. (2011), Cre´pon et al. (2013) etc.
58A world where all “can freely share in the sum of all knowledge” (Wikimedia-Foundation (2013))
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the social spillover parameter if neighbors of the treated nodes observe the treatment
and adjust their outcome as a reaction to the mere fact that their neighbor was treated.
An example would be a teacher who selectively punishes or favors a single student: if
other pupils react to the special treatment, e.g. by changing their motivation to study
for the subject, then their performance change reflects the sum of the spillover and
their behavioral adjustment. In Appendix A.3, I outline such a case and illustrate
formally why the spillover parameter can no longer be identified. Another limitation
is the assumption that the network formation process is not affected by the treatment.
This assumption is warranted for Wikipedia’s “today’s featured article” but less so for
disasters. Generally, if the process is affected by treatment all estimates of indirect
treatment effects will reflect a sum of the treatment on the existing network and new
spillovers due to the changes in the link network which might lead to upward biases
(cf. Comola and Prina (2013)).
A promising area for further analysis would investigate whether the new
contributions, especially the ones by new authors, add substantive knowledge or rather
focus on improving small details. Future research should also exploit the heterogeneity
in intensity of direct treatment effects more thoroughly. In particular, it would be
interesting to analyze how attention, here measured as average effect, is distributed
across neighbors. Is it evenly distributed or do users herd to only a few of the linked
pages? Another promising area would use the methodology based on exogenous local
treatments alongside that based on the network structure and the exploitation of
open triads (Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), De Giorgi et al. (2010)). The approaches are
complementary; research along these lines will result in valuable insights. Finally,
it was not yet possible to surmount the computational hurdle of exploiting the
detailed network information when obtaining the structural estimates. Future research
should include this information and investigate which population parameter should be
optimally included for relating reduced form and structural parameters.
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2.7 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.6: Summary statistics: direct neighbors of shocked ’featured articles’.
mean sd min p10 p50 p90 max
Length of page (in bytes) 6794 6784 17 51 4833 15262 81585
Number of authors 33 35 1 2 21 77 324
Clicks 33 131 0 0 0 77 20384
Number of Revisions 95 130 1 3 48 237 1382
Links from Wikipedia 118 301 0 6 36 286 9484
Dummy: literature section .3 .46 0 0 0 1 1
References (footnotes) 1.3 4.5 0 0 0 4 182
Links to further info 2.3 4.2 0 0 1 6 155
time variable (normalized) 0 8.4 -14 -12 0 12 14
Delta: Number of Revisions .042 .39 0 0 0 0 42
Delta: Length of page 2.1 159 -31473 0 0 0 31462
Delta: Number of authors .015 .13 0 0 0 0 9
Delta: Links from Wikipedia .054 1.1 -90 0 0 0 438
Delta: References .0014 .097 -18 0 0 0 18
Delta: Links further info .00078 .1 -19 0 0 0 16
Notes: The table shows the distribution of the main variables. The unit of observations is the outcome of a page
i on day t. The time variable is normalized and runs from -14 to 14.; no. of obs. = 317550; no. of start pages =
63; no. of articles = 5489.
Table 2.7: Indirect neighbors of shocked ’large events articles’ (2 clicks away)
mean sd min p10 p50 p90 max
Length of page (in bytes) 5658 6287 16 33 3885 13210 76176
Number of authors 29 34 1 1 18 71 435
Clicks 33 174 0 0 0 70 29865
Number of Revisions 84 133 1 2 40 211 2083
Links from Wikipedia 123 447 0 5 31 269 27611
Dummy: literature section .2 .4 0 0 0 1 1
References (footnotes) 1.3 4.2 0 0 0 4 150
Links to further info 2.7 5.1 0 0 1 7 130
time variable (normalized) 0 8.4 -14 -12 0 12 14
Delta: Number of Revisions .035 .35 0 0 0 0 44
Delta: Length of page 1.8 106 -22416 0 0 0 27500
Delta: Number of authors .013 .12 0 0 0 0 11
Delta: Links from Wikipedia .049 2.5 -1148 0 0 0 216
Delta: References .0014 .13 -32 0 0 0 29
Delta: Links further info .0011 .12 -15 0 0 0 31
Notes: The table shows the distribution of the main variables. The unit of observations is the outcome of a page
i on day t. The time variable is normalized and runs from -14 to 14.; no. of obs. = 425981; no. of start pages =
44; no. of articles = 7379.
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Table 2.8: Included “featured articles” and associated articles (1 clicks away).
name of event pages observations
no. control treated Total
Afrikaans 128.0 5,481.0 1,943.0 7,424.0
Alte Synagoge (Heilbronn) 52.0 1,885.0 1,131.0 3,016.0
Banjo-Kazooie 125.0 5,191.0 2,030.0 7,221.0
Benno Elkan 139.0 5,133.0 2,900.0 8,033.0
Bombardier Canadair Regional Jet 92.0 4,205.0 1,073.0 5,278.0
CCD-Sensor 586.0 31,001.0 2,871.0 33,872.0
Charles Sanders Peirce 258.0 11,716.0 3,219.0 14,935.0
Das Kloster der Minne 51.0 1,827.0 1,102.0 2,929.0
Deutsche Bank 343.0 10,005.0 9,860.0 19,865.0
Eishockey 162.0 4,698.0 4,698.0 9,396.0
Ekel 270.0 10,295.0 5,336.0 15,631.0
Fahrbahnmarkierung 44.0 1,276.0 1,276.0 2,552.0
Geschichte Ostfrieslands 235.0 7,453.0 6,177.0 13,630.0
Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 306.0 9,599.0 8,033.0 17,632.0
Glanzstoff Austria 270.0 14,094.0 1,537.0 15,631.0
Glorious Revolution 153.0 6,206.0 2,668.0 8,874.0
Granitschale im Lustgarten 83.0 3,857.0 928.0 4,785.0
Gustav Hirschfeld 142.0 6,438.0 1,740.0 8,178.0
Hallenhaus 71.0 2,117.0 2,001.0 4,118.0
Helgoland 228.0 8,120.0 5,104.0 13,224.0
Jaroslawl 321.0 12,789.0 5,829.0 18,618.0
Jupiter und Antiope (Watteau) 36.0 1,160.0 928.0 2,088.0
Karolingische Buchmalerei 162.0 4,843.0 4,553.0 9,396.0
Katholische Liga (1538) 37.0 1,682.0 464.0 2,146.0
Martha Goldberg 55.0 1,595.0 1,595.0 3,190.0
Naturstoffe 320.0 9,338.0 9,222.0 18,560.0
Paul Moder 61.0 1,798.0 1,682.0 3,480.0
St. Martin (Memmingen) 59.0 1,653.0 1,711.0 3,364.0
Stabkirche Borgund 40.0 1,421.0 899.0 2,320.0
Taiwan 167.0 5,017.0 4,669.0 9,686.0
USS Thresher (SSN-593) 90.0 3,712.0 1,479.0 5,191.0
Visum 56.0 1,624.0 1,624.0 3,248.0
Wenegnebti 55.0 1,798.0 1,363.0 3,161.0
Werder Bremen 292.0 8,555.0 8,323.0 16,878.0
Total 5,489.0 207,582.0 109,968.0 317,550.0
Notes: The table shows the “featured articles” in the dataset that were advertised on German Wikipedia’s start
page. Column 1 shows the number of associated articles that are one click away from one of the corresponding
start pages (be it treated or control). Columns 2-4 show the number of observations. Observations associated
with actually treated articles are shown separately from control observations. Pages can be accessed by pasting
the title behind the last slash in: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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Table 2.9: Included disasters and associated articles (2 clicks away).
name of event pages observations
No. control treated Total
Air-France-Flug 447 102.0 4,495.0 1,392.0 5,887.0
Air-India-Express-Flug 812 369.0 19,662.0 1,711.0 21,373.0
Amoklauf von Winnenden 74.0 2,088.0 2,146.0 4,234.0
Bahnunfall von Halle (Belgien) 52.0 2,436.0 580.0 3,016.0
British-Airways-Flug 38 144.0 6,699.0 1,624.0 8,323.0
Buschfeuer in Victoria 2009 33.0 928.0 957.0 1,885.0
Deepwater Horizon 203.0 8,178.0 3,596.0 11,774.0
Erdbeben in Haiti 2010 379.0 15,602.0 6,322.0 21,924.0
Erdbeben in Sichuan 2008 227.0 11,571.0 1,508.0 13,079.0
Erdbeben von L’Aquila 2009 96.0 3,654.0 1,885.0 5,539.0
Flugzeugabsturz bei Smolensk 368.0 12,412.0 8,758.0 21,170.0
Grubenunglu¨ck von San Jose 149.0 8,033.0 551.0 8,584.0
Josef Fritzl 129.0 6,264.0 1,044.0 7,308.0
Kaukasuskrieg 2008 346.0 18,705.0 1,276.0 19,981.0
Kolonta´r-Dammbruch 99.0 4,669.0 1,073.0 5,742.0
Luftangriff bei Kunduz 2,107.0 113,767.0 7,772.0 121,539.0
Northwest-Airlines-Flug 253 1,151.0 65,279.0 1,276.0 66,555.0
Sumatra-Erdbeben vom September 2009 116.0 4,002.0 2,726.0 6,728.0
US-Airways-Flug 1549 226.0 7,888.0 5,220.0 13,108.0
Unglu¨ck bei der Loveparade 2010 499.0 15,283.0 13,572.0 28,855.0
Versuchter Anschlag am Times Square 202.0 10,353.0 1,334.0 11,687.0
Wald- und Torfbra¨nde in Russland 2010 273.0 13,485.0 2,204.0 15,689.0
Zugunglu¨ck von Castelldefels 35.0 1,508.0 493.0 2,001.0
Total 7,379.0 356,961.0 69,020.0 425,981.0
Notes: The table shows the events in the dataset. Column 1 shows the number of pages that are two clicks
away from one of the two associated start pages (be it treated or control). Columns 2-4 show the number
observations associated with the articles. Observations associated with actually treated articles are shown
separately from control observations. Pages can be accessed by pasting the title behind the last slash in:
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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2.8 Additional Regression and Figures
Figure 2.5: Figure contrasting the mean of clicks on featured articles, with the
aggregated clicks on all neighboring pages.
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Notes: The figure shows the aggregated effect on the pages that are one click away. The average treated page
received up to 4000 additional clicks, all neighbors together received approx. the same number of additional clicks
Figure 2.6: Figure showing the aggregated new revisions on all neighboring pages.
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Chapter 3
Centrality and Content Creation in
Networks*
- The Case of German Wikipedia
3.1 Introduction
User-generated content has proven to be a cheap and surprisingly accurate source of
information. Still, little is known about how its producers select the content to which
they contribute and how platform administrators may influence this choice. While
Wikipedia has been the most successful prototype of a wiki, wikis in other contexts, e.g.
private businesses, often struggle to encourage and manage activity. Administrators
of platforms face three challenges: motivating potential first-time users, making them
connect to the platform and encouraging the contribution of content that is useful to
others (Lerner and Tirole (2002), Jian and MacKie-Mason (2012)).
In order to encourage contributions, it is important to understand how authors
select articles. In this paper, we study one mechanism that possibly channels their
activity. We start from the hypothesis that the hyperlink network between Wikipedia
articles attracts the attention of authors towards more central articles. In particular,
we analyze how the position of an article in the network is related to the amount
of content contributed and to the number of new authors joining the article. This
question is situated in the more general context of understanding how producers in
peer production of information goods select their tasks.
*This Paper is coauthored with Marianne Saam (Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)),
Iassen Halatchliyski (Knowledge Media Research Center (IWM-KMRC)) and George Giorgidze
(University of Tu¨bingen). We thank the Wikimedia Foundation for granting access to the Wikipedia
data, Thorsten Doherr and Manfred Knobloch for support with the data processing, and Fre´de´ric
Schu¨tz for providing us with the data on page views. We benefitted from discussions with Irene
Bertschek, Ulrike Cress, Benjamin Engelsta¨tter, Avi Goldfarb, Francois Laisney, Jose Luis Moraga-
Gonzalez, Martin Peitz, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Michael Ward, the participants of the ICT
Conference 2012 at ZEW in Mannheim and of the annual conference of the EARIE 2012 in Rome.
Benedikt Achatz, Sergiy Golovin, Burak Tuerkoglu and Fabian Trottner provided helpful research
assistance. We acknowledge financial support from the WissenschaftsCampus Tu¨bingen.
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On Wikipedia, there are three main possibilities for finding articles of interest:
categories, text search and hyperlinks. Frequent authors use additional devices such as
lists of new articles, watchlists or lists of articles classified as needing improvement.
Hyperlinks constitute an organizing principle that is indispensable to online peer
production of a vast amount of information. They enable a non-hierarchical access
and a nonlinear reading experience that are characteristic for wikis (Greenstein and
Devereux (2009)).
Meanwhile little research has been undertaken on the question how hyperlinks
influence contributions in wikis. Wikipedia’s rules determine hyperlinks between
articles to be semantic links, that means links that are set according to important
connections in the attributes of the two subjects. The links need not be reciprocal and
the guidelines on the German Wikipedia stipulate that an article must be readable
without the information from the linked pages. It is not compatible with Wikipedia’s
rules to set links just to attract attention to an article or without embedding its subject
into the text pointing to it. Finally, within Wikipedia, links should point only to
pages about technical terms or to pages that contain further information on topics
that might be of particular interest to readers of the originating article.2 Hyperlinks
on Wikipedia are generally regarded as a reliable source of information on semantic
relations between words. They have been used extensively in linguistic research (see
for example Medelyan et al. (2009)). Adafre and de Rikjke (2005) propose a procedure
that automatically detects missing links between pages that should be linked given
their relevance to each other. Taken together, this research suggests that hyperlinks on
Wikipedia are generally set in accordance with the guidelines (see also Priedhorsky et al.
(2007) on rapid detection of vandalism), but that the topics of articles on Wikipedia
do not completely predetermine their link structure. The actual links depend on
the dynamic content of an article and on the accuracy of linking. This implies that
variations in centrality occur regularly and affect the navigation of readers and potential
authors on a given set of articles. Our main hypotheses are that higher centrality is
positively related to (i) the length of an article’s content and (ii) the number of new
authors joining the article.
Economic research considers spillovers to be a central feature of knowledge
production. They arise when the production of new knowledge relies on existing
knowledge, which can be used without paying for it and without diminishing anyone
else’s use of it (see for example Romer (1990) in the context of growth theory). Studies
on R&D have highlighted that the strength of spillovers depends on the distance
between the knowledge that is available and the knowledge that is being produced.
2http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Verlinken, accessed on July 23, 2012.
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This distance may be defined in various ways, for example geographically or according
to sectors of economic activity (Griliches (1992), Audretsch and Feldman (1996)).
In the context of Wikipedia, we also consider spillovers occurring in the production
of knowledge. The channel of spillovers that we are analyzing consists in the hyperlinks
pointing from one article to another. However, we are not looking for knowledge
spillovers in the classical sense, but for spillovers in the level of production activity.
On Wikipedia, this approach is based on the hypothesis that links placed on page A
pointing to page B may attract the attention to page B. Consequently, the existence
of an additional link may trigger the contribution of authors who might not have
contributed in its absence. These spillovers affect the level of content provision on a
page and also increase the knowledge contributed to the page. Note however, that the
dimension to which the notion of spillover applies in our context is not the knowledge
itself but the attention and effort that authors direct to a particular page after they
read another one pointing to it.
When analyzing the relation between centrality and content provision, we exploit
different dimensions of proximity that exist between articles. In particular, we compare
the links from articles that are semantically close to links which are on average less
close. We also compare direct links to an article, measured by the number of incoming
links (the indegree), to indirect links, measured by the closeness centrality. We chose
a sample of more than 7, 000 articles belonging to a particular category (economics;
German: “Wirtschaft”). For this sample, we compute centrality measures both within
the category and on the entire German Wikipedia.
We find that an increase in the number of links from within the category is
strongly associated with an increase in page length. It is also associated with new
authors contributing to the article. The strongest relation between centrality and
content generation is found for direct links from the category network. The relation
to links from other pages of German Wikipedia is weaker and insignificant in our
main specification. The additional influence of indirect links appears negligible.
Social network analysis reveals that the category economics is, like many networks,
constituted by one large cluster and single articles or small network components that
are disconnected from it. We find that getting connected to the large component raises
the page length and its rate of change sizeably in the following weeks.
Our research is inspired by two strands of work on user-generated content: First,
we are interested in knowing whether evidence generated inside a limited category of a
network (e.g., Kittur and Kraut (2008), Ransbotham et al. (2012)) holds when taking
into account links outside the category. Second, we follow work by Fershtman and
Gandal (2011) and Claussen et al. (2012) on direct and indirect spillovers in networks
of software producers. Contrary to these strands of work, we do not consider the
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network of authors but the hyperlink network of user-generated content.
3.2 Related Research
The empirical analysis of (social) networks has been of interest to scientists of different
disciplines for several decades, resulting in a vast literature and in an established
methodology based on the analysis of graphs. This tool has been widely used in
empirical applications that are relevant to economics, so that we are forced to restrict
ourselves to discussing only large overarching themes.3 Some studies center around the
existence and the structure of social networks, applying a variety of formally defined
network measures. Other applications have analyzed the prevalence of homophily in
networks, the importance of weak ties and social capital (for example in job-market
outcomes), or the benefits associated with filling structural holes in networks.
Social networks have since then been at the heart of a variety of theoretical and
empirical studies in economics. Diffusion in networks was originally studied in medicine
and biology, but the methods can also be used in economics to study technology
adoption or viral marketing. Moreover, economists became interested in citation
networks. Goyal et al. (2006) analyze the evolution of the collaboration network of
economists from the 1970s until the 1990s. They find that a structure of separated
’small islands’ of researchers is increasingly replaced by a ’small world’ network where
every pair of nodes (authors) is connected by a short path. In fact, citation networks
of scientific papers had been analyzed as early as the 1960s.4 More recently, Albert
et al. (1999) have undertaken a similar endeavor for web pages.
Particularly relevant to this paper are studies focussing on spillovers in production
through social networks. Fershtman and Gandal (2011) analyze direct and indirect
knowledge spillovers in the production of open source software and Claussen et al.
(2012) in the electronic gaming industry. Both papers consider the relationship between
developers’ network positions and the success of the projects they are working on.
Our research considers a different network in a similar context, namely the hyperlink
network of articles. Thus, we borrow from the approach used by Halatchliyski
et al. (2010) who analyze authors’ contributions in two related knowledge domains
considering the article network.
Several previous papers have studied collaboration between authors on Wikipedia.
Denning et al. (2005) discuss problems associated with the collaboration of volunteers in
3For a more detailed summary of the literature (until 2008), cf. Jackson (2008).
4Without using the more recently developed measures of network position, de Solla Price (1965)
evaluates citation data and provides several interesting statistics on average references and citations
in the network.
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Wikipedia, such as the unknown quality of articles or accidental inaccuracies. Focusing
on a non-monetary reward tool at Wikipedia, “Barnstars”, which can be awarded to
hard working authors, and its contribution to content creation, Kriplean et al. (2008)
offer a theoretical lens for understanding how wiki software can be designed to support
the contribution of good work. In his dissertation, Soto (2009) reviews further existing
research based on Wikipedia data and (among other things) quantitatively analyzes
the ten largest Wikipedias, finding that the patterns concerning the composition of
authors on the platform, as well as production patterns, are highly similar.
Other empirical analyses focus on the determinants of the quality of articles.
Kittur and Kraut (2008) examine how the number of collaborating editors in Wikipedia
and the coordination methods they use affect article quality measured by peer
evaluations in Wikipedia’s quality assessment project. Their empirical results show
that adding more editors to an article improves article quality only when the editors
use appropriate coordination techniques. Zhang and Zhu (2011) empirically examine
the potentially inverse relationship between the incentives to contribute and the size of
the group of contributors. Based on exogenous variation in group size at the Chinese
Wikipedia due to access blocks issued by the government, their analysis shows that
contributors receive social benefits increasing with both the amount of contribution
and group size. Accordingly, the result confirms that the more contributors value these
social benefits, the more they tend to reduce their contributions after the block.
Ransbotham et al. (2012) analyze the relation between the network of authors
associated with the collaborative writing of articles and the content value measured
as article views. Their results based on social network analysis reveal a curvilinear
relationship between the number of distinct contributors to user-generated content
and viewership. They conclude that network effects are stronger for newer articles.
Gorbatai and Piskorski (2012) and Piskorski and Gorbatai (2010) also test hypotheses
related to the author network underlying Wikipedia. They ask whether the density of
their individual social networks is related to both norm violations of authors and the
likelihood of their easy discouragement after deletions and reverts of their work.
Ransbotham and Kane (2011) analyze the duration until an article on Wikipedia
is promoted to a featured article or demoted. They find that an article is most likely to
be promoted if the average experience of authors is close to the mean. Articles written
by relatively “young” and relatively “old” teams face a longer time span until they are
promoted. Halatchliyski et al. (2010) analyze contributions of authors that contributed
to articles in two related but different domains of knowledge. They find that the authors
that are most central in the author network also contribute to integrating the two fields.
Greenstein and Zhu (2012a and 2012b) investigate the language bias of articles and its
evolution over time. Comparing articles in the English Wikipedia to two reference
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corpora taken from publications of the Democrat and the Republican party in the
U.S. Congress, they find that an early bias of Wikipedia towards Democrat language
has gradually disappeared over time. Yet, this erosion of the overall bias comes from
new articles, which use Republican vocabulary, while articles which used to be biased
appear to stay biased. Gorbatai (2011) employs data from Wikipedia to highlight
how demand and supply can be aligned in the absence of market prices. She shows
that “professional” editors of Wikipedia strongly react to (attempted) contributions of
“unexperienced” users, as they are a sign of increased demand.
3.3 Data
We downloaded a full-text dump from the Wikipedia toolserver and constructed the
time-varying graph of the article network on a weekly basis. In addition to the measures
of an article’s network position, which lie at the heart of our analysis, we extracted
data on additional variables like the length of the page, the number of authors or the
categories to which the article belongs. These variables are described in detail in the
next section. Details about the data extraction and the descriptive statistics can be
found in Appendix B.
3.3.1 The Anatomy of the Data Set
In the data set we find approximately 7, 000 articles that were inexistent at the
beginning of our period of observation or ceased to exist before the end and are, hence,
excluded from the analysis. Using network analysis we identify one large cluster within
the category that can be reached via the directed network of incoming links. Following
a typical classification that Capocci et al. (2006) apply to Wikipedia, we observe that
these pages are either part of the one strongly connected component (set of pages
mutually reachable via hyperlinks) or of the out-component (pages reachable from the
strongly connected component) of the subnetwork formed by pages associated to the
category of economics. We observe 7, 635 pages that are always part of this cluster,
which we refer to as the “connected component in the category economics” (or just
“connected” or “reachable” articles). The other pages could not always be reached via
the category network. During the period of observation, 1, 237 of these pages received
an incoming link from the connected component in the category economics, and thus
became part of that component.
Consequently, we use two data sets for our analysis. The first data set is a balanced
panel observing the 7, 635 articles that remain in the connected component during 153
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weeks. It contains in total 1, 168, 155 observations.5 In the second data set we use
only those articles that get connected to the economics category during the period of
observation. In total we count 1, 237 such pages and observing them weekly results
in 203, 031 observations of this group. In this sample we discarded a small portion of
articles that are not only disconnected (in the sense of not linked to the major cluster in
the network) from the economics category but also from the entire German Wikipedia
at some point in time.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics of our variables for the balanced panel of
articles that are always reachable from the category.6 The unit of observation is an
article in a given week and we observe the network position of each article in terms of
incoming hyperlinks. We observe the length of a page in bytes, how many authors it
has and when it was created. One byte corresponds roughly to one letter. The median
length is 3630 bytes and the median article was written by 16 authors. Our main
centrality measures are indegree and closeness centrality. Both are calculated for the
entire Wikipedia and for the articles belonging to the category economics. The indegree
is calculated as the number of direct links pointing to a page from the entire German
Wikipedia and from the category the article was drawn from. Since articles from the
category are also contained in the entire Wikipedia, we report the difference of the two
indegrees. By sample construction, every page is connected to the category and hence
receives at least one link from it. The median page has eleven links from Wikipedia,
four of which are from within the category. Articles usually belong to more than one
category, but we do not observe these additional categories.7 The distributions of the
centrality variables show that for many articles half or more of the links come from
economics. Consequently we consider that this category is central to the majority of
the articles we observe. Maximal values of page length, the number of authors and
indegree lie far above the 90th percentile.
The closeness centrality measures are based on the inverse average distance of
one article to all other articles in the relevant network.8 Again, the directed centrality
measure is computed on both the network made up by pages in the category and the
5In ongoing research we analyze articles that come to existence during the period of observation.
6Since many distributions are strongly left-shaped while having a long right tail, we prefer tables
with percentiles to a graphical illustration
7Except for the category sociology that we use for sensitivity analysis.
8Closeness centrality in terms of incoming links for an article i on a network containing N articles
is defined as the inverse of the sum of shortest paths (geodesic distances) Dij to that article multiplied
by the maximal path length N − 1. Articles j from which no path leads to i (j /∈M) are assigned the
distance N , which exceeds the longest possible distance by one:
Ci =
N − 1∑
j∈M Dij +
∑
j /∈M N
.
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entire German Wikipedia. We observe in our data that the original closeness measures
are mainly driven by the variations in the share of disconnected articles and in the
network size over time (not reported). In order to abstract from these effects, we
compute the relative closeness ranks for our balanced panel. This procedure may be
useful in work on dynamic networks in general. In the econometric estimation we
use age and dummies for redirect pages and pages containing a literature section as
control variables. Several other variables come to mind, that could be included as
controls. Some of them are the number of references, the number of distinct authors
that contributed in the past, etc. However, on the page level, fundamental differences
in the averages of the levels or the growth rates in these variables are all captured
by the page fixed effect we include in every regression. We therefore opted for a
succinct specification with only the three controls we already mentioned. Age captures
whether the article has been on the wiki for a long time or whether it is still “under
construction”. The indicator variable for redirect pages flags pages that were converted
to a linkpage, which merely redirects the reader to the page of a synonym. The presence
of a literature section, finally, points to an article that draws extensively on scientific,
literary or journalistic sources outside Wikipedia and therefore tends to be longer. The
median age of articles is 217 weeks, that is roughly four years. Only around ten percent
of the articles are less than two years old, so the majority of articles in our sample are
mature articles. Table 3.2 shows the same summary statistics as Table 3.1, but for the
sample of articles that get connected to the category of economics during the period
of observation. We consider the sample over the entire 153 weeks. In the beginning,
none of the articles can be reached from the main component but all become connected
later on. The page length and the number of authors are generally a bit smaller, but
otherwise show a rather similar distribution, except for the 90th percentile and the
maximum. The median page length of 3, 044 bytes is about 600 bytes shorter than
the median page length of articles that are always part of the connected component.
The number of links within the category is smaller by sample design, since most of the
articles are disconnected from the main component of the category for many weeks.
The number of links from outside the category is similar in median in both samples but
considerably smaller in the upper percentiles of the sample of articles that are initially
disconnected. We do not report the closeness in this sample because it is mainly driven
by the fact of being connected or disconnected. The articles are slightly younger than
those in the main sample, but the median age still lies far above three years.
Figure 3.1 shows the development of median values of page length, the number of
authors and indegree over the 153 weeks observed. The figure documents the growth
that articles experience over time and hence the need to control for time effects in our
estimation.
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To see how often the variables typically change for individual pages, we aggregate
the frequency of changes in the network and content variables over time. This is shown
in Table 3.3, where the unit of observation is a page observed throughout the 153 weeks
and the table displays the number of changes in variables. The changes are reported
for our main sample of articles that are always reachable from the large component
of the category. Less than 25 percent of the pages never experience any change in
their number of incoming links and less than ten percent are never edited nor receive
any additional author. At the same time we see that most articles do not change in
any given period, since the frequency of changes of 90 percent of the articles lies at or
below 15 to 36 out of 153. An exception are the closeness measures, which change nearly
every week for every page. They depend on the structure of the entire network, which
is subject to almost permanent change, especially when the entire German Wikipedia
is being considered.
Finally, Table 3.4 displays the magnitude of changes for all observations with
non-zero change. The reason not to keep the balanced panel here is to make the
distribution of changes more visible, which is otherwise dominated by zeros. The
median change in page length is 18 bytes in a week, which corresponds to about two
words. This highlights that small changes are frequent in the work that many authors
contribute to Wikipedia in order to improve the quality of articles. The 75th and the
90th percentile lie at 70 and 309 bytes, which corresponds to a short sentence and a
very short paragraph. The median and also most frequent change in incoming links per
week is equal to one. The maximal values of changes in page length and links seem to
correspond to reverts of entire articles and lie far above the 99th percentile. Changes
in closeness are quite symmetrically distributed around zero, which is not surprising,
since we use a relative closeness measure. As much as 80 percent of the changes amount
to an increase of far less than one point (of 100) in the relative closeness position per
week. The distribution of changes is important for interpreting the strength of the
effects obtained in our regressions.
3.4 Relationships of Interest and Methodology
3.4.1 Network Position and User-Generated Content
We are interested in analyzing whether a higher centrality in the article network is
associated with (i) more content being generated and (ii) contributions by new rather
than by previous authors of a page. Our main explanatory variables are measures of
centrality in the network of incoming hyperlinks. As described in the previous section,
we have four centrality measures: the number of incoming links within the category
58 CHAPTER 3. NETWORK CENTRALITY AND CONTENT CREATION
economics (indegree within category) and from the entire German Wikipedia (global
indegree) as well as the closeness rank in the network of the category and in the global
network. As further control variables we add dummies for an article being a redirect,
for the presence of a literature section and for article age. We assume that the relation
between outcomes and indegrees may be linear or quadratic while the other variable
enter our estimation only in a linear way. Data from Wikipedia pages are generated
inside two network contexts, the authors network, analyzed in several previous studies,
and the hyperlink network formed by the pages, which we are investigating. The
skewness and the long tails in the distributions of the number of incoming links, the
page length and the number of authors underline that the data show similar properties
as other network data. Like with almost all dynamic network data, at least three
sources of endogeneity play a role in potentially affecting our estimates.
Firstly, articles differ substantially in their relevance to the wider audience and
in other unobserved dimensions. Particularly the difference in their relevance is likely
to affect both the network position and the content generation in the same direction,
thus generating correlation between these two variables. Secondly, Wikipedia is a
collaborative site where the content matter of certain pages is subject to unobserved
exogeneous shocks and seasonalities. Sudden spikes of interest in certain issues might
lead to more authors contributing to single pages or to the entire platform. Moreover,
since contributions to Wikipedia continuously grow and inevitably generate some
hyperlinks, page length and hyperlinks may both have a time trend. The third source of
endogeneity stems from editors who simultaneously edit page B and set a link from page
A to page B. Such activity will also lead to a correlation between the network position of
a page and its content, but the author’s attention will not have been attracted to editing
page B via the link from page A. Other and observationally equivalent problems are
caused by temporal variations in other unobserved factors such as authors’ idiosyncratic
preferences, or article popularity in general, which influence both content creation and
links. Note that measuring the position of articles based on a two-mode author-article
network suffers from similar problems.
Like Kittur and Kraut (2008) and Ransbotham et al. (2012) we use the temporal
structure of the data to track the variation within one and the same article by
using article fixed effects. Moreover the data are rich enough to allow controlling for
systematic temporal variation or particularities of singular weeks by employing time
fixed effects. We estimate two-way fixed effects panel regressions based on the following
equations:
(page length)it = αi + αt + β ∗ (centralityit) + γ ∗Xit + it (3.1)
(num. authors)it = αi + αt + β ∗ (centralityit) + γ ∗Xit + it (3.2)
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where centralityit is a vector of the four centrality measures mentioned above.
Xit includes the three control variables indicating redirects, literature sections and
age (weeks since the first edit), i designates the article and t the week. Fundamental
differences between pages in the averages (of levels and growth rates) of other relevant
variables, such as the number of references, the number of distinct authors that
contributed in the past, will all be captured by the page fixed effects, which we include
in every regression. Since the data allow observing an article’s network position in a
panel design, we can effectively tackle the first two sources of endogeneity, which are
constant heterogeneity specific to articles and time trends or time-dependent shocks
that affect the entire network.
Tackling the third source of endogeneity, reverse causality from content to links,
is more difficult in our data of connected articles as it cannot be dealt with by fixed
effects alone. Unfortunately, we are also not aware of any completely exogenous and
quasi-experimental source of variation of articles’ network position that allows us to
set up an empirical analysis based on the period before and after of such a variation.
However, we can implement a research design, where we look at a large variation
in network position and analyze the growth of that article before and after this event.
To do so, we can make use of a special type of pages in order to shed more light on the
effect of network position on content provision. These are the articles that are initially
disconnected from the large economics cluster and that got connected in our period
of observation. In order to understand why looking at these articles may be useful,
note that authors in general do not observe whether an article is connected to a large
component or not. Experienced users may look at the option that allows to display the
direct links pointing to a page. Yet, users will not necessarily employ it when linking
from another page and, more importantly, they will not see how the linking articles
themselves are connected. Most authors will thus not consciously decide to link an
article from a large cluster of several thousand articles from which it was previously
not accessible. The length of the page may influence the creation of links towards
this page. But we expect that there is no systematic relation between page length
and whether new links come from outside the category, from isolated pages within the
category (which leaves the article disconnected from the cluster economics) or from
the main cluster of the category. If we find an effect of getting connected to the large
cluster of the category economics that is strong and lasting compared to the coefficients
of the indegrees found in the sample of always connected articles, we consider that it
plausibly results from the sudden sharp increase in connectedness. This sharp increase
is reflected in a discontinuity in the closeness centrality.
When looking at the articles that get connected to the category, we examine both
the effects on the page length (level) and on the growth in page length. If we find a
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significant effect of getting connected on page growth, we consider it to be unlikely to
rely on a correlation between connectedness and the error term, since this unobserved
effect on the error term would have to coincide with connectedness not only in the
period of getting connected but also in future periods.
3.4.2 Getting Connected to the Category of Economics
In order to analyze the effect of becoming part of the connected component in the
category of economics, we put together a sample that includes articles that are at first
not connected, but become connected to the category at some point during our period
of observation. There are in total 1, 237 of these articles. Since the change in closeness
centrality is very similar for all of them, we just consider a dummy for becoming
connected. We do not consider additional changes in indegree, since we know that
most articles change by one link at maximum in a given week and do not change in
most weeks. Therefore accounting for getting connected and indegree simultaneously
may result in overcontrolling. We analyze both the length and the rate of change of
a page from five weeks before the page becomes connected until five weeks after. In
a few cases we observe that a page was connected more than once. In those cases we
consider only the last time when the page gets connected in our sample.
For the eleven weeks in the sample, we regress page length on an indicator variable
that takes the value of one if the page can be reached via the links from the main
component of economics and zero otherwise. This means it takes the value zero in the
five weeks before connection and the value one in the week when connection occurs
as well as in the five weeks after. Furthermore we regress the first difference of page
length over time on the same indicator variable. The two-way fixed effects regressions
thus take the form:
(page length)it = αi + αt + β ∗ ι(page connected)it + it (3.3)
∆(page length)it = αi + αt + β ∗ ι(page connected)it + it (3.4)
with t = 0 at the period of the jump into the category and t ∈ {−5, ..., 5}.
In order to alleviate the concern that becoming connected is rather the effect than the
cause of simultaneous editing of the target page and the pages pointing to it around
week 0, we compare weeks −7 to −3 with weeks 3 to 7 in a further specification
(reported in Table 3.7). While our approach reduces the vulnerability to simultaneity
issues in important aspects, fully disentangling the factors that might drive simultaneity
would require exogenous instruments or the ability to explicitly account for the identity
of the linking articles and their properties, which we believe to be a fruitful avenue for
further research.
3.5. RESULTS 61
3.5 Results
Table 3.5 shows the two-way fixed effects regressions corresponding to equation 3.1,
where page length is regressed on several sets of network variables, article fixed effects
and time fixed effects.9 The table shows the result for 7, 635 articles from the category
economics that belong to the large cluster in that category throughout the entire 153
weeks. The first column shows the coefficients for the number of links that the page
receives from the entire Wikipedia and a squared term. Our estimates indicate that
an additional link pointing to a page is associated with 13 more bytes of text. This
corresponds to one or two words. The insignificant coefficient on the quadratic term
indicates no curvature. A main question of our investigation is whether the effect of
links from the category is different from the mean effect of all links. In the second
column we add the number of links that the page receives from other pages of the
category economics. These links represent a subset of the global links. The effect can
be interpreted as the additional effect from a link being a category link. The coefficient
for a category link is more than ten times higher than the coefficient obtained when
not differentiating between the two groups of links. Moreover, the new variables render
the coefficient for a link that comes from outside the category small and insignificant,
suggesting that the explanatory power mostly stems from the category network. Since
we run regressions with article fixed effects, the coefficients apply to deviations from
the averages that are specific to the article. If the number of incoming links from
the category exceeds this average by one, the target page is by 141 bytes longer
(considering the sum of the two linear coefficients). For links from the category we
estimate significant declining effects, with the coefficient for the quadratic term taking,
however, a rather low value of −0.13.
Column 3 and 4 add the relative closeness rank, which measures whether a page is
located rather in the center of the network or rather in its periphery. Column 3 shows
the specification of column 1 augmented with the relative rank in closeness on the entire
Wikipedia. Given that we scaled the rank variable such that it ranges from 0 to 100,
the coefficient indicates that a ten points improvement in the relative closeness position
is associated with 150 additional bytes of content. In the descriptive statistics we saw
that the closeness of most articles changes by less than one point in any given week.
From this point of view the effect looks small. Moreover, the size of the coefficient
for indegree is barely affected and the added explanatory power of the new variable is
rather low. Finally, Column 4 brings together all available network variables, including
the measure of the closeness rank both on Wikipedia and inside the category. The
9Time fixed effects were implemented manually by adding a dummy for each point in time in the
regression.
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coefficient of the closeness rank inside the category is insignificant and the coefficient
of the closeness rank on the entire German Wikipedia is even smaller than in column
3. The coefficient of the number of links from the category remains very close to its
value in column 2. The control dummies for redirects and a literature section have the
expected signs. Older articles tend to be longer.
To analyze the robustness of the last result we replace the contemporaneous
measures of centrality by the ones from the week before and we ran the analysis
after eliminating more outliers from the sample. We also perform the estimation for a
different category, sociology, and we repeated the estimation when including a proxy
for how often a page was clicked in the last week. Finally we checked, whether the
higher centrality is not only associated with more content but also with more authors.
All of these checks confirm the main results from above. All robustness checks are
presented in Appendix B. We report the four robustness checks on content generation
in Table B.1, and the results on new authors in Table B.2
Summing up our results for the connected component in the category of economics,
we find that a higher number of links from articles in the same category is associated
with more content generation and additional authors. The increase in page length
related to an additional link from the category may look small since it corresponds to a
short sentence. From the descriptive statistics we saw, however, that small changes are
an essential ingredient of the development of Wikipedia. Consequently, we consider the
effect as non-negligible. The effect of links from outside the category is insignificant in
our main specification and significant but about three times smaller in some robustness
checks. The effect of closeness centrality is negligible.
The regressions in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 use the information on the 1, 237 pages
that get connected to the main cluster of economics during the period of observation.
This is associated with a discontinuous jump in closeness centrality at the time of
connection, which can be identified and used to contrast the level (and the growth) of
the content before and after this event. Table 3.6 shows the results when we consider
5 periods before and after the jump, also including the period of the jump itself.
The first two columns show the results from a simple pooled OLS regression, whereas
columns 3 and 4 show the two-way fixed effects results when including both time and
article dummies. The coefficients affecting the level of the page length (column 1 and
3) indicate that getting connected is associated with an increase in page length by
approximately 400 bytes. This effect is both significant and sizeable compared to the
effect of one additional link in the previous sample. The explanatory power of the
regression is, however, very low. The cumulative effect over five weeks is even stronger
for the first differences of page length (columns 2 and 4), ranging from 66 bytes per
week in the pooled regression to 195 bytes per week when including time and article
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fixed effects. These are sizeable effects which cannot be expected to last forever. It
might be that a share of the additional content is provided in the same week as the
article gets connected.
In Table 3.7 we account for that possibility, by excluding the week of the “jump”
into the connected component and the two weeks before and after. Instead we consider
two five-week intervals that are separated by the interval two weeks before and after the
jump (i.e., week −7 to −3 vs. week 3 to 7). As expected, the coefficients get smaller,
which indicates that a substantial fraction of the newly generated content is provided
within the weeks after the new connection was established. However, the effects remain
by and large positive and indicate that an article grows by 9 (pooled) to 21 bytes per
week (fixed effects) faster during weeks 3 to 7 after being connected. We still observe
not only a level but also a growth effect.
3.6 Conclusion
The creation of user-generated content in a peer production setting requires mechanisms
that help producers to identify content they want to contribute to. We consider the
network of hyperlinks between Wikipedia articles as a possible channel of spillovers
in production activity that attracts more producer effort to more central articles. We
find that the page length of an article is positively associated with the number of links
pointing to it after controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, time effects
and several other variables.
On average, one more link is associated with a page length that is 13 bytes higher,
which corresponds roughly to one or two words. When differentiating between links
within the category economics, which we selected as sample, and links from other
Wikipedia pages, we find a large discrepancy in effects. One more link from an article
from inside the category is related to an increase in page length of around 140 bytes.
This is a sizeable effect given that the median weekly change in page length, excluding
observations without any change is only 18 bytes. At the same time, the coefficients for
links from outside the category becomes insignificant. The importance of links from the
same category is corroborated in several robustness checks which persistently confirm
that the effect of links from outside the category is much smaller. Moreover, links
from the category are strongly related to new authors’ contributions. On average every
second additional link from the category is associated with a new author contributing to
the page. These results are all obtained in a balanced sample of articles that are always
connected to the large cluster of the category. Articles that are initially not connected
increase by more than 300 bytes in length during the five weeks after connection.
Taken together the results suggest that adding missing hyperlinks to Wikipedia or
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extending the content of articles in a way that it connects better to other articles may
not only improve the quality of the information but also foster further contribution
by authors that have not yet contributed to the newly linked articles. While the size
of the additional contributions that may be expected is not very high, these changes
of a few words or one sentence constitute a large part of contributions to Wikipedia.
This strategy is expected to work best within a cluster of thematically related articles.
Links from articles that do not share a central category with the target article seem
to enhance content generation much less. Thus we find new evidence that semantical
relatedness may matter more than the mere presence of direct links between pages in
generating spillovers in content provision.
From a researcher’s perspective, our results suggest that it may be an acceptable
strategy in the context of content networks to use only a smaller group of articles
(nodes) for network computations, which share a common category, as long as one
does not extrapolate the result to the unobserved nodes. This should not be said
without adding a word of caution: First, our results are not based on a two-mode
author-article network considered in several other studies but on the link network of
Wikipedia articles. Whether they extend to two-mode contexts remains to be tested.
Second, our conclusions are obtained based on data from relatively mature articles and
should be reexamined for newly created articles.
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3.7 Tables
3.7.1 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of main variables. Connected articles.
min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 max
Length of page (in bytes) 20 1049 1872 3630 7470 14089 229379
Number of authors 1 6 9 16 30 56 821
Links from Wikipedia 1 2 5 11 28 76 7981
Links from Wikipedia excl. categ. 0 0 2 6 17 53 7750
Links from category 1 1 2 4 10 23 667
Rel. closeness rank (Wikipedia) .013 10 25 50 75 90 100
Rel. closeness rank (category) .013 10 25 50 75 90 100
Dummy: literature section 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Dummy: page is redirect 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Age (in months) 1 113 162 217 271 316 492
Articles that were always connected to econ. main component. Number of observations: 1168155
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of main variables. Articles that get connected to
category.
min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 max
Length of page (in bytes) 19 915 1653 3044 5207 9231 67988
Number of authors 1 5 8 12 20 33 267
Links from Wikipedia 1 2 4 7 13 24 3914
Links from Wikipedia excl. categ. 0 1 2 5 10 21 3910
Links from category 0 0 1 1 2 4 122
Dummy: literature section 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Dummy: page is redirect 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Age (in months) 1 84 129 181 236 283 451
Number of observations included: 203031.
Table 3.3: Summary statistics of the frequency of changes of main variables.
min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 max
Length of page (in bytes) 0 3 5 11 22 36 136
Number of authors 0 2 4 7 14 24 123
Links from Wikiped (excl. categ.) 0 0 1 4 12 34 152
Links from categ. 0 0 1 3 7 15 121
Rel. closeness rank (Wikipedia) 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Rel. closeness rank (categ.) 149 151 152 152 152 152 152
The unit of observation is a page over entire period. Number of pages included: 7635
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3.7.2 Regression Results
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Table 3.5: Relationship of page length and centrality.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wiki degree Wiki & cat. add closeness all vars
Links from Wikipedia 13.333*** 2.958 12.934*** 2.931
(3.18) (1.22) (3.14) (1.22)
(Links from Wikipedia)2 -0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.001**
(-0.54) (2.04) (-0.47) (2.07)
Links from category 138.129*** 135.871***
(8.80) (8.47)
(Links from category)2 -0.130*** -0.127***
(-5.24) (-5.02)
Rel. closeness rank (Wikipedia) 15.216*** 7.505***
(6.17) (3.08)
Rel. closeness rank (category) -1.230
(-0.67)
Dummy: literature section 1295.963*** 1249.985*** 1287.521*** 1248.055***
(6.11) (5.95) (6.07) (5.94)
Age (in months) 10.648*** 8.361*** 10.692*** 8.416***
(21.55) (22.76) (21.85) (22.46)
Dummy: page is redirect -546.408 -742.157 -590.851 -767.075
(-0.57) (-0.77) (-0.59) (-0.77)
Constant 3336.571*** 2803.789*** 2582.005*** 2501.686***
(30.10) (22.18) (16.28) (15.73)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1168155 1168155 1168155 1168155
Groups 7635 7635 7635 7635
Adj. R2 0.107 0.130 0.109 0.131
t statistics in parentheses
2-way fixed effects OLS regressions with both time and article dummies (robust stand. errors)
Only articles connected over entire period were included. Dependent variable: page length.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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3.7.3 Figures
Development of variables over time
Figure 3.1: Development of the median of the outcomes and the indegree over time.
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Notes: The figure shows the development of the median of the outcomes and the indegree
in both groups, the always connected sample and the smaller jumping sample.
Chapter 4
Market Structure and Market
Performance in E-Commerce*
4.1 Introduction
Under reasonably general conditions, the consequences of an increase in the number of
market participants are lower prices and lower markups. The empirical assessment of
this relation is however not an easy task. Markups are not readily available, and prices
and market structure are endogenous: firms may enter in response to perceived profit
opportunities or may exit in response to realized losses.2,3
In this paper, we use a novel instrumental variables strategy to investigate the
interaction between market structure and market performance in e-commerce. We use
data for digital cameras from an Austrian online price-comparison site (price search
engine). We observe the firms’ retail and input prices as well as all their moves in
the entry and the pricing game. When we measure the rate at which markups decline
towards zero, we account for the endogenous timing decision to list a specific product
by using previous listing decisions as instruments. In addition, we include product
fixed effects to capture unobserved quality and design features of the specific cameras
*This chapter is coauthored with Franz Hackl (University of Linz), Rudolf Winter-Ebmer
(University of Linz & IHS, Vienna) and Christine Zulehner (Goethe University Frankfurt & WIFO,
Vienna). A paper with the same title is forthcoming in the European Economic Review. We would
like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Furthermore, we
thank Irene Bertschek, Sara Fisher-Ellison, Avi Goldfarb, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Michelle Haynes,
Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, Ariel Pakes, Martin Peitz, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler and the participants
of the SEEK 2010 Workshop on online markets for valuable comments. We are indebted to geizhals.at
and a producer of consumer electronics for providing the data. Andreas Lumesberger and Sergiy
Golovin provided invaluable research assistance. This project was supported by ZEW’s SEEK research
program.
2One way to account for endogeneity is developing a structural model of market structure, entry,
and exit. The pioneering study on entry into local markets by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) shows that
the first two or three entrants have the largest impact on market price, and that later entrants do not
significantly reduce market price any further.
3Experimental evidence of this relation goes back to Selten (1973), who coined the statement “four
are few and six are many.”
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as these might be correlated with both markups and firms’ entry. To obtain a full
picture of the underlying model of competition, we then follow Baye et al. (2004) and
Haynes and Thompson (2008a) and analyze measures of price dispersion as well.4
We further analyze the relation of the number of firms and markups across the
product life cycle. Products in e-commerce are very often only listed for a short time,
which allows us to observe products from birth to death.5 This is important for three
reasons: i) Entry in such a market is particularly easy because an existing firm only has
to decide whether to list a new camera or not. This low entry cost makes the number of
firms volatile and provides an optimal testing field.6 ii) Several researchers have claimed
that competition or the absence thereof is particularly important at the beginning of
a product life cycle, while later on, competition may matter less.7 In particular, when
a new product emerges on the market and consumers are uncertain about their tastes,
they may postpone their purchasing decision. Firms react to this uncertainty of demand
and various price dynamics might be the consequence.8 iii) Finally, we investigate the
effect of substitutes on the markup over the product life cycle and are interested in
differences between newly innovated and old expiring technologies as well as between
own brand and rivals’ brand products.9
We are not the first to investigate the relation of market structure and market
performance in e-commerce. Previous studies such as Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000),
Baye et al. (2009), Baye et al. (2003) and Haynes and Thompson (2008a), however,
do not take the endogeneity of the number of sellers and product life cycle effects into
account.10 Baye et al. (2003) and Baye et al. (2004) look at price dispersion using
4For example, monopolistic competition predicts markups and price dispersion to go down when
the number of firms increases (Perloff and Salop, 1985); while in a model with heterogeneity in
consumers’ search cost and producers’ marginal cost the latter would go up (Carlson and McAfee,
1983).
5The average span of the product life cycle of digital cameras amounts to 167 days in our data.
6In a recent survey, Martin (2012) argues that market structure may adapt only slowly to long-run
equilibrium levels and many entering firms may be atypical fringe firms unable to influence market
structure at the core. While this describes well-established markets with market leaders and high
advertising requirements, market structure in e-commerce is different: due to the cheap and easy
establishment of online shops, many such shops operate only online.
7Examples include Berry (1992), Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005), Carlton (1983), Davis (2006),
Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Geroski (1989), Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006), and Toivanen
and Waterson (2000, 2005). For a survey see Berry and Reiss (2007).
8See, for example, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006a,b), who analyze dynamic price paths in
monopolistic settings and find that in mass markets prices should decrease over the product cycle.
9Klepper (1996, 2002) describes the evolutionary pattern of birth and maturity of technologically
progressive industries and we apply and extend the predictions of his model to the market of consumer
electronics.
10Barron et al. (2004) analyze the relationship of markups and price dispersion and the number of
firms using data from gasoline retail markets. They find that both markups and price dispersion
decrease as the number of firms increases and interpret this as evidence in favor of models of
monopolistic competition.
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various metrics. Baye et al. (2004), for example, analyze price dispersion measured
by the relative price gap (the difference of the first and second price) and show that
it decreases as a function of the number of firms, but not over time. Haynes and
Thompson (2008a) use data on 400 digital cameras in the US and show that with more
firms in the market prices go down and dispersion increases. Ellison and Ellison (2005,
2009) examine the competition of internet retailers and identify different strategies that
are applied in online markets to cope with the increased price sensitivity.
The empirical literature investigating the market structure along the life cycle of
a consumer product is rather small. Haynes and Thompson (2008b) take a first step
to explain entry and exit behavior in a shopbot. To do so, they estimate an error-
correction model and show that entry into and exit from a market are correlated with
a measure of lagged price-cost margins and the number of competitors. Barron et al.
(2004) mention the life cycle, but use it only as a control variable. In the marketing
literature, Moe and Yang (2009) analyze the product life cycle in e-tailing. However,
their data did not allow them to consider the endogeneity of entry and exit. Hitsch
(2006) considers the dynamic decision problem of a single firm that is uncertain about
the demand for a new product and shows that in the ready-to-eat cereal industry the
value of reducing uncertainty is large. This indicates that there are product cycle effects
which should be accounted for.
For e-commerce in Austria, we find a highly significant results of the number of
firms on markups. Ten additional competitors in the market are associated with a
reduction of the median markups by 0.23 percentage points and the minimum markup
by 0.55 percentage points. However, accounting for the potential endogeneity of
markups and the number of firms in the market, we see a substantially higher negative
outcome: ten additional retailers tend to reduce the markup of the median firm by
0.95 percentage points and the markup of the cheapest firm by 1.24 percentage points.
We also find that having one more firm in the market apparently reduces the markup
of the price leader by the same amount as the competition between existing firms in
a period of three additional weeks in the product life cycle. If we abstract from any
dynamic or product life cycle effects, our results support the validity of search theoretic
models such as Carlson and McAfee (1983) or Baye and Morgan (2001) and contradict
models of monopolistic competition.
We use firms’ past listings decisions as an instrument. We argue that this is a
valid instrument as products offered in different markets some time ago should have
no direct influence on prices and sales of current products. Potential threats to this
identification strategy are the timing of past listing decisions and the similarity of
products. We thus run robustness checks on the instrument by varying the timing
of firms’ past behavior and using markets farther away in terms of time or model
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specification from our chosen product market. The results of these robustness checks
show qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results to our preferred specification.
Furthermore, we find that there is a highly significant age effect, i.e., the longer a
product is on the market the lower are markups. Although Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki
(2006a) only consider monopolistic markets, this result could be interpreted in support
of their price dynamics when consumers are uncertain about their tastes of a product
which newly emerged on the market and when there is social learning.
Our main results on the effects of competition are robust to the inclusion of varying
numbers of substitutes over the life cycle of the product. For products with a higher
number or substitutes we measure lower markups, in particular if the substitutes are
newer products and come from rivals rather then from the same brand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the theoretical
predictions derived in the literature in Section 4.2 and describe the data as well as the
empirical strategy in Section 4.3. We discuss our estimation results in Section 4.4 and
conclude in Section 4.5.
4.2 Theoretical Predictions
Our paper aims at explaining the effect of market structure on markups and on price
dispersion. While under reasonably general conditions the direction of the effect is
clear, search cost may complicate things. Therefore, we now discuss the various models
and potential hypotheses. As our empirical analysis also includes the effects over the
product life cycle, we discuss the literature on price dynamics and industry dynamics
with overlapping technologies as well.
As earlier studies have argued, models allowing for price dispersion in a
homogenous market have been classified into three groups:11 i) First, search-theoretic
models (Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980)), which evoke price dispersion by introducing
heterogeneity in the search costs of consumers. These models predict that an increased
number of sellers results in a larger price dispersion and – somewhat counter-intuitively
– a higher average price. Baye and Morgan (2001) is an example that directly considers
e-commerce. They get rid of the counterintuitive result on market structure by
allowing for different groups of consumers (a price-insensitive group and price-sensitive
consumers who take advantage of zero online search costs) which makes the retailers’
randomization over prices rational. ii) Models of monopolistic competition (Perloff and
Salop, 1985) can account for price dispersion when extended by asymmetries across
firms such as heterogeneous producer cost or heterogeneous producer demand (Barron
11See, for example, Barron et al. (2004) or Haynes and Thompson (2008a).
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et al., 2004). These models would predict that a larger number of sellers is associated
with a lower average price and smaller price dispersion. iii) Carlson and McAfee (1983)
present a search-theoretic model that accommodates two sources of heterogeneity by
assuming a non-degenerate distribution of producers’ marginal cost and heterogeneous
visiting cost of consumers. Here, the prediction is that average prices would go down
while price dispersion would rise.
In the purely search theoretic approach as it was coined by Varian (1980) two
types of consumers are present in the market. One type has very low search cost
and will hence always buy at the cheapest shop, while the other one with high search
cost will buy from a random shop. As a consequence shops have to strike a balance
between aiming to be the cheapest shop and selling to all the price-sensitive consumers
or confining themselves to their share of price-insensitive consumers but selling to
them with a higher markup. In such a setup, everything else being equal an increased
number of sellers results in a larger price dispersion and – somewhat counter-intuitively
– a higher average price.
Baye and Morgan (2001) theoretically investigate the market for information
gatekeepers. They analyze the behavior of firms listed on a price-comparison site as
well as the behavior of the monopolistic shopbot. Shops, which have a local monopoly
in their town, have to choose between serving only the uninformed population of their
own town or advertising on the price-comparison site to potentially serve informed
customers in all other towns as well. Consumers, on the other hand, have the option
to subscribe to the price-information site or to remain uninformed. In the first case,
they can choose from among all shops, but in the latter case they can only buy locally.
Given the site’s behavior and the share of consumers using the site, the model predicts
that the shops will randomize over prices in the price setting equilibrium. They do
so in order to maintain positive markups without being undercut by their opponents
with certainty. Thus, they generate price dispersion in the market for this homogenous
product. The impact of more competition on the platform is not explicitly analyzed
in the model. Yet it is relatively easy to see that the minimum price (the lower bound
of the support of the price distribution in their model) is decreasing in the number
of firms, whereas the range of the distribution (price dispersion) increases with an
increasing number of firms.
In models of monopolistic competition it is assumed that consumers perceive
products to be different across sellers. If all sellers have the same marginal cost,
each consumer draws her valuation for the good offered by each seller from a common
distribution, and demand is symmetric, then Perloff and Salop (1985) show that an
increase in the number of sellers yields an increase in the price elasticity of individual
firm demand, lowers the markup and the equilibrium price. If demand is asymmetric
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and the number of different seller types is constant, an extension of the analysis (Barron
et al., 2004) indicates that the increase in the number of sellers of each type will yield
a reduction of markups and prices through an increased price elasticity across sellers.
Because of the reduction in markups for sellers and common marginal cost, the variance
in markups decreases with an increase in competition. As a consequence the price
dispersion diminishes.12
Carlson and McAfee (1983) assume monopolistic competition with heterogeneous
firms in market where heterogenous buyers search. Buyers look for the best price until
their expected return from visiting one more shop is smaller than their search cost.
Shops, which have heterogeneous marginal cost, use pricing rules which depend on
the average price in the market. While price dispersion is due to the heterogeneous
marginal cost, they explicitly conjecture, that reputation or heterogeneous visibility
in advertisement would also generate equilibrium price dispersion. In equilibrium all
shops in the market make positive profits (those who do not are predicted to leave the
market), yet the most efficient ones make larger profits than the others. An increased
number of shops, all else equal, leads to lower prices and a modest increase in price
dispersion, which is bounded from above by the heterogeneity of the shops. As far
as the informational requirements of the model are concerned the model’s assumption
that every change of a shop’s pricing policy is perceived fits well with the setting on
a price comparison site. However, the reasoning of sequential search is somewhat at
odds with such a market setting.
The models discussed so far are static models. In a dynamic context, Bergemann
and Va¨lima¨ki (2006a,b) investigate the intertemporal incentives of a new buyer who
is uncertain about her tastes for an experience good. Their model of optimal pricing
assumes a monopolist that sells a new experience good over time to a population of
heterogeneous buyers. While oligopolistic competition is not analyzed, these models
provide insights into the intertemporal pricing effects per se. For example, Bergemann
and Va¨lima¨ki (2006a)’s results show that markets can be classified into mass and niche
markets. The dynamic equilibrium prices of mass markets decrease over time and
buyers purchase in all periods. In a niche market, however, not all consumers buy
at the static monopoly price. Therefore, the monopolist initially offers low prices to
capture a larger share of consumers. This is at the expense of targeting the more
solvent consumer group of the market. The results also hold in the context of social
learning which fits our market of digital cameras of one brand producer best. From
their analysis we expect price paths that could be either decreasing or increasing, at
12See Barron et al. (2004) for an extensive discussion on the models of monopolistic competition
and their predictions.
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least at the beginning of the product cycle. As we investigate the effect of the number
of firms over the product life cycle, our empirical results may also provide stylized facts
theoretical models could incorporate.
In his seminal work Klepper (1996) describes the evolutionary pattern of birth
and maturity of technologically progressive industries in form of overlapping product
life cycle: Innovation, entry, growth, decline and exit are driven by the way new
technologies evolve over time.13 Consumers are assumed as the driving force behind
this evolvement: as they experiment with alternative technological variants they form
a view on their preferred variation and decide on the success and failure of different
offered technologies. As a consequence overlapping product life cycles emerge in which
existing technology rivals with newly innovated and old expiring technologies. Although
Klepper has its focus on major technological innovations his model can also be applied
to our product markets on consumer electronics in which the product innovations
manifest as additional or increasingly powerful camera features. Our empirical model
differs from the work of (Klepper, 1996) and (Klepper, 2002) in various ways. Whereas
Klepper focuses on the innovational process of manufacturers our focus lies on the
retailers’ markup. Moreover, Klepper does not explicitly distinguish whether the
manufacturers’ innovation (new product) competes with the competitors’ or the own
products’ life cycle. While it typically always makes sense to skim off the rivals’ rents
by introducing new and better products, an early launch of new product generations
might cannibalize the sales of the the firms’ own and earlier introduced products.
4.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
Price search engine: In our analysis we use data from the only Austrian price
comparison site, www.geizhals.at. At the time of our analysis Geizhals.at listed on
average price offers from 1,200 firms for 200,000 products.14 The business model of
Geizhals is as follows: the retailers have to pay a fixed fee for each referral request of a
customer to the respective e-shop.16 If the retailer agrees to embed the Geizhals logo
13Further literature concentrating on market growth as the major driving force that explains market
entry and exit are Schmalensee (1989), Scherer and Ross (1990), Shaked and Sutton (1987), Sutton
(1991), Sutton (1998), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Asplund and
Sandin (1999).
14Recently, Geizhals has expanded to other European countries, including Germany, Poland, and
the United Kingdom.15 This recent internationalization led to a substantial expansion of products
and supplying retailers. At present, the website offers more than 723,000 products with 64 million
price quotes that can could be actualized by the retailers several times per day. In January 2012,
Geizhals registered 3.1 million “unique clients.” The number of unique clients is calculated from the
number of different terminal devices (PCs, PDAs, etc.) used to access a website.
16A referral request is a click by the customer on the link of an online shop at Geizhals.at. After
the click, the online shop of the retailer opens in a new browser window.
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and link on its website, a reduced fee is paid. If the total of these click-dependent fees
does not exceed a certain limit, the online store has to pay a flat fee. The electronic
retailers can list as many products they want and can change the prices as often they
want, free of charge. There is also no cost if retailers decide to suspend a certain
price quote temporarily. Hence, apart from a relatively small flat rate and the click-
dependent fee retailers are not confronted with entry or exit costs in the different
product markets.17 By this construction, Geizhals has the incentive to increase its
profits by permanently extending the number of retailers. However, at least in Austria,
Geizhals has already acquired such a strong reputation among customers that online
stores cannot afford not to be listed at geizhals.at as the market is dominated by this
price search engine. Hence, our data cover the whole electronic retailing market in
Austria.
Available data: For the study in this paper, we use daily data on 70 items (mainly
digital cameras) from a major hardware manufacturer,18 which were listed during the
period from January 2007 through December 2008.19 We define a camera’s birth by its
appearance on Geizhals.at. The cameras were offered by up to 203 sellers from Austria
and Germany. Fixed effects for the different products will control for the unobserved
heterogeneity of goods and traders on the varying product markets.
For time t (measured in days), we observe for each product i and retailer j the
priceijt,
20 the shipping costijt posted at the website,
21 and the availabilityijt of the
product.22 Additionally, we observe the customers’ referral requests (clicksijt) from
the Geizhals.at website to the retailers’ e-commerce website as a proxy for consumer
demand.23 Customers have the option to evaluate the (service) quality of the firms
on a five-point scale, the average of which is listed together with the price information
on Geizhals.at. Wholesale prices for each product i at time t were obtained from the
Austrian representative of the international manufacturer. We do not claim that these
wholesale prices correspond perfectly to the retailers’ marginal cost. Even though the
17Of the 1,200 retailers at the time of our analysis, only a very small number of retailers have other
contracts with Geizhals.at, e.g., they pay only for products actually sold.
18The hardware manufacturer is a multinational corporation specializing in manufacturing
electronic equipment in several areas. The manufacturer asked to keep its name anonymously.
19For our instrumentation strategy, we use also the product life cycle of cameras entering the market
starting from May 2006.
20We would like to stress that in our market transaction prices are equal to posted prices.
Consumers of digital cameras are most often no firms and have no bargaining power.
21Shipping cost is the only variable that has to be parsed from a text field. We use the information
on “cash in advance for shipping to Germany,” which is the type of shipping cost most widely quoted
by the shops. Missing shipping costs are imputed with the mean shipping cost by the other retailers
and controlled for with a dummy for imputed values.
22We coded two dummies whether the product was available immediately (or at short notice) or
within 2-4 days.
23See Dulleck et al. (2011b) for a description of the data.
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manufacturer’s distribution policy indicates that the retailers should be served by the
local representative, it may happen that single retailers procure commodities from,
for instance, the Asian market. Moreover, the local representative might offer special
promotions including lower wholesale prices in exceptional cases, e.g. if a retailer
commits to promoting the manufacturer’s good in a special way. Finally, it must be
mentioned that the retailers in e-commerce might have additional costs each time they
order in addition to the wholesale price. We assume this additional cost to be constant
for all stores. Despite these qualifications, our measures are a very good proxy for
the actual marginal cost of the retailers.24 Price ijt and wholesale price it were used to
calculate the firms’ markupijt
25 according to the Lerner index and the markets’ price
dispersion it.
Organization of data: We reorganized the data in such a way that the product
life cycles of all digicams start at the same day 1. Hence, we have shifted the product
life cycles of the digicams so that we can analyze the impact of market structure on
markup and price dispersion in each of the different stages of the product life cycle26.
Our panel consists of 70 product life cycles. We define the end of a product life cycle
as the point when the number of referral requests diminishes to less than 500 clicks.
Thus, we use a daily unbalanced panel with information on the products’ age, the
number of firms, average markups, the markup of the price leader, different measures
for price-dispersion, and the number of clicks for product market i over time t.
Descriptives: Table 1 contains summary statistics of the data. Our dataset
includes 70 complete product life cycles. The average length of a model’s life cycle
is 240 days with a standard deviation 133 days. Each observation in the descriptives
refers to a single product i at a given day t in the product life cycle. We will use the
markup (Lerner index) and the price dispersion as endogenous variables. Whereas the
median markup amounts to 18% on average, the mean markup for price leaders is only
4.8%. These numbers are of comparable size to those in Ellison and Snyder (2011),
who report an average markup of 4% for memory modules on Pricewatch.com. We use
different measures for price dispersion: the coefficient of variation and the standard
deviation of the distribution of prices, as well as the absolute price gap between the price
24According to the Austrian distributor the Austrian and German lists of wholesale prices are
almost identical. Note the manufacturer’s incentive to keep cross-border sales between distributors
and retailers as low as possible - an argument which supports the reliability of our wholesale prices as
indicator for marginal cost.
25To account for the problem that high markups might be economically irrelevant, we run all our
regressions also weighted by clicksijt. We do not observe quantities sold, only the clicks when a
consumer goes from the Geizhals.at website to the retailers’ e-commerce website. The clicks do, of
course, not reflect the actual demand, but we think is a valid indicator.
26We control for the contemporaneous structure of calendar time with dummies for each different
month in the dataset and with the number of substitutes at the respective calendar times.
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leader and the second cheapest price. On average, a product life cycle amounts to 166
days with a mean of 104 firms offering the digicams.
Figure 4.1 shows that the estimated markup declines with age, and, more
importantly, as the number of firms increases. The decline in markups with the
number of firms is a rather smooth phenomenon, and not as quick as one might expect
in perfectly transparent e-commerce markets. Even with 70 and more firms in the
market, there is a positive markup. In the top left panel, the median markupit is
scattered against the number of firmsit in the corresponding market; the top right
panel shows the average pattern. The number of firms ranges from 0 to more than 200
and the median markup ranges from 0 to 35%.
There are also some negative markups, especially for the minimum price firms,
where the average markup of the price leader is only 4.8%. In our dataset, we observe
negative markups for 26.9% of all best-price offers. This is in line with Ellison and
Snyder (2011), who also report a substantial number of price offers with negative
markups in the case of Pricewatch.com. Negative markups might have several possible
causes: they might simply point to sellouts after overstocking, they might hint to cases
where retailers are not procuring products via official retail channels, or they might
indicate the use of loss leader strategies where a digicam is offered at a price below
marginal cost to attract new customers or to make profits with complementary goods.
In the middle row, the median markup is plotted against the age of the product.
We typically observe a camera between seven and 15 months. Again, the markets’
median markups fall with the duration of the product life cycle. Our assumption of
constant variable costs for e-tailers squares well with the flattening of the markup after
3-4 months. In the lower row, the number or retailers is plotted against the age of the
camera: there is a steep increase in the number of listing firms at the very beginning
of the life cycle, whereas after 12 months the number of firms is declining again. This
average pattern hides some heterogeneity, which can be seen on the left-hand side.
Some cameras are listed only by a small number of firms (between 20 and 60). Then
there is a group of products which is offered by about 60 shops, and finally, the third and
largest group of cameras is listed by roughly 150 shops and more. This segmentation
can be explained by a specialization of shops on certain product categories. Whereas
some shops are focused in their assortment on mass products (simple digital cameras)
others restrict their range of products on highly specialized digital SLR cameras for
professionals. This heterogeneity over the products provides a first indication on the
importance of product-fixed effects in our estimations.
Empirical strategy: To estimate the impact of market structure on markups and
price dispersion, we estimate the following fixed-effects regression as our baseline model:
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markupit = γ + α1 ageit + α2 age
2
it + β1 numfirmsit + β2 numfirms
2
it + ωi + τt + it
This model will be estimated for the market’s i median markup and the minimum
markup; a similar strategy is used for price dispersion which is measured as the
coefficient of variation and other measures. Life cycle effects are captured by a
quadratic age trend. In a later specification, we compute separate splines for each
phase of the life cycle to capture varying competition effects over the life cycle of
the product. We included month-specific dummies to account for calendar-time fixed
effects (τt) and product fixed effects (ωi). Note that the product fixed effects control for
observable and unobservable product characteristics on the basis of which the e-tailers
build their profit expectations and thus make their decisions on the offered product
portfolio. These product fixed effects filter out product specific characteristics which
remain constant over the lifespan of the camera 27. Hence, for our analysis we exploit
only the time varying information within the life cycle of each product. However, we
have to control for potential endogeneity issues which are based on the time dimension
of firms’ listing decisions over the product life cycle.
Sources of endogeneity : In all markets, particularly in an e-tailing shopbot market,
it is important to treat market structure as endogenous; due of simple and low-cost
market entry and exit, e-tailers can easily adapt to changing circumstances by listing
a particular product or not. If, for example, unobserved factors temporarily drive
up markups for some item, shops that did not sell the item before might move into
this market. Thus, we would expect to observe more shops in markets where higher
markups can be reaped and vice versa: reverse causation. This, in turn, will result in
an upward bias: an estimated OLS coefficient showing the correlation of the number
of firms with markups will be less negative than the true causal parameter.
On the other hand, an OLS estimate might suffer from omitted variables bias:
variables related to demand, like consumer preferences or actual sales are unobserved,
but might be correlated with both prices and market structure. Again, a positive
correlation between demand and market structure and at the same time a positive
correlation between sales and prices will lead to an upward bias of an OLS estimate.
In order to overcome both problems, we suggest an instrumentation strategy that
can explain market structure but which is both unrelated with demand and has no
direct influence on prices.
Instrumentation strategy: In the Geizhals.at data, we observe the complete life
27For example, they control for the shops’ expectations in best-seller products with a large number
of sellers versus non-selling products which will be listed by only few shops
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cycle of many products together with the firms’ decisions to carry the products in
the shop. Therefore, we use previous listing decisions as instrument to cope with the
endogeneity of the number of firms offering a specific product at time t during the life
cycle. There are two dimensions for the endogeneity problem: One dimension refers to
the timing decision over the product life cycle. Does a shop list these products from
the beginning or at a later point in time? For markets with brand names, part of the
listing decisions can be explained by common patterns, such as an established supply
relationship, a shop might have with a producer or a wholesale importer, or variations
in the availability of the product. These patterns will be independent from the type
of camera the shop may supply. Thus we use the timing of previous listing decisions
of e-tailers for other brand products of our manufacturer as an instrument for current
listing decisions. This is a strong instrument: statistically it does influence current
listing decisions strongly. For our instrument to be valid, an exclusion restriction must
hold: the listing decision of a series of different products in the past will have no direct
impact on markups for another product in the future. This is a plausible assumption
because we are using very different markets. We will discuss some threats to this
identification strategy below.
Another dimension refers to the assortment the e-tailer offers. There might be
shops, which specialize only on products that promise ex ante large markups (or
variables correlated with the markup like sales). There might be some heterogeneity
of the cameras in the market in terms of aspects as quality and design features that
might be correlated with both markups and entry of firms. In our estimation, we will
use product fixed effects to capture these unobserved features of the specific cameras.
To cope with this dimension of endogeneity we control throughout the paper with
product fixed effects for observable and non-observable product features which might
have influence on the assortment decision. Given these product fixed effects on the first
and second stages of the IV regressions potential selection effects by varying product
assortments are controlled for. Therefore, in our analysis we are only exploiting markup
variations over the individual product life cycle.
The instrumentation strategy is illustrated with an example in Figure 4.2. The
figure shows the product life cycles for cameras A to H introduced at different points
in time. In a first step we are only interested in the listing decision of a single e-tailer,
which we shall call an E-shop for the sake of illustration. The vertical dashes indicate
the listing decisions (either zero or one) on the third (tenth) day of product life cycle
of camera D (camera F ). Let us consider whether our E-shop will list a product D on
the third day after introduction. This decision is represented by the encircled line on
item D. We predict the probability of this event by the E-shop’s general probability of
listing a similar item that has been on the market for three days. We consider only the
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last three items that have been introduced before product D has entered the market.
We then calculate how many of those items were listed by the E-shop on the third day
after they appeared. Taking the share gives us an estimate of E-shop’s probability of
listing product D on its third day of existence. In a second step, we aggregate these
probabilities across shops to obtain the predictor of the number of shops that will offer
item D on a given day.
This strategy can easily be extended for each day in the product life cycle, giving us
a predicted market structure for each day of the product cycle. For the E-shop’s listing
decision of product F on the tenth day, for example, we use the respective decisions on
the tenth day for products E, G, and H. To guarantee the validity of the instrument,
we use only products that were introduced before the introduction of the camera in
question. Note that for instrumenting F , we ignored products A through D because
those cameras lay too far in the past. When calculating the instrument, we fixed
the number of earlier introduced cameras to a constant number of three products.28
In contrast to a constant time interval our approach of fixing a constant number of
products guarantees valid standard errors that can be calculated without bootstrapping
methods.
First-stage regressions: As we use the time patterns of previous listing decisions in
completely different markets, our instrument should not have a direct causal implication
for today’s markups and price dispersion. Moreover, the listing of a particular type
of camera on a particular day in the past should have no influence on sales today.
Therefore, the instrument will comply with the necessary exclusion restrictions. Table
4.2 presents the first stage regressions and shows that the instrument is strong enough to
explain the market’s actual entry decisions, which are depicted by the number of firms
at each point in the product life cycle. Columns (1) and (2) compare the contribution
of the instrument to explaining the number of firms, and columns (3) and (4) show
the contribution to its quadratic term. The instruments are strongly significant and
have the expected sign. The marginal R2 – due to the large number of fixed effects –
amounts from 0.0016 up to 0.028 with F-values close to or above 400.
Could past listing decisions have a direct impact on markups of current products
and thereby threaten our identification mechanism? Potential threats concern the fact
that markets for past products might be close – either in calendar time or in the type
of product – to the current product. Therefore, we tested variations of the instrument
to see whether our findings are robust. We applied three systematic variations: i) We
vary the number of previous products forming the baseline of previous listing decisions
from 3 to 5 or 8. This changes also the length of time used for previous listings. ii) We
28In the next subsection robustness checks on the first-stage regressions are discussed.
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use the listing decisions of different brand names – instead of our brand name. iii) Our
cameras can be roughly divided into several subsubcategories29: simple digicams and
SLR cameras. We introduce instruments which are only from the same subsubcategory
as our product or only from the other subsubcategory. Both previous listings from
other brand names as well as those from other subcategories should be seen as exerting
even less influence on demand for the current product and, therefore, the exclusion
restriction should be easier fulfilled. All these variations do not change our results
much.30
Caveats with respect to the instrumentations strategy are dynamic aspects of
pricing decisions of firms: if there is a remaining correlation between the market
structure of past products at a particular day in their life cycles and current pricing
decisions of the firm on the same days of the life cycle, then our identification would
fail and we would get biased IV coefficients.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Market Structure and Market Performance
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show our basic results for the interrelation of market structure
and markups. These baseline specifications are parsimonious, as they consider only
the number of firms on the market – either linearly or in quadratic terms – and the
product life cycle. We also account for calendar time and product fixed effects. Columns
1 and 3 show OLS estimations, whereas in Columns 2 and 4, our instrumental variables
approach is used.
Our results indicate a highly significant and relatively strong correlation of the
number of firms with markups. Not accounting for the endogeneity of the number of
firms and using OLS, we would estimate the effect of ten additional competitors in the
market to reduce minimum markup by 0.55 percentage points and median markups
by 0.23. The cheapest firm would react significantly more strongly than the median
firm, which might be explained by the high frequency with which prices are changed
in online markets, where the cheapest price is a focus of considerable attention from
both consumers and firms.
If we instrument for the number of firms, we see a substantially larger negative
effect: 10 additional retailers tend to reduce the markup of the cheapest firm by 1.24
percentage points and the markup of the median firm by 0.95 percentage points. These
figures are large in economic terms considering the standard deviation of 57 firms in
29The categorization has been done by geizhals.at.
30Results are available from the authors.
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our sample. As discussed above, OLS is likely to underestimate the true absolute effect
of an additional firm on the markup, as it does not account for the fact that attractive
items also attract more firms. Again, the cheapest firm reacts considerably stronger
than the median firm.
In Columns 3 and 4 we use a quadratic specification of the number of firms:
it turns out that there is a solid negative but decreasing influence of the number of
retailers on markup, both for the cheapest and the median firm. There is virtually
no turnaround given the maximum number of firms in our sample of 203. For the
minimum markup, the negative influence of the number of firms ceases at 375, and
that for the median markup with 195 firms.
Looking at the impact of the product cycle on markups, we observe that markups
decrease with time in all regressions. In the 2SLS regressions markups decrease more
slowly at product introduction, then more steeply as the product life cycle advances.
This decline is stronger for minimum markups – relative to median markups. One
reason for this phenomenon could be market saturation.
To investigate the impact of the number of sellers on price dispersion we
concentrate on the coefficient of variation (Table 4.5). While the OLS regressions
show a small negative relation between the number of firms and price dispersion, in
the 2SLS results (Columns 2 and 4), we see a positive relationship. In the linear case,
increasing the number of firms by 10 increases the coefficient of variation by 0.011. For
the quadratic case (Column 4) we observe an even stronger increase in price dispersion.
Ignoring dynamic effects, the combined results on markups and price dispersion
are compatible with the search theoretic model of Carlson and McAfee (1983)
that accommodates two sources of heterogeneities by assuming a non-degenerate
distribution of producers’ marginal cost and heterogeneous visiting costs of consumers.
In addition, the augmented search theoretic model by Baye and Morgan (2001), which
features the firms’ randomization over prices as a consequence of different user groups,
are well in line with our findings. The other search theoretic models are, however,
not in line with our findings of a decreasing median markup. Moreover, models of
monopolistic competition predict a decreasing price dispersion, a hypothesis which is
not supported by our data.
Baye et al. (2004) analyze price dispersion, using a very similar dataset to the one
we use here. They focus on the relative price gap (the difference of the first and second
price) and show that it decreases as a function of the number of firms, but not over
time. Given this finding and a brief analysis of the average price they use a calibration
to discriminate the predictions of several clearing house models. We build on their
findings, but estimate both markups and price dispersion. Moreover, we analyze the
lifecycle dynamics and we can instrument the number of firms based on the lifecycle of
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previous models. Our OLS estimates corroborate their finding of a decreasing average
price, since even the median markup is decreasing in the number of firms. The negative
relationship is even stronger, when accounting for the endogeneity in the number of
firms. When instrumenting for the number of firms, we do not find a statistically
significant decreasing relationship between the number of firms and the coefficient of
variation (price dispersion).31 Note however, that their baseline measure of dispersion
is the price difference between the first two offers, whereas we focus on the coefficient
of variation (a measure they used in robustness checks).
Shipping cost: While sellers are ranked at Geizhals.at according to prices net of
shipping costs by default, the price ranking including shipping cost is only accessible
via a detour. Figure C.1 in the appendix shows a screenshot of the price comparison
site. As can be seen there, a quick and easy comparison of shipping costs alone is
not possible, because shipping costs can be reported in different waysand there is no
automatic ranking possible.32 As shipping costs are often used as part of an obfuscation
strategy (Ellison and Ellison, 2009) it is interesting to see whether shipping costs react
to market pressure as well. In Table 4.6 we report the effects of the market structure on
shipping costs divided by median price.33 As there are different shipping costs available,
we concentrate on those mostly observed in the data: shipping costs to Germany when
paying cash in advance. Interestingly, the IV patterns are largely the same as in Tables
4.3 and 4.4. While OLS predicts a positive relationship between shipping costs and the
number of firms, Columns 2 and 4 reveal a robust negative relationship with a small
and positive quadratic term.
It is remarkable that more competition seems to decrease also shipping costs. Our
estimation shows that ten more firms actually decrease average shipping cost in that
market by 62 cents (the mean of the shipping cost is 7.7 Euro).This market structure
effect of shipping costs is economically significant, but smaller than the effects on
markups: around a quarter of the effect on the median and one-eighth of the effect
on minimum markups. These results confirm the visibility argument, that consumers
have a much harder time comparing shipping costs than actual prices.34 This raises
interesting questions about whether and how different market structures may result in
a different role for price transparency. As this is beyond the scope of the paper we left
31This finding persists even after introducing a click-weighted measure of price dispersion.
32Different possibilities of shipping costs are e.g. standard shipping, shipping to Germany or
Austria, and different shipping costs depending on the payment options.
33In order to make the results comparable with the percentage values of the markup we are also
using a percentage value for the shipping cost.
34In a robustness check we computed the total markup including shipping costs to Germany when
paying cash in advance. In line with the separate results for markups and shipping cost, we find an
even higher effect of market structure on “gross markups”: both the minimum and median markups
tends to decline significantly with the number of firms. The dispersion of “gross prices” increases.
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it for further research.
4.4.2 Life Cycle Effects
In this section we investigate whether the profit-squeezing effect of a higher number of
firms is the same in different phases of the product life cycle. Several authors claim
that competition might be particularly important at the beginning of the life cycle
of a product (e.g. Toivanen and Waterson (2005) and Berry (1992)). On the other
hand, at the beginning of the product life cycle pioneer consumers might react less to
prices and therefore a higher markup can be achieved. If they are uncertain about their
preferences, the opposite may also hold (see Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006a)).
To check for different effects of market structure on markups over the product
cycle we extend our linear baseline model with crossterms. These crossterms interact
the number of firms with four dummy variables for the life cycle of the product (Phase1:
days 0-45, phase 2: days 46-105, phase 3: 106-225, phase 4: days 226-800). For ease
of interpretation of the coefficients, in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 we plot these results for the
minimum and median markup, respectively.
In these plots, each line represents a product of a certain age; we plot the curve for
products right after their introduction and after 1, 2, 5, and 9 months on the market35.
Our plots show a consistent pattern. In Figure 4.3, we observe the pattern for minimum
markups. Throughout the life cycle of the product, an increasing number of firms is
associated with a fairly similar reduction in markups. The picture is similar for median
markups in Figure 4.4, but here the reaction to an increasing number of firms tends to
fall over the life cycle - the splines become flatter.
A simple Cournot model would predict that the markup is inversely related to the
number of firms, which would lead to a flattening out reaction to increased competition.
Our detailed analysis of competition effects over the life cycle shows a more nuanced
pattern. For median markups, we do see some flattening out: after the first months
of product introduction, median markup reacts still negative, but somewhat less to an
increased number of firms. For minimum markups, this is not the case: regardless of
the phase of the life cycle of the product, the reaction to more intense competition is
the same. This may be due to the higher importance of minimum mark-ups (prices)
for consumer demand in online price-comparison sites. Actual transactions are much
more concentrated towards the lowest prices. An intuitive argumentation would be that
in online price-comparison sites, where prices are very transparent, it does not make
sense for newcomers to start with median prices. Only very low prices will catch the
35The dots represent the median of the empirically observed distribution of the number of firms
within each phase.
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attention of customers. In addition online stores on Geizhals.at can follow the prices
of their competitor over the platform. Although we do not know whether the retailers
actually follow all their competitors, we are convinced that they know when their lost
their leading position and to whom. An increased competition effect might be the
results. In contrast to existing literature stressing that the first two or three entrants
have the largest impact on markets prices (e. g. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)) our
empirical results show a different picture: enforced by the transparency of e-commerce
markets additional firm entries in all phases of the product life cycle have the same
effect on markups of the price-leader.
4.4.3 Substitutes over the Product Life Cycle
So far, we considered all markets for cameras independently, implicitly assuming no
interrelations between cameras of different type which are offered at the same time
and on the same platform. This simplification allowed us to describe the market
in general terms. In this section, we enlarge our empirical model by allowing for
substitute products. The availability of substitutes may offer an additional channel for
competition in such a market; not considering it may seriously bias measured market
structure or competition effects.
On the one hand, the availability of substitutes may drive down profits and
markups as such; on the other hand, our measure of competition, the number of firms
offering the same camera, may be misleading: the number of competitors offering
a similar camera may be important as well. As the technology of these cameras is
quickly improving over time, it is important to distinguish between substitutes with an
older technology – which we define as products brought earlier on the market – and a
newer technology, i.e. cameras which are introduced later. Moreover, the brand of the
camera may be decisive: cameras from a rival producer may be stronger substitutes
as compared to new cameras from the same producer. The former may target a new
camera towards successful rival products, whereas in the latter case firms may fear
cannibalization effects in the introduction of successor products and may, therefore, be
more careful in the choice of design or timing of a new product introduction.
As there is no natural definition of substitutes, we identify substitutes by a
conclusive behavior of searchers on the price comparison site. We will follow the
general idea to identify and analyze different search spells (search cluster) for each user
of the website geizhals.at. Each search spell should represent the customers’ search and
information process during the purchase of a specific product. We assume customers
to consider all clicked products during the search spell as potential substitutes. The
analysis of frequencies and the identification of most frequently clicked pairs of products
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over all customers give us a statistical foundation for the identification of substitutes.
See Appendix A for a description how we have calculated substitutes in our data.
Table 4.7 extends our 2SLS estimations for minimum markups36 (compare the
benchmark case from Table 4.4, Column 4) by controlling for available substitutes in
its different forms. Note, that the number of substitutes is time varying as it counts
the number of available substitutes during each day of the life cycle separately. As
expected, the coefficient for the number of firms is still significantly negative, but
a little bit smaller than in the simple specification. Moreover, the quadratic terms
disappears. This may be due to the additional competition effect coming from the
substitutes. As compared to the simple specification, the life cycle effect is completely
unchanged.
In general, an additional substitute product reduces the markup of the cheapest
firm by 0.77 percentage points. Note, that we have defined substitutes in a very narrow
sense, with a mean of only 0.63. This markup-reducing effect of additional substitutes
is substantial, its economic importance is difficult to judge, though. Bringing a
new substitute to the market may open up a new field of competition, which is not
easily compared with an additional number of firms: Many firms may offer this new
substitute, but the new product does not operate at exactly the same market. To make
the effect of substitutes comparable with the direct competition effect we can increase
substitutes and number of firms each by 10%: increasing the number of firms by 10%
will reduce minimum markup by 1.19 percentage points, whereas 10% more substitutes
will reduce markup only by 0.04 percentage points.
Splitting up substitutes into older and younger ones we see our presumption
confirmed that technologically more advanced (newer) products represent a larger
threat to the minimum markup compared to older substitutes. Furthermore,
substitutes of rival brands have a substantially larger negative outcome – minus 2.3
percentage points of the markup. On the contrary, same brand substitutes even have a
positive association with the minimum markup. One explanation for this result might
be found in the fact that we observe the retailers’ and not the manufacturer’s markup
(although we would assume a high correlation between both). When introducing new
products manufacturers apparently leave retailers larger margins if potential and good
running older products from the same brand are still on the market. In that way
manufacturers might convince retailers to better promote the new brand product with
new technology or features.
A look at the most detailed level in Column (4) confirms this presumption. Newer
substitutes from competitors have a larger negative effect on the markup than older
36Similar results can be obtained for the median markup.
92 CHAPTER 4. MARKET STRUCTURE IN E-COMMERCE
and more outdated products of rivals. Although we do not measure any effect of newer
substitutes of the same brand – as manufacturers may understand their business not
to cannibalize the old products’ rents – we measure a significant positive association
with the markup if older same brand substitutes are still seen as potential substitutes
by the customers.
4.4.4 Robustness
We perform several robustness checks. First, we test the robustness of the basic
results by using varying definitions of price dispersion and by using other definitions
of markups, Second, we account by weighting for the fact that some of the price offers
may attract less attention from potential buyers. Finally, we consider characteristics
of shop specialisation and quality.
We experiment with different definitions of price dispersion: apart from the
coefficient of variation (the benchmark case from Table 4.5, Column 4) we use the
standard deviation of prices and a coefficient of variation calculated in such a way that
the prices are weighted with the number of clicks received. All these variations show
a similar pattern: price dispersion increases with the number of firms, in some cases
with a decreasing rate.37
We investigate further whether our results are influenced by the fact that we treat
all product offers symmetrically in our regressions. In particular, in questions of price
dispersion researchers typically mistrust the validity of price offers that are much too
high (cf. Baye et al. (2004)). This suggests weighing price offers with the number of
clicks they receive to give low-ranked and perhaps less reliable price offers less weight.
We do this in Table 4.8, which weighs each offer by how often it was clicked. This
also implies that any offers that did not attract clicks by consumers do not enter this
specification at all. Our main results are confirmed in this specification. In the case of
the minimum markup weighting reduces significance of the linear term to some extent
while the squared term gains importance.
Finally, we want to see whether our results are due to changes in the composition
of the shops offering an item over the life cycle. In particular, the presence of larger
shops, cheaper, or more reliable shops or a higher presence of shops that sell not only
online but also have a brick and mortar outlet might affect the outcomes. Therefore, in
Table 4.9 we include the composition of shops in the regression. In this table the first
column shows the benchmark estimation (compare Table 4.4, Column 4). We then add
the share of firms that have the item stocked (i.e., immediately available), the share
of firms with low reputation (measured by customer feedback), the share of low-price
37Results are available on request.
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firms (firms offering generally lower prices in other markets), the share of large firms,
and the share of shops with a brick and mortar facility. All of these shares are scaled
on a range from 0 to 100: for example, if, in Table 4.9, the share of large firms increases
by 10%, this is associated with a drop in median markups by 0.55 percentage points.
When we introduce these measures of market heterogeneity one by one, because
they are to a large extent multicollinear, we find our general results completely
unaffected. Both, minimum and median markups fall as the share of larger firms
(Column 5) and the share of firms with low reputation (Column 3) increase. The sign
of the statistically significant variables are reasonable: we would expect lower markups
if there are more firms with low reputation and stronger competition in case of an
increasing share of large firms in which undercutting of prices might have a larger
impact. The decrease of markups is more pronounced for the size of the firms. The
share of low-price firms is not correlated with the median markup (Column 4). Finally,
the share of firms that have the item in stock (Column 2) and the share of firms also
having a brick-and-mortar facility (Column 6) are related to an increase in markups;
again, the positive signs confirm the expected price-setting behavior.38
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the interaction between market structure and market
performance in e-commerce using detailed data for digital cameras from an Austrian
online price-comparison site. We analyze the empirical association of competition with
the markup of the price leader and of the median firm. We account for potential
endogenous timing decisions to list a specific product by using previous listing decisions
as instruments and include product fixed effects to capture the products’ unobserved
quality and design features. We further investigate the relation of market structure and
measures of price dispersion as well as the development of markups over the product
cycle.
Our estimation results show a significant empirical association of markups and the
number of retailers in the market. Median markups are lower by 0.23 percentage points
and the minimum markup by 0.55 percentage points once ten additional competitors
have entered the market. We also find that instrumenting is important for estimating
the relation between competition and the markup and we see a substantially higher
negative effect. With ten additional retailers, the markup of the median firm is reduced
by 0.95 percentage points and the markup of the cheapest firm by 1.24 percentage
38Analogous regressions for minimum markups show the same signs, except for the presence of
low-price shops, having a positive effect.
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points. Ignoring dynamic pricing effects, we may interpret our results as support
for search theoretic models (Carlson and McAfee, 1983). They contradict models of
monopolistic competition (Perloff and Salop, 1985).
Our results are also in line with the theoretical predictions of Baye and Morgan
(2001) as well as the results of recent empirical papers by Haynes and Thompson
(2008a) for the US online market for cameras and by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005)
for the US brick-and-mortar retail industry. In both cases, the competitive effects of
an increasing number of firms persist in a homogenous goods market. Even with more
than one hundred retailers we find markups still decreasing.
The analysis of markups over the product cycle further shows significantly lower
markups the longer a product is on the market. Our results refer to e-tailing in
the presence of a price-search engine with very narrowly defined products. In such
a situation, consumers can very easily collect information about prices and seller
reliability. Still, it takes a large number of sellers and a relatively long time for firm
markups to dissipate. We may interpret this result in support of price dynamic models
when consumers are uncertain about their tastes of a product newly emerged on the
market and there is social learning (Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2006a).
The markup of the price leader diminishes over the life cycle of the product. This
allows us to compare the competitive effect of the number of firms to the effect of time:
having one more firm in the market reduces the markup of the price leader by the
same amount as three additional weeks in the product life cycle. In other words, by
waiting three more weeks a consumer will get the same price reduction she would get
if she went to a market with one additional firm, ceteris paribus. In reality, waiting
longer will typically also increase the number of firms, thus increasing the advantage
of waiting.
Finally, our results also indicate support for substitutability between newly
innovated and old expiring technologies. The inclusion of potential substitutes in
our estimations reveals interesting stylized facts. The amount of substitutes tends to
reduce the firms’ mark ups. We distinguish between older and younger substitutes as
well as own brand or competitors’ brand products. Newer substitutes by competitors
are associated with larger reductions in markups compared to older substitutes by
competitors. Whereas an increasing amount of older substitutes of the same brand leads
to higher markups for the younger products,39 we do not observe changing markups
for the older substitutes if more new own brand products are introduced. Lacking
testable theoretical hypothesis we do not account for the price setting game which
39Manufacturers might, for example, incite retailers with higher markups on the new product if a
high number of older own brand substitutes are on the market
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might be involved in the listing behavior of online shops but just focus on the quantity
of competing products.
Our results highlight the usefulness of this very specific market for consumer
electronics, where product life cycles are particularly short and thus can be fully
observed. Thus, analyses of such environments have great potential to shed light on
phenomena of markups over the product life cycle, early adopters, and inter-temporal
price discrimination.
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Table 4.3: Minimum Markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Number of firms/10 -0.548*** -1.243*** -0.768*** -1.366***
(0.012) (0.110) (0.030) (0.159)
Number of firms/10 squared 0.012*** 0.018**
(0.002) (0.009)
Age in months -3.702*** -2.140*** -3.661*** -2.517***
(0.109) (0.274) (0.109) (0.166)
Age in months squared 0.027*** -0.068*** 0.028*** -0.040***
(0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.008)
Constant -0.017 1.416* 0.963 2.430**
(0.672) (0.773) (0.682) (0.981)
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15893 15893 15893 15893
Number of products 70 70 70 70
Adj. R2 0.559 0.561
Notes: The unit of observations is the outcome of product i on day t. The first two columns show the results
without a squared term, Columns C and D include the squared number of firms. Columns A and C show OLS
panel regressions with product fixed effects. In columns B and D the number of firms has been instrumented. The
dependent variable is shown above the columns. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.4: Median Markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Number of firms/10 -0.232*** -0.951*** -0.596*** -1.159***
(0.007) (0.076) (0.018) (0.097)
Number of firms/10 squared 0.021*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.005)
Age in months -2.008*** -0.392** -1.941*** -1.028***
(0.065) (0.189) (0.064) (0.101)
Age in months squared -0.005*** -0.103*** -0.004** -0.057***
(0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.005)
Constant 8.544*** 10.026*** 10.164*** 11.734***
(0.398) (0.533) (0.398) (0.597)
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15893 15893 15893 15893
Number of products 70 70 70 70
Adj. R2 0.274 0.296
Notes: The unit of observations is the outcome of product i on day t. The first two columns show the results
without a squared term, Columns C and D include the squared number of firms. Columns A and C show OLS
panel regressions with product fixed effects. In columns B and D the number of firms has been instrumented. The
dependent variable is shown above the columns. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.5: Coefficient of Variation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Number of firms/10 -0.003*** 0.011*** -0.006*** 0.016**
(0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007)
Number of firms/10 squared 0.000** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Age in months 0.024*** -0.008 0.024*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007)
Age in months squared -0.000 0.002*** -0.000 0.001***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.404*** 0.372*** 0.416*** 0.338***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.041)
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15801 15801 15801 15801
Number of products 70 70 70 70
Adj. R2 0.042 0.043
Notes: The unit of observations is the outcome of product i on day t. The first two columns show the results
without a squared term, Columns C and D include the squared number of firms. Columns A and C show OLS
panel regressions with product fixed effects. In columns B and D the number of firms has been instrumented. The
dependent variable is shown above the columns. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4.6: Shipping Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Number of firms/10 0.009*** -0.104*** -0.065*** -0.240***
(0.002) (0.015) (0.004) (0.023)
Number of firms/10 squared 0.004*** 0.014***
(0.000) (0.001)
Age in months 0.018 0.250*** 0.025* 0.019
(0.014) (0.035) (0.014) (0.023)
Age in months squared -0.001* -0.014*** -0.000 0.002**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant 1.303*** 1.583*** 1.618*** 2.383***
(0.084) (0.104) (0.084) (0.129)
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15441 15441 15441 15441
Number of products 70 70 70 70
Adj. R2 0.207 0.227
Notes: The unit of observations is the outcome of product i on day t. The first two columns show the results
without a squared term, Columns C and D include the squared number of firms. Columns A and C show OLS
panel regressions with product fixed effects. In columns B and D the number of firms has been instrumented. The
dependent variable is shown above the columns. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.7: The Importance of Substitutes over the Life Cycle
Minimum Markup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
older vs. own brand vs. all
all newer other brands interactions
Number of firms/10 -1.143*** -1.102*** -0.972*** -0.922***
(0.147) (0.151) (0.149) (0.154)
Number of firms/10 squared 0.005 0.003 -0.005 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Age in months -2.562*** -2.532*** -2.566*** -2.523***
(0.163) (0.165) (0.164) (0.165)
Age in months squared -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.044***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
All substitutes -0.765***
(0.112)
Substitutes newer -1.496***
(0.279)
Substitutes older -0.618***
(0.121)
Substitutes same brand 0.383**
(0.173)
Substitutes other brands -2.276***
(0.236)
Substitutes newer same brand 0.077
(0.502)
Substitutes newer other brands -3.912***
(0.578)
Substitutes older other brands -2.038***
(0.253)
Substitutes older same brand 0.512***
(0.196)
Constant 1.783* 1.436 0.722 0.438
(0.951) (0.971) (0.965) (0.998)
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15827 15827 15827 15827
Number of products 70 70 70 70
Notes: The table is based on the main results in the paper, but includes the number of substitutes for the product.
The unit of observations is the outcome of product i on day t. The first columns shows the results when including all
substitutes. Columns B differentiates between newer and older substitutes. Column C shows the results for distinguishing
same brand substitutes from competitors’ substitutes. Column D distinguishes the substitutes along both dimensions. In
all columns the number of firms has been instrumented. The dependent variable is the minimum markup. Standard errors
in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.8: Markup and price dispersion weighted by clicks.
(1) (2) (3)
clw. min. markup clw. med. markup clw. coeff. var.
Number of firms/10 -0.228 0.758*** 0.019***
(0.241) (0.284) (0.006)
Number of firms/10 squared -0.030** -0.052*** -0.000*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.000)
Age in months -3.104*** -3.545*** -0.016***
(0.192) (0.227) (0.004)
Age in months squared -0.015* 0.014 0.001***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.000)
Constant -0.639 -0.848 0.035
(1.276) (1.508) (0.029)
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Product Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14401 14401 13639
Number of products 70 70 70
Notes: The table weighs prices by clicks on the respective product before computing the moments of the price distribution
to reproduce the main results in the paper. The unit of observations is the outcome of product i on day t. Each column
shows the same estimation with a different dependent Variable. The dependent variable is shown above the columns. The
number of firms has been instrumented. Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 4.1: Median markup plotted against the number of firms and age of product
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Notes: The plot shows the empirically observed distributions of the number of firms, age and median markup
plotted against each other. In the top left panel, the median markupit is scattered against the number of
firmsit in the corresponding market and the right column shows the corresponding averages. In the middle
row the median markupit is plotted against the age of the product. In the lower row, the number of firms
is plotted against the age of the product (in months).
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Figure 4.2: Instrument using firm’s listing behavior in earlier lifecycles
Notes: If we want to predict how many shops will list a product on any given day q after introduction we use a shop’s
general probability of listing one of the three items that entered the market before product j, q days after they were
introduced. Examples: to predict listing behavior for camera D on day 3 (encircled dash), we would use information
on the three cameras A, B, and C on their respective third days of existence (black squares). However, we would not
use the information from the cameras that saw light after D was introduced. To predict how many shops listed camera
F on day 10 (encircled dash), we would use the information from the three cameras E, G, H which saw light before F
was introduced. Cameras A, B, C (on day 10) are ignored for the computations of the instrument for camera F on day
10. These considerations can be applied to each day in the product lifecycle of a camera.
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Figure 4.3: Minimum markup in different phases of the product life cycle
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Notes: Each spline shows the estimated relationship of number of firms and markup at a different point
in time (after 1,2,5 and 9 months). The curves are plotted on the range from the 33rd to 67th percentile
and the dots represent the median of the empirically observed distribution of the number of firms at the
point in time it corresponds to.
Figure 4.4: Median markup in different phases of the product life cycle
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Notes: Each spline shows the estimated relationship of number of firms and markup at a different point
in time (after 1,2,5 and 9 months). The curves are plotted on the range from the 33rd to 67th percentile
and the dots represent the median of the empirically observed distribution of the number of firms at the
point in time it corresponds to.
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Chapter 5
99 Cent: Price Points in
E-Commerce*
5.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the role of price points or focal prices (used synonymously) in the
sellers’ price setting behavior of e-commerce markets and the consumers’ purchasing
decisions. Price points are defined as values with special price endings that are
frequently used, i.e., ending in zero (also referred to as “even prices”) and 9-ending
prices (“just-below prices” or “odd prices”). Early explanations for this phenomenon
rely on the customers’ perceptions of these price points, i.e., particular price endings
may convey a particular image of a product (image effect). Examples for these prices
are 1e100.00 or 6e.00. With these even prices firms might signal that the high quality
of their products does not make it necessary for the selling firm to engage in a Bertrand
competition with declining prices. In a more recent study, Basu (2006) explains the
price-setting of odd prices as a rational strategy of oligopolists in a retail market. In
his model, consumers disregard the right-most digits of the price, due to the cost of
processing very detailed information. Hence, in equilibrium, it might be rational for
firms to set 9-ending prices. By doing so, the firms can increase their prices somewhat
and escape the zero-profit forecast of the Bertrand equilibrium in a retail market (level
effect). Examples for these prices are 9e.99 or also 1e.999,00.
*This chapter was coauthored with Franz Hackl (University of Linz) and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer
(University of Linz and IHS, Vienna). A paper with the same title was published in Information
Economics and Policy (2014, Vol. 26, pp. 12 - 27.) We thank the editor an dtwo anonymous
referees for valuable suggestions. We are grateful to Martin Peitz, Christine Zulehner, two referees
and seminar participants at Istanbul (EARIE), Milano (Bocconi), Madrid (CEMFI), Essen (RWI),
Hannover, Heidelberg, Linz, and Vienna for helpful comments. We thank the Austrian National
Bank’s Jubilee Fund for supporting the research (grant 12444) and geizhals.at for giving us access to
the data and providing useful advice.
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From a managerial perspective price setting is an important entrepreneurial task.
This is especially true for the area of e-commerce in which the success of retailing
depends on the firms’ behavior in Bertrand competition. Taking the right decisions
when it comes to setting prices is a crucial factor for a retailer’s economic success. But
what are the right prices for maximizing a firm’s profits? Do customers react fully
rational on the lowest price or do we observe some kind of bounded rationality (such as
left-to-right price-processing in which the cents get irrelevant). Do some price endings
(price points) have more impact in the consumers’ demand than others? In a setting
of Betrand competition it is equally important to know how other firms (re)act and
how other firms set their prices: can we observe that certain price points are undercut
more often than other ones? This paper sheds light on the role that price points play
for the behavior of firms and customers and thereby provides important managerial
implications.
Whereas previous research analyzes these price points in offline markets (scanner
data from supermarkets and real estate markets), we focus on online markets. The
lack of studies in emerging e-commerce markets is surprising given that the digital
revolution might change our understanding of the pricing process of firms. One might
argue that the lack of comprehensive studies in online markets can be explained by the
less pronounced problems of price comparison: less cognitive difficulties to memorize
and compare products of different retailers. In particular, at a price comparison site, all
price offers for a specific product can be seen by one mouse-click. On the other hand,
price dispersion in such markets is still high Baye et al. (2006). We also observe service
differentiation between e-tailers so that the idea of strictly ascending price listings loses
importance. We will show that, although less than in brick-and-mortar stores, we do
see a considerable proportion of odd as well as even prices in online shopping as well.
Most of the studies in offline markets analyze price points either on the demand
side in the form of field or laboratory experiments or on the supply side in the form
of price rigidity analysis. The focus and innovation of our paper lies in the consistent
and comprehensive analysis of both sides of an online market. A careful analysis of the
pricing strategies with price points has, on the one hand, to consider the price-setting
decisions of firms, and, on the other hand, regularities in consumer demand. In order
to draw correct conclusions, both market sides should be analyzed within a single set
of data and it should be checked whether the reactions of both sides of the market are
consistent. If the price points turn out to be equilibrium outcomes, they should prevail
longer as comparable non-focal prices. The fact that we are the first to observe an
entire market place enables us not only to look at the price stickiness for prices set by
random firms but also to see the prices set by price leaders (i.e., the retailer that offers
the good at the lowest price).
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We use comprehensive data from Austria’s largest price comparison site to explore
theories on price points. While most previous studies consider only buying intentions,
small samples, and a limited number of products, our data has the advantage in
that we can observe the entire online market place with all competing shops. We
use the price information on 23,317 products posted by 698 sellers together with the
information about referral clicks and last-click-throughs, which are typically used as
demand indicators in e-tailing. As many products are more expensive, we not only
concentrate on 99 cent endings but also on prices ending in 9 euros, which will carry
the same flavor of the argument.
In the beginning, the Internet was seen as the embodiment of perfect competition
with instantaneous and comprehensive information of customers leading to fierce
price competition, dwindling product differentiation, and vanishing brand loyalty
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000). In such an environment of perfect information, special
price patterns like 99-cent endings are not expected to be important for the consumers’
decisions. In contrast to this presumption, we show that price points are also prevalent
in e-commerce markets. Our empirical results are generally supportive of Basu’s theory:
consumers are prone to disregard ordinary cent endings in their shopping behavior;
price points are, therefore, more stable if they end with 9; and the best-prices ending
in 9 or 99 are not changed by the price-setting firms and are less likely to be underbid
by the rivals of the shop. Moreover, we observe higher price jumps for prices ending
in 9. On the other hand, there is some role for image effects in the perception of
consumers as well.
5.2 Literature
5.2.1 Theories for price points
Researchers have focused mainly on two consumer-oriented explanations for the
phenomenon of price points2 Stiving and Winer (1997):
(i) The first approach has been called the level effect, left digit effect, left to right
processing (Thomas and Morwitz (2009), Basu (2006), Thomas and Morwitz (2005)).
The basic idea is the assumption that the consumers use a heuristic to calculate,
2There is a wealth of operational or ad-hoc explanations. The most famous example is the
anecdotal account Stiving and Winer (1997) of shop owners, who posted prices that would force
the clerks to give back some small change in order to force their staff to register the transactions
rather than pocket the money. Among other ad-hoc theories, Monroe (1973) mentions (and refutes)
views that the number 9 might be considered a magical number with special properties. Clustering
has also been considered as a tool to maintain tacit collusion as has been shown in Christie and Schultz
(1994) and Christie et al. (1994).
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compare, and memorize prizes due to their limited brain-capacity to process prices
exactly: they read prices from the left, and in particular, they disregard cent prices.
As a result of this boundedly rational behavior, the consumers tend to overestimate the
gap between prices differing only by a small amount, if the lower price has a smaller
left digit (e.g., e3.00 vs. e2.99).
This theory has only recently been formalized in a Bertrand-Equilibrium model
Basu (2006). The paper assumes boundedly rational consumers, who do not bother to
take into account what’s after the comma. Instead, they ”guess” that it is the average
of all the last digits of the products in the market. This setting is used to analyze
the market equilibria in a Bertrand setting where the firms can post prices but cannot
affect quantities.
The model is relevant for two reasons. First, the mechanism attacks the Bertrand
paradox. Since the consumers ignore the cent ending, undercutting a 9-ending price by
less than a full euro does not generate additional turnover; on the other hand, it reduces
the profit margin. As a consequence, the firms who want to undercut will undercut
by a full euro; undercutting with small amounts does not make sense. Second, Basu’s
model generates an equilibrium in 99-prices, which is perfectly rational on the part of
the firms and results in positive profits for the competing firms.
Basu’s (2006) model predicts that if a market equilibrium results in focal prices
ending in 99 cents, other firms might be less willing to undercut this price point. Let’s
assume marginal costs of e10.00. Is a price of, say, e11.47 equally stable than a price
of e10.99? In the former case, Bertrand behavior of firms will lead to some downward
pressure below e11.00; not so in the latter case due to left-to-right price-processing.
Furthermore, even though the theory would not predict price-endings other than 99
in equilibrium,3 it predicts similar demand for such items as long as they are priced
with the same euro digit; in other words: cent prices should not have an effect in an
estimation of a demand function. Given this theoretical equilibrium, we predict the
prices that end in 9 to be maintained longer than any other price-endings.
A different explanation for the level effect is given by Monroe (1973). The
hypothesis postulates that consumers, when they plan to purchase an item, have
already formed an expectation of the price they are going to pay, a so-called target
price.4 If such a target price is memorized with an even number, it would typically
be beneficial to set prices below these even-numbered thresholds. Gedenk and Sattler
3Basu (2006) not only establishes an equilibrium in 99 cent prices but also a further result with
two equilibria, one with 99 cent, and the other at marginal cost.
4In a similar version of the story, consumers might have a binding budget set, because they have
only one or two cash bills with them and while a price just below this threshold lies within their
budget set, a price just above does not.
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(1999) argue that it might be rational for profit-maximizing firms to set 9 ending
prices when facing some uncertainty about the type of customers: there might be some
consumers who show a discontinuous reduction in demand if a price passes a certain
(even) threshold (type 1) and others who do not (type 2). In case the firm raises its price
above this threshold, the firm might gain only little by charging a higher price from
type 2 types, but lose a lot of revenue from type 1 consumers. As these explanations
are usually seen observationally equivalent to the boundedly rational behavior from
above, we do not discriminate between the two explanations any longer.
(ii) The other important consumer-based approach is called the image effect
(Stiving and Winer (1997), Thomas and Morwitz (2009), Schindler (1991)). Price
setters may use the pattern of a price to transmit specific information about the item
that is being offered. An example would be a clothing company that uses 00c endings
in regular times and 99 endings for items on sale. If this was true and a 9-ending
communicated a good bargain, we would also expect price clustering, higher demand,
and maybe some rigidity on 9-ending prices. Yet, not all the prices are predicted to end
in 9 and a similar pattern might emerge for prices ending in 00 (or any other special
number), if zeros were to transmit positive properties such as product quality.5
It should be noted that the “image effect” predicts higher demand at focal prices,
whereas the “level effect” predicts that consumers do not react to the differences in
the cent digits with their demand behavior. Moreover, the “image effect” might be
prevalent not only in 99-ending prices, but also in even prices. In terms of price
stability, Basu (2006) predicts that 99-ending prices are more stable; in particular, they
are not underbid by the rivals. As for the “image effect” theory the model has no clear
prediction for the equilibrium outcome: image prices could be less stable, because rivals
might, for instance, want to destroy the image of a cheap price by simply underbidding
it; on the other hand, they might be more stable if the additional demand at the image
price is so high that any changes are not worthwhile.
5.2.2 Empirical evidence
As for the demand effects of focal prices, there exists a broad experimental literature,
going back to Ginzberg (1936), but only a few studies look at real markets and actual
demand on a larger scale. In one larger study on single products, Stiving and Winer
(1997) use scanner data on yoghurt and tuna and find a large and generally positive
relationship between a 9-ending price and sales. Moreover, they find that consumers do
not process prices holistically. Aalto-Setala (2005) analyzes the utilization of special
5See also Palmon et al. (2004) for a survey.
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price points before and after the currency change to the euro in Finland and finds
a slow adjustment process of price endings over two years. Sehity et al. (2005)
were using the introduction of the euro to show that the retailers all across Europe
quickly converged to focal prices again, which had been overturned on January 1, 2002.
The field experiments by Schindler and Kibarian (1996) and Anderson and Simester
(2003) observe the demand for items in a mail-order catalogue, where the prices were
manipulated to show 9-endings. Generally, these experiments find an overall positive
effect on demand. Yet, the significance of the effect depends on a variety of other
factors, such as how much information was available on a product and whether the
item has been introduced only recently. Laboratory experiments, in general, have
to rely on purchase intentions instead of actual demand.6 An example of such an
experiment is Gendall et al. (1997), suggesting that 9-ending prices affect purchase
intentions positively.7 Lacetera et al. (2011) find substantial evidence for the tendency
to focus on the left-most digit of odometer values in the purchasing decisions of car
buyers.
Studies looking at price setting and rigidity in an online environment are highly
infrequent.8 Levy et al. (2011) find evidence that the prices ending in 9 are sticky in
the sense that the price setters are more reluctant to change them. Once these prices
are changed, though, the ultimate price jump is larger what might be due to a larger
adjustment need.
Only a few studies differentiate explicitly between the level (left-digit effect) and
image effects. The aforementioned study by Stiving and Winer (1997) finds that the
consumers treat the pre- and post-comma digits in a different manner. However, apart
from this study, the evidence on the image effect stems from lab experiments and
surveys. In an intention-to-purchase experiment, Liang and Kanetkar (2006) obtain
similar results as Stiving and Winer (1997). However, both studies report that even
pricing plays a role, which they tend to take as evidence for the image effect. Using the
experimental evidence from Italian consumers, Guido and Peluso (2004) find evidence
for even target prices. Moreover, when analyzing how prices are memorized, they find
that consumers recall odd prices smaller than they really are, especially when the left-
6There are exceptions to this rule, however, such as the lab study by Thomas and Morwitz (2005),
who measure dependent variables beyond purchase intentions.
7Liang and Kanetkar (2006) provide an extensive review of the existing literature on price endings
and discuss the literature on numerical processing and memory-effects of odd prices; Kauffman and
Lee (2005) review the issues of price rigidity in e-commerce in general.
8Macroeconomists look at the price points or reference prices when they inquire the existence or
prevalence of nominal price rigidities; e.g., Eichenbaum et al. (2011), Levy et al. (2011), and Konieczny
and Rumler (2006). The 9-ending prices can act as price points and might contribute to the price
stickiness in general.
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most digit is manipulated in the experiment.9 Thomas and Morwitz (2005) finally
conclude that the scale of the level effect depends on which digit to the left is affected,
which is an indication that the left-digit-effect plays a role.
Specific evidence for the image effect is provided by e.g. Naipaul and Parsa
(2001), who compare restaurant menus and find that menu makers use even prices to
suggest higher quality and just-below prices to indicate bargains. Lynn et al. (2013)
use data from prices which are set by consumers themselves – pay-what-you-want
prices, tips in restaurants and amounts in self-pumped gasoline purchases – to argue
that consumers do have a preference for even numbers.
5.3 Data and prevalence of price points
For our empirical analysis, we use the database of http://www.geizhals.at. This website
is a price search engine collecting the price offers via standardized protocols from
retailers and presents them electronically via its website. Due to the broad Austrian
market penetration of Geizhals.at, this price search engine practically covers the whole
Austrian online market including suppliers from other countries (especially Germany)
that are interested in the Austrian e-commerce business.
We use an inflow sample of all price spells starting in an arbitrary week in 2007.
A price spell is defined as the offer from a specific firm j for a specific good i at a
specific price pij. Each spell has a starting and ending time so that we can exactly
measure the spell durations in seconds. Price spells end because firms change their
price or stop offering the product. We can observe all price spells between Monday,
June 4, 2007, 03:00:00 to Monday, June 11, 2007, 02:59:59. We used these data to
compute aggregate product specific or shop specific variables such as the relative price
of a firm’s price spell.10 Considering all prices in this step is necessary to avoid a
sampling bias in favor of volatile prices. Next, we moved on to consider only offers that
were newly quoted in the given week for the analysis, that is we focus on the inflow
sample of prices. This is particularly important for the duration analysis, since looking
at the stock sample would introduce a sampling bias in favor of long lived prices.11
Additionally, we know for each and every price spell, the respective referral requests
9See also Gue´guen and Legoherel (2004).
10The relative price is calculated as the offers’ price relative to the week’s mean price of all price
offers on geizhals.at. Hence, for these aggregate data not only the spells of the inflow dataset are used.
11Note, that by construction a specific offer of a firm with highly volatile prices might be represented
several times in the data set. A reduction of the data set in a way that only one price spell per firm
and product remains in the sample does, however, not change our empirical results concerning the
duration analysis and the estimated effects of price points on consumers’ demand.
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from the customers. The referral requests are customer clicks on the firm’s product
offer at the Geizhals.at webpage resulting in a forward from the website of the price
search engine to the online shop of an e-tailer. We normalize the referral requests to
clicks per week to cope with the different offer durations. As very cheap products
are not expected to be bought online due to relatively high shipping cost, we consider
only those product offers whose average price is larger than e25. In 2007, purchases
below that threshold were still rather atypical in Austrian e-commerce and thus very
likely to occur as a part of a bundle. In total, we have 805,949 price spells for 698
e-tailers and 23,317 products. On average, we measure 24.8 referral requests per day
and product. Due to the multi-faceted structure of the data, we have control variables
at three different levels. More detailed descriptives on the variables of interest can be
found in Table 5.1.
(i) The e-tailer specific variables that are constant for the product offers of a
specific web-shop j are the (a) country of origin, (b) a dummy variable, indicating
whether the firm provides a pick up facility for customers who want to avoid the cost
and time it takes to ship an item, and (c) all quality reviews of previous customers.
The reviews consist of a free text section and a standardized grading scheme (five-
grade scale: 1 denotes best, 5 denotes worst). We use this information to construct the
average grade as a variable that captures the perceived service quality of shops. (d)
Moreover, we can control for the number of customer evaluations.
(ii) Furthermore, we have information on three product-specific controls. (a) The
number of competing shops measures how many shops were active in market i, and is
thus a measure of competition. (b) Another control is the activity in the market that
is generated by counting the number of price changes that were observed during the
week of observation to control for the general turbulence in market i. (c) The third
control is the quality indicator for the product: customers can recommend the product
on the Geizhals.at website for purchase or avoidance. From these valuations, we know
the percentage of positive recommendations for the product.
(iii) Apart from price, referral clicks and the time stamps (the start and end
times) of a price spell, we observe the following offer-specific (ij) information: (a)
shipping cost and (b) whether the product can be shipped immediately. If some control
variables (mostly availability, shipping-cost, pick-up facility, and product reviews) were
not available, we imputed those variables at the mean and used the imputed variables
together with a missing flag for imputations.
Even though the referral clicks are available in the data, the actual act of
purchasing a product is unknown, because actual purchases happen at the e-tailer’s own
web site. This is unobservable for Geizhals.at, and thus, for us. Therefore, following
Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001), we use the concept of last-click-through (LCT) as a
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proxy for the purchasing decision. If a customer is searching for a product, he/she
might meander around different websites, comparing the characteristics of the shops,
but will finally settle for the preferred shop and buy from there. The last click to a
shop selling the product is usually identified as the click with the highest purchase
probability. We construct the LCT from the referral clicks using a procedure based
on hierarchical clustering and Grubbs’ test for outlier detection.12 As LCTs have, by
definition, a higher purchase probability, the comparison of normal clicks with LCTs
enables us to make predictions of the impact of price points on actual demand.
Figure 5.1 shows the frequency distribution of price-endings to check for the
prevalence of price points.13 The four graphs depict the distribution of price endings
in different samples of interest: (a) all prices, (b) offers that were clicked at least once,
(c) price-leading offers, and (d) best-selling offers (defined as most frequently clicked
offers with a market share greater than 10%).14
Note that in any of the four samples, special price endings are relatively more
frequent. Given that we observe 100 different cent-endings, a uniform distribution
would imply a frequency of 1 percent of the observations for each digit. Clearly the
00c-, 99c-, 90c-, and 50c-endings are more frequent than the other price endings. This
pattern is even more pronounced, when we restrict our attention to price-leading or
best-selling offers. More than 15% of the online best-price quotes end with 00c. Almost
4% of the price-leading offers (fourfold the expected frequency) were quoted in 99c and
another 5% were quoted in 90c. Taken together, the four focal price endings make up
more than 35% of the bestselling price-endings.
This is not surprising given the fact that about 30% of all price offers end with a
9 at the unit position or at the ten’s place (e.g., 9e.990,00).
It might be surprising that the percentage for price quotes ending with 00c is
relatively high. As the average price in our sample is more than e400, many prices
can be expected to end by even numbers. In this case, a typical focal price will be a
12In practice, the construction of the LCT is a lengthy procedure because a time span for observation
as well a product span has to be chosen. See Dulleck et al. (2011a) for details. Here, we define LCTs
on the product level where a time interval of one week initiates a new search period. Additional results
for the other definitions of LCTs are available upon request.
13We focus on the endings of prices as they are quoted (without shipping cost), since this is the
main view for consumers and also the sole criterion for sorting offers on geizhals.at. A series of tests
including gross prices (sum of price and shipping cost) did not change the estimates for the coefficients
of specific endings of the net prices. Looking at the endings of the gross prices we found no effect at
all. We therefore conclude, that consumers do not perceive specific endings that result from the sum
of price and shipping cost.
14Market share was defined as the number of referral requests for offer ij relative to the total
number of clicks on product j.
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price like e599.00 or e739.00.15 Hence, even if the prices end with 00c, the left-digit
effect might apply. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of the unit position for prices
ending with 00c. The four graphs show the same four groups of interest we used above.
It seems that in all groups, a cumulation of prices ending in 9 can be observed, and
as before, the pattern is even more pronounced for the clicked and best-selling offers.
E.g., in the sample of best-price offers, almost a third of the offers end with nine euro,
zero cent.
Table 5.2 shows how focal prices vary across different types of goods. In the first
two columns the offers for the given products are separated according to the relative
product price. The lowest price offers for the given products are listed in the lowest
tercile, the distribution of focal prices for the highest price offers can be seen in the
highest tercile. In column four and five products are distinguished according to the
mean price of all offers per product in different terciles. The columns list the shares
of the focal prices for the cheap (lowest tercile) and the expensive (highest tercile)
products. In the last column the distribution of focal prices for the total sample is
shown. The comparison of the different terciles reveals that, on average, price points
can be observed more often for higher-priced offers as well as more expensive products.
Moreover, endings in zero cent (including e9.00) are relatively more common for high-
price offers and expensive products whereas the relative importance of price endings in
nine increases for low-price offers and cheap products.
5.4 Price rigidity and firm behavior
In this section, we analyze the relationship between price endings and the duration of
price-quotes.16 If the equilibrium is on 99-ending prices, then the maximizing firms
have a low inducement to change these price points. On the other hand, if a price
ending is non-focal, e-tailers should have an incentive to switch to a nearby price point
to increase demand. Hence, the price point theory predicts that shops maintain offers
at price points significantly longer than non-focal prices.
We use a duration analysis to compare the survival time of offers with price points
to the other offers’ survival time. First, we look at individual firm behavior as it is
measured by the time span that elapses until a firm changes its own price. We model
the hazard of ending an individual spell at duration t using a semi-parametric Cox
15Given such high prices, it would stretch the model a bit too far to expect the firms to bid prices
up to e599.99.
16Kauffman and Lee (2005) discuss the hypotheses about price rigidity in e-tailing relating to
market concentration, product quality, and size of the market. Kashyap (1995) gives a comprehensive
overview of the price stickiness in retail (catalogs).
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model that allows for a fully flexible baseline hazard hj0(t) and adds other variables
proportionally (j is the firm index and i is the product index):
h(t|j,Dij, θij, xi) = hj0(t)exp(δDij + βxi + γθij).
We use two different definitions for price points. In the first definition, we use the
most frequent price points as dummy variables: cent prices ending in 99c (1=ends in
99c), 90c (1=ends in 90c), and 50c (1=ends in 50c). For prices with 00c we distinguish
those with a nine before the comma (1=ends in 9.00) from those with other digits
(1=ends in ¬9.00) because the former should be considered as 9-ending prices. Note,
that the marketing literature defines odd prices as the practice of pricing just below
the nearest round number, where “nearest” is left somewhat ambiguous and context or
level specific Holdershaw et al. (1997).
To convey the flavor of odd and even prices, we use a second, more encompassing,
definition. We set the dummy 9-clustered to 1 if the price is either ending with 9
neglecting the right-most zeros (e.g., e576.90, e39.00, e590.00) or has at least one
nine in the last four digits including the cent (e.g., e91.81, e899.11, e59.92). This
definition for 9-clustered prices combines differing variants of 9-ending as an additional
check. It is broader and covers also prices that at first sight might not be considered
as focal prices: obviously a price of 1e9.98 sends out a certain signal — and most
observers would consider it as a kind of “odd” price. While we present this combination
to catch also such special prices, we are aware, that the concept is not so clear-cut as
the version with the individual focal price endings. The advantage of the definition
is that it is quite generally capturing the notion of just below pricing. Moreover, this
encompassing concept of 9-clustered prices may lead to a potential downward bias
because the concept may be too broad.
The dummy even price (without 9) takes the value 1 whenever a price’s ending is
00c without a nine being present in the four right-most digits (e.g., e345.00, e100.00).
Additionally, we add controls at the offer level and the product level:17 θij captures
four offer-specific controls, which include relative shipping cost, immediate availability
(1 if the product is immediately available), clicks, and price. xi captures three product-
invariant characteristics such as the number of competing shops, activity in the market
in form of the number of price changes, and an indicator for recommendations of the
product by consumers.
17Since we later stratify with respect to shops, there is no need to add shop-specific controls.
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5.4.1 Pooled analysis
Table 5.3 (column 1-3) presents the results from a pooled analysis where the baseline
hazard hj0(t) is assumed to be equal for all firms (i.e., hj0(t) = h0(t)∀ j). Standard
errors are clustered at the product level. The base regression in column (1) uses no
additional control variables, and thus, corresponds to estimating simple Kaplan-Meier
survivor functions for the five different price points: e0.99, e0.90, e0.50, e9.00, and
e¬9.00. All offers with price points have a lower hazard: they last longer. The effect
is strongest for the odd price ending with e9.00 followed by that ending with e¬9.00
and e0.99. We see the lowest impact for e0.50. A coefficient of -0.764 for e9.00
corresponds to a reduction of 53.33% in the hazard rate. Likewise, a coefficient of
-0.239 for the 50c dummy translates to a reduction of 21.18%. When a non-focal price
ending has a 50% chance of surviving 54 hours, an offer that is priced in 50c has a 58%
chance to make it to the same point in time. A 90c offer’s odds to survive 54 hours or
more are 72%.
When adding control variables in column (2), we see that our results basically
remain unchanged: both the numerical values as well as the ranking of coefficients for
our price points are fairly stable. Although there are no strict theoretical predictions
for our control variables, the coefficients fit into a reasonable picture. More expensive
articles and offers with higher shipping cost tend to have longer offers. The fact
that offers for products that are immediately available hold longer is consistent with
obfuscation strategy: e-tailers that do not have the product in stock might use short-
run bargain offers in order to attract the customers’ attention. At a later point in time,
when the product can be delivered immediately, they switch to a higher price. The
more clicks an offer generates, the lower is the incentive to change the price. The same
applies for a low number of average price changes from all other firms on the market,
which is an indicator of the market’s intensity of competition.
Column (3) uses the alternative specification of price points. Again, the price
points have significant and substantial longer durations than other prices: here, the
highest effect is for even price (without 9), with a somewhat smaller effect for the
9-clustered dummy.
5.4.2 Stratified analysis
It may be that particular shops have specific pricing strategies: one shop is changing
prices routinely each week, while another might change them every day. In order
to deal with these differences, we use a stratified analysis, allowing for firm-specific
baseline hazard rates. Our identification of the effect of price points stems only from
the within-firm variation in the duration of the price offers. As in any fixed-effects
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model, we expect lower coefficients in this stratified analysis.
In columns (4-6) of Table 5.3, we report the results from the stratified estimation,
again including product-specific clustered error terms. While, as expected, our
numerical coefficients are smaller as compared to the pooled analysis, all the previous
patterns are reinforced. The focal prices have a longer average duration and the effect
is the strongest for the prices ending in e9.00 in column (5) and even price (without
9) prices in column (6). Again, the weakest effect is found for the price quotes ending
in 50c. This stratified analysis shows that our price point effects cannot be explained
by firm-specific pricing policies: even within the same shop, offers with price points are
kept longer than other comparable offers.
5.4.3 Price rigidity for price leaders
Up until now, we looked at the temporal stability of any price offers. To investigate
the market outcomes or equilibrium outcomes, the equilibrium price should be studied.
As there is always a significant amount of price dispersion in online markets, we take
the offer with the lowest price, the “price-leading” offer, as the equilibrium price. We
thus draw a sub-sample of offers, which held the lowest price at one point in time. The
time for which a price-leading offer is valid can be reduced in different ways: either
another firm actively undercuts this price or the price-leading firm itself discontinues
the offer by going out of the market or charging a higher price. For an analysis of the
competitive actions in such a market, undercutting by rivals is the decisive feature.
Basu (2006) would argue that an equilibrium at 99-cent prices would not be undercut
by a rival because it is not profitable to do so.
The reduced sample consists of 41,764 offers and 14,933 incidents, where a price-
leading offer was undercut by an opponent. Our analysis uses a competing risk Cox
model stratified by firm in order to allow for two outcomes: underbidding of opponents
and own price changes. Table 5.4 shows the results. Columns (1-3) show the top
offers that ended by undercutting while columns (4-6) show the top offers that were
withdrawn or changed by the price-leader itself. We use the same specifications as in
Table 3. Our main interest is in the undercutting part. The focal prices are less likely
to be undercut, the effects for the prices ending in e9.00 and e0.99 (columns 1 and 2)
are the strongest, and the effects for even prices are smaller (e¬9.00) or insignificant
(e0.50). When we use our alternative specification (column 3), we see a similar pattern:
a strong effect for odd prices and a weaker effect for even prices (even price (without
9)). The results for own changes in columns (4-6) are less clear: only prices ending in
90c live longer before they are withdrawn by the firms.
The controls in Table 5.4 basically show a consistent picture. The higher the
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number of clicks while in lead, the higher is the probability that the offer is undercut
by a competitor. The more active a market is (measured with the number of price
changes of all other firms), the shorter are the best-price spells. In markets with a
higher number of competing shops, we observe that the shops change their prices more
frequently.
5.4.4 Price jumps after focal prices
If the price points, like the 99c prices, are a possible equilibrium outcome and are more
sticky, price changes, once they occur, should be larger Kashyap (1995). Levy et al.
(2011) report higher price jumps for the price points in both brick and mortar stores as
well as for the Internet prices. As we can observe the complete market we can improve
the strategy for online markets by observing only the price jumps of the price leaders.
This is of special importance in the online business in which the price search engines
provide higher levels of transparency, and therefore, price leading offers describe the
equilibrium phenomena better by simply considering any price quotes in the market.
We test the hypothesis of higher price jumps for focal prices using all downward price
changes, where we can also distinguish between undercutting by other firms and own
price reductions. If the best price is undercut by another firm, the average price jump is
minus 27c, and if the own firm is reducing the price, the reduction is smaller, amounting
only to 7c on average.
Table 5.5 shows the results using a log change of the best price as the dependent
variable in a product-fixed effects panel regression. In the first two columns for
undercutting by rivals, we find very strong price-point effects, in particular, for price
endings e0.99 and e9.00, but also somewhat smaller effects for price endings e0.90,
e0.50, and e¬9.00. If we, in turn, use our shortcut for suspicious 9 prices, 9-clustered
(column 2), we see significantly larger price jumps, whereas for even prices (even price
(without 9)), there is no effect.
For own price reductions in columns (3-4) the effects are generally smaller, but they
do confirm the theory that 99c prices are an equilibrium. We do find significant positive
effects only for price endings e0.99 and e9.00; all other price points are insignificant.
For 9-clustered price endings (column 4), contrary to undercutting, we do not find
significant effects, which might be due to the broader and more hazy concept of focal
prices that is used here.
A similar picture can be shown for upward changes in the bestprice caused by the
price leader raising its price or withdrawing the offer (in this case either the same or
another firm will have the new lowest price for the product). Considering these upward
jumps we again observe that focal prices are generally more stable. Price jumps (in
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the upward direction) are larger if the previous best price was either ending in 99, 9.00
or in zero Cents.
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5.5 Price points and consumer behavior
Finally, we look at the impact of price points on consumer behavior. Our
demand estimation in Table 5.6 looks at the consumers’ clicks (qij) on the website
www.geizhals.at. A consumer click is a referral request to retailer j for product i.
qij = a0 + bDij + a1rel. priceij + cXij + a2iproducti + ij.
As the duration of the price offers varies, we standardize the consumer clicks as
the number of clicks per week. The vector Dij includes various dummy variables for
the price points, like odd or even prices. The variables of interest are the indicators
for the respective price endings e0.99, e0.90, e0.50, e9.00, e¬9.00, 9-clustered, and
even price (without 9).
Additionally, to directly test Basu (2006), we artificially split up the price into its
euro digits (multiplied by 100) and the remaining cent digits. Fully rational consumers
would pay the same attention to the changes in both the euro and the cent digits,
provided the change is the same; the coefficients for the two variables should be equal
and negative. Basu (2006), on the other hand, argues that the consumers do not
consider the cent digits in their demand, and hence, its coefficient should be zero.
The variable rel. price measures the price of product i of retailer j relative to the
average price of product i over all retailers (rel. priceij =
pij∑N
j=1 pij/N
). The additional
control variables in vector X include rel. shipping cost, German shop (equal to 1 if
the online shop is located in Germany, and 0 otherwise), immed. availability (equal
to 1 if the product is deliverable at a short notice), reviews (grade) that measures the
service and reliability evaluation of a shop j by the costumers on a scale from 1 to 5
(very good to very bad), and reviews (num.) that counts the number of customers who
have given an evaluation of the retailers’ service characteristics. As we are merging the
markets for different products, we include the product-fixed effects in the estimation.
We are using the price offers for a week in June 2007. As different price offers are valid
for varying time periods, we calculate a standardized number of clicks per week as our
dependent variable qij.
The price setting may be endogenous to demand. Therefore, we instrument the
relative price of the product by the mean relative price a firm has in all markets except
in the markets where the products belong to the same subsubcategory as the product
in question.18 The identifying assumption is that the price setting in not-related
18Geizhals.at maps products hierarchically into subsubcategories, subcategories, and categories
describing the substitutional relationship between the products. As an example, the category
“Video/Photo/TV” contains the subcategory “TV sets” and the subsubcategory “30-39 inch LCD
TV sets”. In total, 358 subsubcategories and 40 subcategories are given.
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markets should not influence demand in our model.19 In the first stage regression, the
instrument has a strong and significant impact on the prices resulting in a marginal
R2 of 0.093. The exclusion restriction is particularly convincing because the customers
in a price-comparison site cannot look at the complete price list for all products in the
other subsubcategories of one particular firm. As the organization of the website allows
only price comparisons for one particular product across firms, the consumers have a
very hard time to get an image of the overall pricing behavior of one particular firm.
Table 5.6 looks at the influence of the price points on demand using customer
clicks. Columns (1-3) of Table 5.6 use all referral requests as demand indicators,
whereas columns (4-6) employ only LCTs that are considered as better indications
for real purchasing decisions. Both indicators for demand give fairly similar results. As
expected, those on LCTs are numerically considerably smaller.
There is no clear indication that the usage of price points (column 1) boosts
demand. The prices ending with 99c are unremarkable. Whereas the prices ending
with 90c or 50c attract somewhat less clicks, those ending with 00c, and in particular,
those ending with 9 euro, attract more clicks. These results may be due to our sample
that primarily consists of higher-priced items: setting prices ending with 9 euros seems
to boost demand. The regression results for the LCTs in column (4) confirm this
picture, albeit on a lower scale.20 The pattern is generally confirmed when we use
our definitions for the odd and even prices in column (2): we have somewhat higher
demand for 9-clustered price endings, but no effects for even prices that do not contain
any nines. The relatively small effect of 9-clustered prices vanishes once we introduce
LCTs in column (5).
Our test for left-to-right processing also brings interesting results: contrary to a
fully rational consumer, our shoppers behave apparently only boundedly rational. The
euro part of the price has a strong negative effect on demand, whereas the effect of
the cent is either positive for the number of clicks or zero for LCTs.21 This is a direct
affirmation of Basu’s (2006) hypothesis of consumers disregarding the cent, which can
19Kaiser and Minjae (2009) use the same instrumentation strategy for the demand for consumer
magazines.
20Note that the LCTs indicate, by definition, a higher purchase probability. Therefore, the
comparison of normal clicks with LCTs allows us a prediction of the impact of price points on actual
demand.
21We do not use the instrumented relative price in columns (3) and (6) as we did in the other
regressions. Note, that we cannot instrument the absolute euro value, as we want to compare the
coefficients for the euro value and the cent value directly: perfectly rational consumers should indicate
a significant hundredfold coefficient for the euro value as compared to the cent value. We cannot
use our instrument for the absolute euro value since it is not possible to meaningfully instrument the
absolute price across the huge variety of completely different products. However, the comparison of
IV-regression with simple OLS regressions does not show significant differences that might question
our results in columns (3) and (6) of Table 5.6.
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also explain the heterogenous results concerning the impact of cent endings on demand.
We do not find convincing arguments supporting the theories on the image effect of
price points (note, for instance, the negative impact of 50c on the demand).
For more expensive products, not only the cent but also the unit digits should
be irrelevant for the consumer’s decision. Therefore, we repeat this exercise for the
products with prices above e100 for which we shifted our test procedure one digit to
the left: a price of e234.67 is thus split up into a “relevant variable” with a value of
23.000 and an “irrelevant variable” with value 0.467. Again, the rational consumers
would show the same coefficients for both variables. For all clicks, we find coefficients
of -0.028*** (0.002) for the first and +0.376***(0.081) for the second variable; for the
LCTs, we find -0.002*** (0.0002) and +0.034***(0.010) (there are no other substantial
changes for the other variables). Although the consumers are price sensitive at the
relevant price digits (the relevant variable), the positive significant coefficient for the
“irrelevant variable” shows that the shoppers tend to choose price endings with high
digits (9s). These patterns with the non-negative signs for the ”irrelevant variable”
again strongly confirm Basu’s bounded rationality hypothesis.
The additional control variables are in line with what is to be expected in online
markets. The relative price of the shop decreases demand.22 The positive influence of
the higher shipping cost on market demand can be seen as evidence for obfuscation
strategies, where the online shops compensate their lower prices with higher extra
charges.23 E-tailers with immediately available offers and better and more customer
evaluations attract more customers. The positive sign of the Germany dummy points
out that this highly successful Austrian price search engine is increasingly used by
German users.24
To test the robustness of our results and also to better understand which forces
drive them, we replicated the specification in our estimation of demand (Table 5.6)
for different subgroups of consumers, different types of products or different types of
shops.25 The results of these experiments are shown in Table 5.7. In the first two
columns of panel A we distinguished extensive searchers, who spend a lot of time on
the site and look at many offers and brief searchers, who look at only a few offers,
before either leaving the site or making their purchase. In columns (3) and (4) of the
22This effect is not statistically significant in the LCT model, which might be due to the
instrumentation strategy. We also estimated the model with OLS, and there, the coefficients for
the relative price are both significant and somewhat higher than the ones presented in Table 5.6.
23Hossain and Morgan (2006) show that the buyers are inattentive to the shipping costs in eBay
auctions as well.
24In November 2008, 72 percent of the online shops were located in Germany and 62 percent of the
clicks were from German IP addresses.
25We thank the anonymous referees for valuable suggestions for these sample splits.
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Table we distinguished between expensive and cheap products. Columns (5) and (6)
juxtapose frequent users of geizhals.at and users who request the price comparison site
only sporadically. In the last two columns, finally, we compare the results when we use
only “pure play” webshops with those from a sample where we use shops having both
a web-store and a brick and mortar shop.26
For brevity, panel A shows only the coefficients for the price points. Considering
the interpretation of the coefficients, one has to take into account that between some
subgroups the mean of the dependent variable is different in size. Between intense
and brief searchers – as well as between frequent and infrequent searchers – there are
not many differences, except that the infrequent and the brief searchers buy more
at 99-ending prices. In the case of cheaper products prices ending in 50 or 90 cents
attract less demand, whereas in the case of more expensive products, even prices attract
more demand. Apparently, the importance of images varies. Finally, price points are
perceived fairly different in “pure play” webshops as compared to combined web and
brick and mortar stores: When a brick and mortar store exists as well, consumers
reward typical odd prices – those ending in 99 cents or 9 euros; whereas consumers
shopping in a web-only store reward even euro endings and dislike cent endings, like
90 or 50 cents.
In panel B we test whether consumers attach different weight to euro vs. cent
digits – and whether these weights differ across subgroups. The results overwhelmingly
confirm the hypothesis that consumers read prices from the left to the right and attach
less weight to cent digits. While the euro digits are consistently negative, the cent digits
are mostly positive and in many cases significantly so. While this significantly positive
coefficient may be due to some image effects, it indicates, indeed, that consumers have
a peculiar awareness of prices: if the difference of a higher price lies only in the cent
endings, it does not reduce demand.
5.6 Interpretation and conclusions
In this paper, we present the first comprehensive and consistent analysis of price points
on the supply and demand side of a market. We analyze the issue in the context of e-
commerce, an environment that is, a priori, not very favorable to price points. We can
show that price points (special prices ending in 9 or 0) are non-the-less prevalent in
e-commerce. Our results are consistent with Basu (2006) who assumes boundedly
rational shoppers ignoring the rightmost digits due to limited processing capacity.
26We define “pure play” webshops as shops that do not have a real world shop and click and mortar
shops as stores which also have offline facilities, where consumers can inform themselves and make
their purchases.
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Profit-maximizing firms will adapt to this bounded rational behavior of consumers
by setting prices ending in 9.
We found in our data covering the Austrian e-commerce market that the prices
ending in 9 show typical equilibrium characteristics: they are more sticky than regular
or even prices. This is particularly so for best-price offers: when these offers end with
9, they are less likely to be undercut by the rivals, and are also less often changed by
the firm itself as compared to non-focal prices.
Although there is no clear-cut consistent impact of price points on the consumers’
demand we find that the market does not react to the differences in the cent digits,
as Basu (2006) is assuming. From a more general perspective, our results are more in
line with Basu’s level effect explanation for price points rather than the image effect
theories even though we cannot rule out the existence of image effects for certain price
patterns.
From a managerial perspective, price setting is one of the most important tasks.
It turns out that even in highly competitive and transparent settings, like e-commerce
with price-comparison sites, price points seem to matter. Which prices should firms set
to maximize profits? We found clear-cut empirical evidence that consumers do display
some form of left-to-right price-processing. Setting 9-ending prices might therefore
be profitable: the price might lie below consumers’ even-numbered thresholds for
the maximal willingness to pay and and competitors might leave such a best prices
unchallenged a little longer. Managerial implications are less clear when it comes
to other focal prices for which theoretical predictions and empirical results reflect
ambiguous evidence: While it seems that consumers reward firms which set prices
at zero cents, they punish those with prices ending in 90 or 50 cents. Image theory,
however, is still too unspecific to give a clear reason for this.
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5.7 Tables and Graphs
Figure 5.1: Distribution of the cent digits
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of the last euro digits of 00c-ending offers
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Table 5.2: Frequency of focal price endings for (i) low-price and high-price offers and
(ii) low-price vs. high-price products.
low-price vs. low-price vs. total
high-price offer high-price product sample
lowest highest lowest highest
tercile tercile tercile tercile
1=ends in 00c 0.0720 0.147 0.0743 0.144 0.109
1=ends in ¬9.00 0.0543 0.126 0.0659 0.107 0.0863
1=ends in 9.00 0.0177 0.0209 0.00843 0.0369 0.0227
1=ends in 50c 0.0285 0.0342 0.0317 0.0369 0.0343
1=ends in 90c 0.0361 0.0524 0.0418 0.0427 0.0423
1=ends in 99c 0.0215 0.0173 0.0183 0.0216 0.0200
Notes: Number of observations: 523,748 offers; The figures represent shares of the focal
price in the respective terciles.
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Table 5.3: Focal prices and price stickiness: all price offers
pooled stratified
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1=ends in 99c -0.428*** -0.297*** -0.098*** -0.053***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
1=ends in 90c -0.408*** -0.370*** -0.098*** -0.087***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
1=ends in 50c -0.239*** -0.172*** -0.055*** -0.037***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
1=ends in 9.00 -0.764*** -0.533*** -0.195*** -0.131***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
1=ends in ¬9.00 -0.445*** -0.375*** -0.132*** -0.103***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
9-clustered -0.138*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.003)
even price (no 9) -0.334*** -0.055***
(0.005) (0.006)
euro digits in 100s -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rel. shipping cost -0.065*** -0.047*** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
immed. availability -0.166*** -0.173*** 0.042*** 0.042***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
clicks -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
number of shops 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
price changes (excl. i) 0.450*** 0.456*** 0.424*** 0.424***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
recommendations 0.017 0.013 0.027** 0.026**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 805949 805949 805949 805949 805949 805949
Number of Failures 778521 778521 778521 778521 778521 778521
Log L -9720432 -9720432 -9720432 -5942823 -5942823 -5942823
χ2 13812 30442 22454 626 9883 9241
DF 5 14 11 5 14 11
Notes: Cox hazard model with cluster-robust standard errors, columns 4-6 include a stratification with respect to shops. Dependent
variable: duration of price spell; no. of distinct offers (j offering i) = 410245; no. of e-tailers j = 698; no. of products i = 23317; standard
errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.4: Focal prices and price stickiness: price-leading offers.
undercut own change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1=ends in 99c -0.227*** -0.242*** 0.067 0.066
(0.050) (0.051) (0.056) (0.057)
1=ends in 90c -0.119** -0.103** -0.128*** -0.118***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.040) (0.041)
1=ends in 50c -0.086 -0.090 0.009 0.008
(0.063) (0.064) (0.047) (0.047)
1=ends in 9.00 -0.336*** -0.312*** -0.047 -0.048
(0.055) (0.056) (0.044) (0.044)
1=ends in ¬9.00 -0.139*** -0.144*** 0.026 0.020
(0.044) (0.045) (0.035) (0.035)
9-clustered -0.093*** -0.018
(0.025) (0.014)
even price (no 9) -0.080** 0.018
(0.037) (0.027)
euro digits in 100s -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
rel. shipping cost -0.007 -0.008 -0.040** -0.041**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.016) (0.016)
immed. availability 0.028 0.022 0.006 0.005
(0.041) (0.041) (0.023) (0.022)
clicks while in lead 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
number of shops 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
price changes (excl. i) 2.463*** 2.473*** 3.322*** 3.324***
(0.375) (0.376) (0.444) (0.444)
recommendations 0.146** 0.141** -0.011 -0.011
(0.058) (0.058) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 41764 41764 41764 41764 41764 41764
Number of Failures 14933 14933 14933 26817 26817 26817
Log L -80060 -80060 -80060 -152829 -152829 -152829
χ2 51 609 566 16 208 185
DF 5 13 10 5 13 10
Notes: Competing risk Cox hazard model with cluster-robust standard errors, stratified at the firm level; dependent variable: duration
the offer marked the lowest price; failures in the group of undercut (actively changed) offers: 14933 (26817; and 14 offers that were valid
for more than 43 days); no. of firms j in estimation = 519 ; no. of products i=13341; no. of distinct firm-product combinations ij = 21629;
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.5: Focal prices and price stickiness: size of price jumps
undercut own change down upward change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1=ends in 99c 0.731** 0.296*** 0.564**
(0.289) (0.084) (0.232)
1=ends in 90c 0.387*** 0.099 -0.165
(0.134) (0.131) (0.106)
1=ends in 50c 0.489*** -0.008 0.114
(0.170) (0.118) (0.144)
1=ends in 9.00 1.254*** 0.866*** 1.461***
(0.177) (0.158) (0.165)
1=ends in ¬9.00 0.503*** 0.192 0.658***
(0.147) (0.160) (0.158)
9-clustered 0.261*** 0.053 -0.047
(0.074) (0.037) (0.084)
even price (no 9) 0.119 -0.066 0.060
(0.106) (0.118) (0.101)
price in 100s 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.025***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
number of shops -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
clicks while in lead -0.006* -0.006* 0.005 0.005 0.013*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
immed. availability -0.245* -0.225 -0.009 -0.001 -0.063 -0.039
(0.138) (0.138) (0.094) (0.099) (0.087) (0.087)
price changes (excl. i) 1.406 1.299 -0.026 -0.179 4.799 4.516
(0.940) (0.929) (2.689) (2.820) (5.155) (5.180)
recommendations 0.004 0.012 0.009 0.016 -0.307** -0.304**
(0.090) (0.090) (0.071) (0.071) (0.123) (0.122)
1=no recommendation 0.114* 0.107 0.011 0.010 -0.016 -0.025
(0.067) (0.067) (0.041) (0.043) (0.065) (0.067)
rel. shipping cost -0.101 -0.100 0.030 0.032 -0.022 -0.000
(0.111) (0.115) (0.058) (0.060) (0.089) (0.096)
Constant -1.377*** -1.317*** -2.842*** -2.818*** -0.985*** -0.875***
(0.207) (0.220) (0.086) (0.093) (0.145) (0.153)
Observations 14933 14933 11399 11399 12809 12809
Number of Firms 444 444 246 246 340 340
Mean of Dep. Var. -1.32 -1.32 -2.70 -2.70 -1.13 -1.13
Log L -32400 -32400 -17239 -17239 -24357 -24357
DF 13 10 13 10 13 10
Notes: Fixed effects panel regression with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors; dependent variable in columns (1) to (4):
log(bestpricet− bestpricet+1); due to the logarithmic transformation the dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is: log(bestpricet+1−
bestpricet); no. of distinct firms j in estimation = 481; no. of products i=9804; no. of individual offers (i x j) = 15581; standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.6: Demand and focal prices
.
clicks per week LCTs per week
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1=ends in 99c 0.082 -0.020
(0.124) (0.014)
1=ends in 90c -0.288*** -0.019**
(0.084) (0.010)
1=ends in 50c -0.582*** -0.039***
(0.095) (0.011)
1=ends in 9.00 0.580*** 0.042***
(0.127) (0.014)
1=ends in ¬9.00 0.270*** 0.016**
(0.063) (0.007)
9-clustered 0.088** 0.007
(0.038) (0.004)
even price (no 9) 0.064 0.003
(0.059) (0.007)
euro digits in 100s -0.301*** -0.017***
(0.019) (0.002)
cent digits 0.139*** 0.005
(0.053) (0.006)
relative price -3.908*** -3.992*** -0.265*** -0.273***
(0.470) (0.468) (0.053) (0.053)
rel. shipping cost 0.092** 0.103*** 0.096** 0.008* 0.009** 0.008**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
immed. availability 1.602*** 1.583*** 1.664*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.120***
(0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
reviews (grade) -0.120*** -0.127*** -0.092*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.007**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
reviews (num.) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
German shop 0.213*** 0.218*** 0.236*** 0.008 0.008 0.010*
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Constant 4.161*** 4.198*** 1.382*** 0.287*** 0.290*** 0.085***
(0.482) (0.480) (0.114) (0.054) (0.054) (0.013)
Observations 793507 793507 793507 793507 793507 793507
Number of Products 22722 22722 22722 22722 22722 22722
Log L -3244456 -1513480
χ2 7152 7064 2490 2458
DF 13 10 9 13 10 9
Notes: Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) show IV-Panel regressions, columns (3) and (6) show simple panel regressions; dependent variable
in columns (1-3): clicks per week , dependent variable in columns (4-6): LCTs per week ; no. of distinct offers (j offering i) = 388655; no.
of firms = 569; no. of products = 22722; standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.1 Details about Data Preparation, the Treated
and the Control Groups
This section gives detailed information about the preparation and storage of the
dataset. The subsequent subsections explain how the database was put together and
the procedure I used to extract the dataset that I use.
A.1.1 Preparation and Extraction
The dataset is based on a full-text dump of the German Wikipedia from the Wikimedia
toolserver. To construct the history of the articles’ hyperlink network for the entire
encyclopedia, it was necessary to parse the data and identify the links. From the
resulting tables, I constructed a time-varying graph of the article network, which
provided the foundation for how I sample articles in my analysis. Furthermore,
information about the articles, such as the number of authors who contributed up
to a particular point in time or the existence of a section with literature references
was added. Hence, the data I use are based on 153 weeks of the the entire German
Wikipedia’s revision history between December 2007 and December 2010. Since the
data are in the order of magnitude of terabytes, it was not be possible to conduct
the data analysis using only in-memory processing. We therefore stored the data in
a relational database (disk-based) and queried the data using Database Supported
Haskell (DSH) (Giorgidze et al. (2010)).1
A.1.2 Choice of Treated Articles and Neighborhood
“Featured articles” were found by consulting the German Wikipedia’s archive of pages
that were selected to be advertised on Wikipedia’s main page (“Seite des Tages”)
between December 2007 and December 2010. To reduce the computational burden
and to avoid the risk of temporal overlaps of different treatments, I focus on pages that
were selected on the 10th of a month. I identified all the pages that received a direct
link (L1) or an indirect link (L2) from such a featured article more than a week before
treatment. I evalutated links with this time gap before the shock actually occurred
to make sure that the results are not driven by endogeneous link formation.2 Having
fixed the set of pages to observe, I extracted daily information on the contemporary
state of the articles (page visits, number of revisions, number of distinct authors that
contributed, page length, number of external links etc.). I determine these variables on
a daily basis, 14 days before the event occurred (on a neighboring page) and 14 days
after the shock (giving a total of 29 observations per page).
To identify major events, I consulted the corresponding page on Wikipedia and
selected the 26 largest events with spontaneous onset. For each of these events we
identified the page that corresponds to the event, which are considered to be in the
set “L0” (sometimes also called “start pages”). Note that this page is typically created
after the event occurred3, which obliges me to identify the pages, that user will most
likely turn to until the disaster’s page is in place. To achieve this, I used the link data
to identify the set of pages that later shared a reciprocal link with the start page. Such
1This is a novel high-level language allowing the writing and efficient execution of queries on nested
and ordered collections of data.
2I thus only include pages that had a link before it was known that the start page will be hit.
I furthermore exclude pages that receive their indirect (L2) link via a page that has more than 100
links, since such pages are very likely either pure “link pages” very general pages (such as pages about
a year), that bare only a very weak relationship to the shocked site.
3Usually it takes up to two days until the event receives its own page.
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a reciprocal link indicates that they were closely related to the event. After the event
page came in to existence they were only one click away (set “L1”). Next, we identified
those pages that received a link from an L1 page (unidirectional) (2 clicks away set
“L2”)
I am most interested in attention spillovers and content provision, which are not
directly related to the events but rather a consequence of the spike in interest and the
resulting improvements to the linked pages. Hence, I will not focus on the treated pages
directly, but on the set L1 that are “one click away”, in my analysis of the “featured
articles”.4 For disasters the shock is very large and the event page usually does not
exist at the time of the shock, so the L1 pages might have been treated themselves.
5
Hence, I focus on the indirectly linked set of pages (L2) in the analysis below.
A.1.3 Choice of Control Group Articles and Neighborhood
The approach I take in this paper hinges on the availability of a valid control group. To
obtain such observations I pursue two distinct strategies. The first approach uses pages
which are similar but unlikely to be affected by the treatment. For a first comparison
I selected other featured articles and neighbors thereof that were advertised featured
either later or earlier in time. Given such a similar page, I identified their direct and
indirect neighbors when the event occurred on the treated page. This gives me a set
C1control which is similar in both size and characteristics to the sampled pages (before
the shock). Yet, the choice of the start pages in the comparison group is somewhat
arbitrary.6 I address this issue by simulating a treatment on the treated pages 42 days
before the disaster or event occurred. I refer to the articles in this “placebo-treatment”
as C1placebo, because for them t = 0 when no actual treatment occurred. By design,
this comparison group consists of the same set of articles (treated and their neighbors).
This comes at the cost of observing the articles at a different point in time. A third
control group of “unrelated” observations results from applying a placebo to the control
group.7
Table 2.8 (in the data appendix) shows which featured articles were chosen by
my procedure and included in the data. In general, they cover various topics such as
innovations (e.g. the CCD-sensor), places (Helgoland), soccer clubs (Werder Bremen)
or art history topics (Carolingian book illustrations). The first column of the table
shows the number of articles that belong to each featured article. The last three
columns show the number of observations that received a link from an article before it
was advertised featured, separated by whether or not they belong to a time-series with
actually treated observations.8 The numbers range from 2,088 to 33,872.
4Effects on the pages that are 2 clicks away were to small too be measured.
5Some of the consequences of major events, such as earthquakes, might change the state of the
world and thus trigger a change in content, which is merely due to the event (e.g. destruction of an
important monument). Consequently, I do not emphasize the change in activity on the pages that are
only one click away for disasters. I also exclude pages if they were later directly linked to the event
page.
6Ideally the selection of comparison pages should be based on matching procedures, which is
unfortunately not possible without computing the characteristics of all the 1,000,000 nodes. My
approach is however quite robust independently of how I specify the control group. I also compared
to the neighbors around articles of similar size and relative importance, about similar topics, but in a
remote geographic space or technical domain. Such a change in the specification of the control group
does not affect my results. (available upon request).
7This set of observations actually emerged as an artifact from the data extraction. Nevertheless
it provides yet another group that can be compared to the treated group.
8Note, that each page shows up 29 times in the raw data and was sampled twice (placebo and
real treatment), so that the number of corresponding pages (treatment or control) can be inferred by
dividing the number of observations by 58.
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For disasters I proceeded along similar lines. I focused on the network around older
catastrophes that occurred at a different point in time and were not from exactly the
same domain, to avoid overlaps in the link network (Ccontrol). Alternatively, I observe
the same set of pages seven weeks before the disaster (Cplacebo). Table 2.9 shows which
events were included in the data and shows the associated number of observations
for each of them. The dataset includes both natural disasters as well as technical or
economic catastrophes.
A.2 The empirical model and structural identifica-
tion of the parameter of interest.
This section presents the structural model and discusses the parameters of interest, the
challenges in identifying them and the approach taken to tackle them.
A.2.1 Introductory remarks
I depart from the well known linear-in-means model as formulated by Manski (1993).9
yit = α
∑
j∈Pit yjt
NPit
+Xit−1β + γ
∑
j∈Pit Xjt−1
NPit
+ it (A.1)
yit denotes the outcome of interest in period t and Xit−1 are i’s observed characteristics
at the end of period t− 1 (beginning of period t).10 Pit is the set of i’s peers and NPit
represents the number of i’s peers. β measures the effect of i’s own characteristics and
γ accounts for how i’s performance is affected by the peers’ average characteristics.
The coefficient of interest is α. In the present context it measures how the clicks on
page i are influenced the clicks on the adjacent pages. Bramoulle´ et al. (2009) suggest
a more succinct notation based on vector and matrix notation:
yt = αGyt + βXt−1 + γGXt−1 + t E[t|Xt−1] = 0
Note that the linear in means model provides the weakest basis for identification. I
conjecture that the insights carry over to other linear models and less weakly identified
non-linear models.
A.2.2 Setup and Basic Intuition
Augment the model (eq. A.1) by observable and locally applied treatments (shocks):
yit = α
∑
j∈Pit yjt
NPit
+Xi,t−1β + γ
∑
j∈Pit Xj,t−1
NPit
+ δ1Dit + it (A.2)
where the new coefficient δ1 measures the direct effect if a node(page) is treated.
Note thatXit−1β may contain an individual fixed effect and an additively separable
age-dependent part: Xit−1β = βi + X˜i,t−1β1 + β2f(age). To see how local treatments
9Note that it is easy to add a fixed effect to the model, but that it will be eliminated when taking
differences. Consequently, I omit it for ease of notation.
10The choice of the temporal structure depends on the application that the researcher has in mind.
In the present application many independent variables are stock variables (articles’ characteristics
such as page length), while the dependent variables are typically flows (clicks or new revisions).
A.2. DETAILS: ESTIMATION OF SPILLOVER PARAMETER 141
can be used as a source of identification, consider two pairs of nodes.
Local application of treatment: First, consider two connected nodes, where one
is treated (`0) in period t and the neighbors are not treated (`1 ∈ L1). Assume for
simplicity that `0 is the only treated node in `1’s neighborhood.
`0 :: y`0t = α
∑
j∈P`0t yjt
NP`0t
+X`0t−1β + γ
∑
j∈P`0t Xjt−1
NP`0t
+ δ11 + `0t (A.3)
`1 ∈ L1 :: y`1t = α
y`0t +
∑
j∈P`1t/`0 yjt
NP`1t
+X`1t−1β + γ
∑
j∈P`1t Xjt−1
NP`1t
+ δ10 + `1t (A.4)
If we now consider a comparison group of two connected nodes (c0 and c1) where
nobody gets treated, Dt would take the value 0 for both c0 and c1. The newly
introduced term would simply drop out. It can easily be seen, how the local treatment
will allow to measure the spillover or peer effect. This will be possible despite the
richness in other sources of variation, provided (i) the shocks are large enough and (ii)
the “control network” allows to credibly infer the dynamics in the “treated network”,
had no treatment taken place.
Condensed Notation: I use the matrix notation suggested by Bramoulle´ et al.
(2009) and incorporate the newly proposed vector of treatments11:
yt = αGyt + Xt−1β + γGXt−1 + δ1Dt + t E[t|Dt] = 0 (A.5)
G is a NxN matrix, which captures the link structure in the network. Gij =
1
NPi−1
if
i receives a link from j and Gij = 0 otherwise. Note that I do not require G to be
exogenously given, but only Dt, a vector which is 1 at the treated nodes (if they are
currently treated) and 0 otherwise. In some of the proofs and in my application I will
assume a local treatment that affects only a single node. Formally this is written as
an elemenatry vector Dt = e`0 with the 1 in the coordinate that corresponds to the
treated node. On the untreated subnetwork we have Dt = 0, a vector of zeros.
Unlike Bramoulle´ et al. (2009), I do not look for an instrument for Gy. Since I
rather use exogenous shocks that affect only one part of the network, there will be no
requirements on the linear independence of G and G2.
A.2.3 Proof of Result 1
I shall now proceed to provide the formal argument for Result 1. To increase the
readability I will make a few assumptions to keep things simple. Most importantly I
assume the network G to be stable over time but I allow Xt to change dynamically.
I set the comparison group (which was indexed by c) to be the group itself S periods
earlier, which results in an S-period difference-in-differences.12
11X might include a time-dependent component (e.g. a linear function of age) as well.
12Importantly the nodes in the network have to be observed over time and have to evolve in a stable
fashion, to ensure that the first differences are the same at t and t − S. This setting corresponds to
comparing the evolution of nodes in a very stable network during a post and a pre-treatment stage. It
is also reasonably close to the “placebo condition” of my application below. At the end of the formal
derivations I will discuss the consequences of relaxing the requirement of a stable network or the
consequences of adding the assumption that Xt does not change between the periods of observation.
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Result 1: A difference-in-differences estimator contains the following quantity:
DiD = δ1Dt(I + αG + α
2G2 + α3G3 + ...)
Proof. The reduced form corresponding to equation A.5 is given by:
yt = (I− αG)−1[Xt−1β + γGXt−1 + δ1Dt + t] (A.6)
and the expectation conditional on the “treatment” is:
E[yt|Dt] = (I− αG)−1[(β + γG)E[Xt−1|Dt] + δ1Dt + E[t|Dt]] =b.A. (A.7)
=b.A. (I− αG)−1[(β + γG)E[Xt−1|Dt] + δ1Dt]
Taking the first difference, we obtain:
∆tE[y|D] = E[yt|Dt]− E[yt−1|Dt−1] = (A.8)
= (I− αG)−1[(β + γG){E[Xt−1|Dt]− E[Xt−2|Dt−1]}+ δ1∆Dt] =
= (I− αG)−1[(β + γG){E[Xt−1|Dt]− E[Xt−2|Dt−1]}+ δ1Dt]
...where ∆Dt = Dt −Dt−1 and the second equality holds, because treatments are
assumed to start in period t, but not before.13
Now consider the control group formed by the same network, but S periods earlier:
yt−S = αGyt−S + Xt−S−1β + γGXt−S−1 + δ1Dt−S + t−S
The first difference of the reduced form’s conditional expectations are:
∆t−SE[y|D] = E[yt−S|Dt−S]− E[yt−S−1|Dt−S−1] =
= (I− αG)−1[(β + γG){E[Xt−S−1|Dt−S]− E[Xt−S−2|Dt−S−1]}+ δ1∆Dt−S] =
= (I− αG)−1[(β + γG){E[Xt−S−1|Dt−S]− E[Xt−S−2|Dt−S−1]}+ 0]
with ∆Dt−S = 0, since treatments are assumed to start in period t, but not earlier.
Proceeding to take the Difference in Differences, we obtain:
DiD := ∆ytE[y|D]− ∆yt−SE[y|D] =
= (I− αG)−1 [(β + γG){E[Xt−1|Dt]− E[Xt−2|Dt−1]}+ δ1Dt]−
− (β + γG){E[Xt−S−1|Dt−S]− E[Xt−S−2|Dt−S−1]}]
Denoting the change in the expectation of Xt−1 conditional on Dt more concisely by{E[Xt−1|Dt]− E[Xt−2|Dt−1]} = ∆t(E[X|D]) and rearranging gives:
DiD = (I− αG)−1 [(β + γG){∆t(E[X|D])−∆t−S(E[X|D])}+ δ1Dt] (A.9)
which reduces to:
DiD = (I− αG)−1{δ1Dt} (A.10)
13That difference contains the time-dependent component and the effect of any changes in the
independent variables. If βXit is modeled to contain an additively separable age-dependent part as
in our example above, ∆Xit−Sβ would contain
df(age)
dt (to be eliminated by taking the Difference in
Differences).
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if ∆t(E[X|D]) = ∆t−S(E[X|D]). Thus, the identifying assumption is that the expected
changes of the pages between t − 1 and t are the same as from t − S − 1 and t − S.
This is satisfied if ∆Xt|Dt is stationary of order one.
Provided (I− αG)−1 is invertible we can use the property that (I− αG)−1 =∑∞
s=0 α
sGs14, the general impact of a local treatment is:
DiD = δ1Dt(I + αG + α
2G2 + α3G3 + ...) (A.11)
which completes the proof.
Discussion of the assumptions used:
(i) E[t|Dt] = 0
(ii) α is smaller than the norm of the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of G. A
regularity condition to ensures that the expression (I− αG)−1 = ∑∞s=0 αsGs is
well defined.
(iii) I assumed the network to be stable over time and used it’s earlier state
as control observation. Formally this is written as G`,t = G`,t−1 = G and
Gc,t = G`,t−S = G. This assumption could be relaxed, but only at the expense
of strengthening the following assumption.
(iv) ∆t(E[X|D]) − ∆t−S(E[X|D]), which means that the expected changes of the
pages between t− 1 and t are the same as from t−S− 1 and t−S15. This is the
analogue of the well known common trends assumption.
(v) SUTVA on the level of subnetworks: the non-treated subnetwork is not affected
by treatment of the treated subnetwork. In the present context SUTVA holds
for my placebo condition and, given the size of the Wikipedia network, it is also
plausibly satisfied for the control group formed by a remote part of the network.
The proof for the control group consisting of remote nodes is analogous. It relaxes the
third assumption and requires a more general formulation of the fourth. The qualitative
meaning of the generalized assumption will be the same: Absent treatment the treated
network and the control network must “evolve in the same way.”16 However, I have
to maintain the assumption that the network formation process is not affected by the
treatment.17 I do not consider this assumption warranted for disasters and I checked
this assumption in my “today’s featured article application”: Link formation remains
on low levels. On normal days, articles’ degree grows steadily by about 0.1 links per
day, with total in-links averaging at 120. There is a short increase by 0.2 in-links per
article (or 0.2% of the link stock). Yet, first this is in sync with the peak in edits, but
14G is invertible if α < 1 (Bramoulle´ et al. (2009)) and the infinite sum is well defined if α is
smaller than the norm of the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of G (Ballester et al. (2006)).
15Particularly, any time trends or other dynamics, is to be eliminated by the Differences in
Differences, if df(age)dt is the same evaluated at t-S and at t.
16To be more precise, the link formation and the way in which the characteristics of the nodes
change over time have to be the same (common trends) in both networks. This guarantees that the
counterfactual outcome of the treated network can be inferred from its own past and the evolution in
the control network. The derivations require a lot of notational overhead and the resulting conditions
are quite unwieldy. Assumption 4 would refer not only to ∆X, but to ∆GX to allow for relaxing
Assumption 3.
17If this is the case, all estimates of indirect treatment effects, will reflect a sum of the treatment
on the existing network and new spillovers due to the changes in the link network (cf. Comola and
Prina (2013)), which will lead to upward biases if not accounted for.
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not with the peak in clicks, and second, like for edits, the peak is large in relative, but
small in absolute terms. I conclude that this is an acceptably small source of potential
bias.
Estimating α: Analysis on the Node Level
Above we have shown what is measured by the difference-in-differences. From now
on I shall refer to a node in the control condition by c and to a node in the treated
condition by `. If Dt denotes the vector of treatments which is 1 at the treated nodes
and 0 otherwise, estimation of the difference-in-differences identifies:
DiD = δ1Dt(I + αG + α
2G2 + α3G3 + ...) (A.12)
When we take the analysis back from the level of treated networks and look at the
nodes individually, all that matters for each focal node j is its own row in this set of
equations. To simplify this analysis I now introduce the local treatment assumption,
exploiting the fact that only a single node in my network is treated each day. This is
like a partial population treatment Moffitt (2001) with only one single node (a mini
population) being treated.
Local Treatment Assumption: Under the local treatment assumption Dt = ei,
where ei is an elementary vector with node i being the only treated node.
If only one node is treated, the spillover dynamic is greatly simplified. With
D = ei, the only factor to be evaluated for each node is its corresponding ji element
in the matrix G, G2 and its higher orders.18 We distinguish a shocked node `0 ∈ L0,
a neighbor `1 ∈ L1 and the indirect neighbors (2 clicks away, 3 clicks away etc.) as
follows:
`0 : DiD0 = δ1(1 + 0 + α
2G2ii + α
3G3ii + ...)
`1 : DiD1 = δ1(0 + αGij + α
2G2ij + α
3G3ij + ...) (A.13)
`2 : DiD2 = δ1(0 + 0 + α
2G2ik + α
3G3ik + ...)
etc.
Sorting the nodes with respect to their distance from `0 and estimating these strata
separately results in as many estimation equations as can reasonably be traced and
two parameters to be estimated. This fact is the basic idea of this paper, because it
enables the researcher to back out the estimates for the structural parameters α and
δ1. All that is needed is a sequence of reduced form difference-in-differences estimates
for increasingly large link distances. If the precise information on G and its higher
orders is available the parameters can be directly estimated.19 If not, it is possible
to compute an upper and a lower bound for the parameters α and δ1. In the next
subsection I proceed to show how the boundary estimates can be computed.
18The information in the higher orders of the adjacency matrix G is the same as the information
from the sampling strategy in combination with knowing who was affected by the local treatment.
Some nodes (L0) are known to be directly treated. Neighbors (L1) have a direct link so that the entry
in G that links them to the treated node is positive. However, for those who only have an indirect
link, the corresponding entry in G takes the value 0 and only the relevant element of G2 will be
greater than 0.
19To do this use all the ij values that correspond to each individual focal node j as weights for α,
α2, α3, etc. and minimize a quadratic loss function. Unfortunately I cannot show this here, because
the full matrix G formed by the German Wikipedia is too large to be computed in memory.
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A.2.4 Estimating Bounds for the Parameters of Interest
If the researcher lacks information on G it is possible to compute an upper and a lower
bound for the social parameter α and the treatment effect δ1. The goal in this section
is to back out a lower and an upper bound estimate for α and δ1, that is based only
on the estimated DiD’s and the number of nodes. This is useful, since the precise
information on G is often not easy to obtain.20 In my proofs I use the local treatment
assumption (only one individual in the network is treated), for both ease of notation
and understanding. It applies to “today’s featured articles”.21
In what follows I will show how to obtain these bounds. In Subsection A.2.4, I
will give an intuitive account of the underlying ideas. In Subsection A.2.4, I will set up
the preliminaries, including a Lemma that will be used. Subsection A.2.4 obtains the
upper bound and Subsection A.2.4, finally, provides the proof for the lower bound.
Figure A.1: Schematic representation of the two extreme networks, used to compute
the upper and lower bound estimates of the parameters of interest.
Network A (outbound) Network B (fully connected)
Notes: The “ outbound network” (left) is used to obtain the upper bound estimate. It is a directed network with
only “outward bound” links. Holding the number of nodes and the observed ITEs fixed, the social parameter
will be estimated to be largest in this type of network. The fully connected network (right), is the benchmark
case from which the lower bound of the social parameter can be estimated.
Intuition for obtaining Bounds
To see why we can bound the parameter, even without knowing the details of the
network structure, we can select two ‘specific ‘extreme” types of networks which either
minimize or maximize the higher order effects. For greater convenience, I repeat the
illustration of such networks in Figure A.1.
The network that minimizes higher order spillovers is a directed network with
only “outward bound” links from `0 to `1 ∈ L1 22. This implies no links between the
20The information might either not be available, or so big that computing its higher orders might
confront the researcher with substantial computational challenges.
21I conjecture that extending the proof to partial population or randomized treatments will be
straight forward. It merely means taking into account that more than one node gets treated and that
the effects from the treated can also spill to the other treated, which will render the formulas quite
unwieldy.
22and possibly further on to `2 ∈ L2, `3 ∈ L3 and so on.
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nodes in L1 and will serve as upper bound. The opposite type of network is a network,
where every node is the direct neighbor of every one of its peers.23 The fully connected
network simplifies the analysis, because it has only two types of nodes (treated or
not). Higher order spillovers are the same for every node of the same type. Moreover,
given α and N , the fully connected network has the greatest second and higher order
spillovers.24 This allows to derive a closed form solution for the lower bounds of the
relevant parameters.
Preliminaries
Before I proceed to characterize the bounds of the coefficient, it is useful to point out
a fact that will be important in the argument that follows. Start by rewriting the
formulas in equation A.13 without explicit characterization of the higher order spills:
DiD0 = δ1 +HO`0 (A.14)
DiD1 =
α
NP`1
δ1 +HO`1 (A.15)
where HO`0 = δ1(α
2G2ii + α
3G3ii + ...) and HO`1 = δ1(α
2G2ij + α
3G3ij + ...). These
effects are typically not trivial. They depend on the underlying network of peers and
need to take into account the network structure. However, I can use a simple insight
concerning the size of the higher order effects.
Lemma A.1. Given the total effect, larger higher order effects, imply smaller
coefficients, i.e. for DiD0 > DiD1 > HO
B > HOA ≥ 0: for any HOA < HOB,
αA > αB and δA1 > δ
B
1 .
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Proof. We have to make the following two comparisons:
DiD0 = δ
A
1 +HO
A vs. DiD0 = δ
B
1 +HO
B
DiD1 =
αA
NP`1
δA1 +HO
A vs. DiD1 =
αB
NP`1
δB1 +HO
B
This can be transformed as follows:
δA1 = DiD0 −HOA vs. δB1 = DiD0 −HOB (A.16)
αA =
(DiD1 −HOA)
δA1
NP`1 vs. α
B =
(DiD1 −HOB)
δB1
NP`1 (A.17)
From equation A.16 it is immediately obvious that HOA < HOB implies δA1 > δ
B
1 .
For comparing α substitute the corresponding δ1 from A.16 into A.17, define HO
A :=
HOB − ε (for ε > 0) and rewrite equation A.17 as
αA =
a
b
NP`1 vs. α
B =
a− ε
b− εNP`1 (A.18)
23I will sometimes refer to this network as “classroom” network.
24Every node affects every other node via a direct link and everybody will get second and higher
round spillovers from every other node.
25Note that the requirement DiD1 > HO
B has bite, since it implies α < 0.5. This assumption
need not be satisfied in all applications, but it applies well to settings where the spills dissipate
quickly and to settings where the direct effect on the treated is much larger than on the neighbors
(DiD0 >> DiD1). This is the case in most applications and certainly so in the present one.
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where a = (DiD1 −HOA) and b = DiD0 −HOA. Comparing αA vs. αB is equivalent
to comparing a
b
vs. a−ε
b−ε . Since we have a, b, ε > 0, ε < b and ε < a:
a
b
− a− ε
b− ε > 0 ⇔ a(b− ε)− b(a− ε) > 0
⇔ aε < bε
⇔b.A. a < b
The last inequality holds by the initial assumptions, which completes the proof.
With this lemma in hand we can now proceed to derive benchmarks (upper and
lower bound estimates) for the parameters of interest.
Upper Bound: Network without higher order spillovers.
In the “outbound” network higher order spills back to the originating nodes do not
exist26: HO`0 and HO`1 would be 0. This is equivalent to assuming:
DiD =b.A. δ1Dt(I + αG + 0 + 0 + ...) (A.19)
which is equivalent to having27:
DiD0 = δ1 for treated L0− nodes (A.20)
DiD2 = 0 for L2
...analogously for L3 and higher
By Lemma A.1 this assumption leads to an upper bound of both coefficients. If all
effects are of the same sign and DiD0 > DiD1 > HO > 0
28, the difference-in-differences
for a node `1 ∈ L129 would simply reduce to:
DID1 =
α
NP`1
δ1 (A.21)
A consistent estimator of δ1 and the observed difference-in-differences will be enough
to estimate α. In the “outbound network”, I apply difference-in-differences on the level
of directly treated nodes to obtain such an estimate. Then I move on to estimate α:
δˆ1 = D̂iD0 = ∆ˆ`0− ∆ˆc0 (A.22)
αˆ =
D̂iD1
D̂iD0
NP`1
with ∆ˆ`0 := 1
NP`0
∗∑i(yi,`0,t=0 − yi,`0,t=1), ∆ˆc0 := 1NPc0 ∗∑i(yi,c0,t=0 − yi,c0,t=1). The
definition of ∆ˆ`1 and ∆ˆc1 for the D̂iD1 parallels the definition of ∆ˆ`0 and ∆ˆc0.
26Admittedly, in such a network, endogeneity would not be a problem in the first place.
27D`0 denotes the value of D at the central node, that is related to the focal node.
28DiD0 (DiD1) denotes the difference-in-differences for treated nodes (neighbors). For the reverse
relationships (DiD0 < DiD1 < HO < 0) the estimate based on assuming an“outward bound”network
gives a lower bound, if the effects go in opposite directions, my claims do not necessarily hold and will
have to verified by the researcher. Slightly more involved assumptions will be needed.
29Which corresponds to an Indirect Treatment Effect or an “Externality”
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Discussion: The assumption in equation A.19 implies no “multiplication-effects” or
“feedback-loops” between the nodes.30 In the light of the formalization presented here,
this is a strong assumption. However, in the impact evaluation literature with fixed and
stable classroom sizes or villages, this assumption is almost taken implicitely, whenever
the researchers report merely the ATE and ITEs. (cf. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009),
Carmi et al. (2012), Dahl et al. (2012), etc. etc.).
Having said that, the upper bound estimator is quite suitable if higher order
spillovers are negligible. In what follows I compute the lower bound estimates under
the assumption of maximal higher order spillovers. This will give a sense of the maximal
size of the bias that might result from assuming away the higher order complexities of
a network.
Lower Bound: Network with maximum higher order spillovers.
In this subsection I derive the lower bound estimates under the assumption of a fully
connected network. Formally, consider the matrix G, that corresponds to a fully
connected network:
G =

0 1
N−1
1
N−1 ...
1
N−1
1
N−1 0
1
N−1 ...
1
N−1
1
N−1
1
N−1 0 ...
1
N−1
. . . .
. . . .
1
N−1
1
N−1
1
N−1 ... 0

First, observe that all nodes are direct neighbors, i.e. NP`0 = NP`1 = NP` = N − 1.
Next, note that there are only two types of nodes: Directly treated nodes and neighbors.
Let us now characterize the higher order spillovers that arrive at the treated node. From
equation A.13 we know that the spillovers that arrive at a node in L0 are given by:
`0 : DiD0 = δ1(1 + 0 + α
2G2ii + α
3G3ii + ...)
The formula above points out that no spillovers of order 1 arrive at the treated node,
since i does not link on to himself.31 But in a network characterized by G, (and
maintaining local treatment) the second order spillovers arrive from every neighbor,
i.e. NP` times, third order spillovers arrive (N − 1)2 − (N − 1) times etc.32 The
number of channels for spillovers of order S is given by:
#channelsii,S = (N − 1)S−1 − (N − 1)S−2 + (N − 1)S−3 + ...
=
S−1∑
s=1
(N − 1)s(−1)(S−1)−s S ≥ 2
30Neglecting higher-order spillovers is like implicitely introducing a temporal structure where a
spillover takes time to occur and taking a snapshot after the first order effect. This is possible if, for
example, spillovers are slow or if the temporal structure of the available data is fine grained enough.
31Note that this is precisely the point where the local treatment assumption is most useful, because
had we treated T > 1 nodes, then we would have to count T-1 direct spillovers that arrive at i, which
obviously would render the following considerations less tractable.
32Counting the number of channels for third and higher order spillovers is a matter of combinatorics:
The number of channels for higher order increases at an almost exponential rate, leading to potentially
very large effects, that are moderated only by the decrease of the primary effects during transmission.
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The sum of second and higher order spillovers arriving at the treated node is:
HOii =
inf∑
S=2
δ1
αS
(N − 1)S#channelsii,S
=
inf∑
S=2
δ1
αS
(N − 1)S
S−1∑
s=1
(N − 1)s(−1)(S−1)−s
All non-treated neighbors are the same and the number of channels for spillovers
of order S from node i to node j is computed almost33 in the same way:
#channelsij,S = (N − 1)S−1 − (N − 1)S−2 + (N − 1)S−3 + ...
=
S−1∑
s=0
(N − 1)s(−1)(S−1)−s S ≥ 2
Again the sum of second and higher order spillovers at the neighboring nodes is:
HOij =
inf∑
S=2
δ1
αS
(N − 1)S#channelsij,S (A.23)
=
inf∑
S=2
δ1
αS
(N − 1)S
S−1∑
s=0
(N − 1)s(−1)(S−1)−s
Before we can move on to derive the lower bound estimates, note that we have∑S−1
s=1 (N − 1)s(−1)(S−1)−s < (N − 1)S−1 which will be a convenient fact for simplifying
the estimation of the lower bound.
HOii =
inf∑
S=2
δ1
αS
(N − 1)S
S−1∑
s=1
(N − 1)s(−1)(S−1)−s < (A.24)
<
inf∑
S=2
αS
(N − 1)S (N − 1)
S−1 =
=
1
(N − 1)
inf∑
S=2
αS =
α2
(N − 1)
1
1− α
Let us call this expression HOii. Analogously we obtain HOij =
α2
(N−1)
1
1−α . Plug
these values into the equations A.14 and A.15 from above. With Lemma A.1 at our
disposal, we can use HOii and HOij to back out the lower bounds of the coefficients α
and δ1:
DiD0 = δ̂1 +HO`0 (A.25)
DiD1 =
α̂
NP`1
δ̂1 +HO`1 (A.26)
It is somewhat tedious, but straight forward to show, that solving this system of
33s now starts at 0.
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equations results in a quadratic equation for α̂:
α̂2 − [DiD0
DiD1
+ (N − 1)]α̂ + (N − 1) = 0 (A.27)
The closed form solution for α̂ is hence given by:
α̂1/2 =
1
2
[
DiD0
DiD1
+ (N − 1)] + /−
√
1
4
[
DiD0
DiD1
+ (N − 1)]2 − (N − 1) (A.28)
Under weak regularity conditions34 one solution is above 1 and another one
between 0 and 1. The latter one is the solution for α̂ and it can easily be used to
retrieve δ̂1 from equation A.14
Discussion: Note that this closed form solution requires only the number of
nodes, and the two estimates from the difference-in-differences (for treated nodes and
neighbors). It can be computed when nothing is known about the network, except how
many agents and who was treated. It is thus as readily available as the upper bound
estimators.
Clearly, one would immediately wish for more.35 Having more information about
the network structure or even the link strength between nodes is certainly desirable
and, generally, will allow for more interesting additional results. Finally, while the
proof here advantageously uses the local treatment assumption, I conjecture, that it is
straightforward to extend it to treatments of more than one node.
A.3 Aside: Reaction to treatment of the neighbor
Everything above was derived under the assumption that nodes do not observe or at
least do not react to the local treatment of their neighbors. This is appropriate for
neighbors of Wikipedia articles that get advertised on the start page.36 In general
however, subjects might observe treatment of their neighbors and react to the fact.
An example are children at school, who get annoyed or jealous when their peer
was treated in a nice way and they were not.37 In such situations the students/villagers
might react to merely observing the treatment of their neighbors by selecting a different
value for the outcome variable. To model such a situation we need to further augment
the model in equation A.2 by both the observable treatments (shocks) that are locally
applied, and a term that captures the possible reaction to the treatment of the neighbor.
yit = α
∑
j∈Pit yjt
NPit
+Xitβ + γ
∑
j∈Pit Xjt
NPit
+ δ1Dit + δ2
∑
j∈Pit Djt
NPit
+ it (A.29)
Where δ1 measures the direct treatment effect and the new coefficient δ2 measures
reactions of the node, when it “observes” treatment of one (or several) of its peers.
Consider again two connected nodes, where one is treated (`0) in period t and the
34DiD0 > DiD1, which is to be expected for most treatments and follows from α < 0.5 and N > 1
35Note that if there is reason to believe that α is greater than 0.5 an analogue of Lemma 1 that
relaxes my assumption of α < 0.5 is required.
36For two reasons: (i) Wikipedia articles cannot react and (ii) the advertisement is not associated
with any changes in the real world, so there is no reason for any updates.
37Other examples entail economic agents in a village, who observe that their neighbor was refused a
social service for failure to comply with a requirement (e.g. sending their kids to school) or commuters
in a city, who observe when their friends got caught (after the local transport authority increased the
frequency of controls and the punishment for failure to present a valid ticket).
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neighbors are not treated (`1 ∈ L1). Assume for simplicity that `0 is the only treated
node in `1’s neighborhood. Similarly, but different, we have:
`0 :: y`0t = α
∑
j∈P`0t yjt
NP`0t
+X`0tβ + γ
∑
j∈P`0t Xjt
NP`0t
+ δ11 + δ2
∑
j∈P`0t 0
NP`0t
+ `0t (A.30)
`1 ∈ L1 :: y`1t = α
y`0t +
∑
j∈P`1t/`0 yjt
NP`1t
+X`1tβ+γ
∑
j∈P`1t Xjt
NP`1t
+δ10+δ2
1 +
∑
j∈P`1t/`0Djt
NP`1t
+`1t
(A.31)
Now we get two types of spillover effects in this model: First the “pure spillover”
α, due to the effect of treatment on the outcome of `0. But second, also the “behavior
change” of the node, δ2, when it “observes” treatment of its peer kicks in.
Applying a Difference in Differences strategy alone will measure the joint effect
of these two “spillovers”. It will not identify α seperately, unless δ2 is believed to be
0. If this assumption is not warranted only the total “treatment-of-peer”-effect can be
measured. Depending on the application we might care about the effect of treatments,
in which case this aggregate effect will be interesting. It is simply important to be
aware that it is not possible to identify the pure spillover effect in such a setting.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3:
“Centrality and Content Creation
in Networks”
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B.1 Preparation of the Data and Definition of the
Category Economics
We downloaded a full-text dump from the Wikipedia toolserver and constructed the
time-varying graph of the article network on a weekly basis. In addition to the measures
of an article’s network position, which lie at the heart of our analysis, we extracted
data on additional variables like the length of the page, the number of authors or the
categories to which the article belongs. Before computing the values of the variables,
we accounted for the revisions that were made by small programs, so-called “bots”,
which automatically make small formal changes to ensure that a consistent style is
maintained throughout Wikipedia. We did not consider the revisions that were carried
out by bots and we also excluded bots from the author count. In our analysis we use
data on 153 weeks between December 2007 and December 2010. While articles have
been selected from one category, network measures account for links between these
articles and the entire German Wikipedia.
Because of the scale of the data in the order of magnitude of terabytes, it would be
unthinkable to conduct the data analysis using only in-memory processing. We stored
the data in a disk-based, relational database and queried the data using Database
Supported Haskell (DSH) (Giorgidze et al. (2010) and (2011)), a novel high-level
language allowing for formulation and efficient execution of queries on nested and
ordered collections of data.1
With this tool we sampled all the articles belonging to the categories and
subcategories of economics (“Wirtschaft” - which may mean both “economy” and the
discipline of economics in German) from this relational database. The choice of articles
sampled was based on Wikipedia’s category tree. Even though the ordering is not
purely hierarchical, articles that belong to a category are usually allocated among
specific subcategories. The more general category is often not reported on the article
page. Therefore we had to account also for subcategories if we wanted to ensure that
our definition of a category is not too narrow. Consequently, to sample the pages
belonging to economics, we extracted a list of the subcategories of that category and
eliminated those which were too remotely related to economics. This procedure left
us with a list of 380 subcategories. We then proceeded to identify all pages that
were linked to one of the categories on the list during at least one week that lies
within our period of observation, which resulted in a sample of roughly 19, 000 articles.
Sampling articles based on categories of content is an approach that has been used in
previous papers dealing with large content networks like Wikipedia (cf. Halatchliyski
et al. (2010)). However, when evaluating the information from the network formed
by directed hyperlinks between articles, we do not rely exclusively on the subset of
articles that we sampled. While we compute the social network measures only for the
1DSH queries are automatically translated into efficient lower-level query languages that the
underlying database system understands. For this study, we utilised DSH’s capability of translating
high-level queries on nested and ordered collections of data to efficient bundles of SQL queries. For
comparison, we have formulated several DSH queries used for the Wikipedia data analysis directly
in SQL and found that the equivalent DSH queries were more concise, easier to write and easier to
maintain. This was mostly due to DSH’s support for order, nesting, abstractions for query reuse and
concise comprehension notation.
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articles inside the category (i.e., for roughly 10,000 nodes), we use the links from all
pages in the entire network (i.e., more than one million nodes) to compute them. This
is different from previous work, where network measures are often computed only on
subnetworks, that means abstracting from the existence of all the other articles. We
therefore consider it to be of methodological interest to see whether estimating the
effect of the network position on such a reduced network leads to a big or a small
error. Hence, we define the category network as the set of nodes that remain within
the category economics and the global network as the one that is set up by the entire
German Wikipedia.
As we are interested in the network position within the entire Wikipedia, we have
to handle the large mass of more than a million articles. We compute the number
of incoming links and, using the igraph library by Csardi and Nepusz (2006), the
closeness centrality for each article at every week. We do this for both the network
corresponding only to the pages in the category and for the global network of all articles
in the German Wikipedia. It is important to note that we carry out the entire analysis
using the directed network formed via incoming hyperlinks. These links are observed
and edited on those pages from which they direct away, but considered in our analysis
as features of the pages which they are pointing to. On the latter pages they are
only visible when using a tool provided on the side bar. Finally, Wikipedia collects all
content about a topic on one single article and creates “redirect pages” for widely used
synonyms that users might be looking for. These pages redirect users, who search for
synonyms of the Wikipedia entry, almost silently to the main page. Before computing
the network measures, we accounted for the existence of redirect pages, by counting a
link to a redirect page also as a link to its target page.
B.2 Additional Descriptive Statistics and Robust-
ness Checks
In Table B.1, we report four robustness checks of the last result: In the first column, we
replace the contemporaneous measures of centrality by the ones from the week before,
which cannot be influenced by current editing behavior. This tests whether our result
is mainly driven by a reverse effect of content generation on incoming links created in
the same week. We find virtually no change in the results and thus consider this effect
not to be important. In the second column, we eliminate outliers from the sample. We
observe two kinds of outliers visible in Tables 3.1 and 3.4: articles that gain a lot of
attention in the form of long contributions, many authors and many links (both from
the entire Wikipedia and within the category), and articles that experience very high
changes in these variables in at least some periods. We compute maxima of levels and
changes per article. We eliminate articles that lie in the extreme two percent for any
maximal change. Of the remaining articles, we eliminate those lying above the 95th
percentile of the maximal levels of any variable. In total this eliminates 15 percent of
the articles. The results show that both indegrees are estimated to have even larger
coefficients, which sum to 222 bytes for a link from within the category. The quadratic
specification now better captures a positive but declining influence of links from outside
the category.
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Table B.1: Robustness checks for the relationship of page length and centrality.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged cent. Excl. outliers Sociology Add clicks
Links from Wikipedia 2.946 62.605*** 31.015*** 2.940
(1.22) (8.01) (4.19) (1.22)
(Links from Wikipedia)2 0.001** -0.264*** -0.011*** 0.001**
(2.04) (-5.07) (-7.50) (2.07)
Links from category 134.937*** 159.688*** 59.778* 135.463***
(8.42) (7.07) (1.71) (8.46)
(Links from category)2 -0.125*** -1.230** -0.104*** -0.126***
(-4.95) (-2.14) (-2.74) (-5.03)
Rel. closeness rank (Wikipedia) 7.505*** 1.818 10.421 7.473***
(3.10) (1.23) (1.28) (3.07)
Rel. closeness rank (category) -1.182 -4.608*** -8.406* -1.205
(-0.65) (-3.86) (-1.96) (-0.66)
Dummy: literature section 1248.652*** 1002.577*** 338.438 1247.455***
(5.92) (9.60) (0.77) (5.93)
Age (in months) 8.396*** 3.576*** 11.154*** 8.502***
(22.30) (17.61) (9.62) (22.56)
Dummy: page is redirect -718.429 110.313 0.853 -771.635
(-0.74) (0.39) (0.00) (-0.77)
Clicks 0.233**
(2.38)
Constant 2516.272*** 1933.826*** 3633.877*** 2481.048***
(15.89) (21.14) (6.95) (15.47)
Observations 1160520 994041 195381 1168155
Groups 7635 6497 1277 7635
Adj. R2 0.130 0.227 0.095 0.131
t statistics in parentheses
2-way fixed effects OLS regressions with both time and article dummies (robust stand. errors)
Only articles connected over entire period were included.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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In the third column, we perform the estimation for a different category, sociology,
excluding those articles that overlap with economics. As in our main sample, links from
within the category have a much stronger effect on page length (roughly three times as
large as a link from outside the category). However, this coefficient is significant only
at the ten percent level, which may be a consequence of the smaller sample size. The
coefficient for links from the entire Wikipedia is now significant, which was not the case
for economics. Column 4 finally reports how the results change when including a proxy
for how often a page was clicked in the last week.2 Not surprisingly, as articles are
clicked more often they get longer. However, the relationship of an article’s network
position and its length remains unaffected by the inclusion of this variable.3
Next we turn to the question whether the higher centrality is not only associated
with more content but also with more authors. Table B.2 shows the two-way fixed
effects regressions corresponding to equation 3.2. It mirrors the specifications from
Table 3.5, but the regressions have now the number of authors as the dependent
variable. Columns 1 and 3 show the results when using the centrality measures from the
entire Wikipedia. The results indicate that an additional link is associated with roughly
0.11 more authors, with a very weak curvature of the slope. Similarly to our results
for page length, the effect is much stronger for links from the category: an additional
link from the category corresponds to approximately 0.54 more authors (considering
the sum of Wikipedia and category coefficients). The coefficient for links from outside
the category is much smaller but remains significant in all specifications. The closeness
rank has a negligible effect in column 3, which turns insignificant in column 4.
2We measured the clicks in the 24 hours before the next due date in our weekly panel.
3We performed further robustness checks that did not affect the main conclusions. We excluded
pages that merely redirected the reader to a different page and explanation pages. We also included
a measure of how often pages linking to the page under consideration were viewed. Next we included
several other (potentially endogenous) measures that better describe the pages (number of revisions,
number of references). We repeated everything for authors, where some effects are somewhat reduced,
but they are always in the same direction and continue to matter. The results are available from the
authors upon request.
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Table B.2: Relationship of number of authors and centrality.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wiki degree Wiki & cat. add closeness all vars
Links from Wikipedia 0.112*** 0.073*** 0.111*** 0.072***
(4.25) (3.24) (4.23) (3.23)
(Links from Wikipedia)2 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(-2.51) (-2.05) (-2.50) (-2.04)
Links from category 0.468*** 0.476***
(6.39) (6.38)
(Links from category)2 -0.000*** -0.000***
(-3.06) (-3.18)
Rel. closeness rank (Wikipedia) 0.017** -0.007
(2.29) (-1.22)
Rel. closeness rank (category) -0.009*
(-1.65)
Dummy: literature section 1.552*** 1.393*** 1.543*** 1.406***
(4.78) (4.53) (4.76) (4.57)
Age (in months) 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.064***
(26.10) (44.22) (26.07) (43.66)
Dummy: page is redirect 0.269 -0.399 0.220 -0.434
(0.13) (-0.19) (0.10) (-0.20)
Constant 6.127*** 4.376*** 5.291*** 5.140***
(13.05) (11.30) (13.73) (13.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1168155 1168155 1168155 1168155
Groups 7635 7635 7635 7635
Adj. R2 0.463 0.495 0.463 0.495
t statistics in parentheses
2-way fixed effects OLS regressions with both time and article dummies (robust stand. errors)
Only articles connected over entire period were included. Dependent variable: number of authors.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Additional Materials to Chapter 4:
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C.1 Screenshot of the Price Comparison Site
Figure C.1 displays a screenshot of the price-comparison site www.geizhals.at. By default
the shops are sorted according to their price (the lowest price listed on the first place). The
first column (“Preis in EURO”) shows the price, followed by the shop’s name (“Anbieter”) the
average consumer ratings for the shop (“Ha¨ndlerbewertung”). Shipping cost and how readily
the item is available (“Verfu¨gbarkeit Versand”) are indicated in the fourth column. Several
prices are usually quoted, depending on destinations and method of payment. Consumers can
easily see how much they will be charged for shipping (shipping costs are quoted on the same
line as prices). The screenshot also shows that consumers themselves have to build the sum
of price and the relevant shipping cost, if they use the standard settings. In the rightmost
column, most shops provide additional information on the product (“Artikelbezeichnung des
Ha¨ndlers”).
Figure C.1: Typical screenshot of the price comparison that is shown at geizhals.at
Notes: The Figure shows which information is shown to consumers on the price comparison web site. The shops’
price quotes for a specific item are ordered by price net of shipping cost. The shops’ consumer rating, the shipping
cost, availability and the shop’s own information about the item are provided with the price.
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C.2 Construction of Substitutes
Based on the idea to identify the most frequently clicked pairs of products during the
customers’ search processes our calculation of substitutes is operationalized with the following
steps:
(1) First, we identify the different consumers according to their individual geizhals.at-
cookie which was downloaded to the users’ computer by the Website and which uniquely
identifies the user of the price search engine.
(2) Some users might search for very different products at the same time (e. g. a
vacuum cleaner and a digicam), others are interested in similar products at different points
in time (e. g. a consumer buys another camera one year later). We therefore have to sort
the customers’ click sequence (=referral requests) on geizhals.at into different search clusters.
(a) A search cluster includes only clicks in the same subsubcategory1 and have to contain at
least three clicks. To detect whether consumers search identical products at different points
in time we apply Grubbs’ outlier detection test with a significance level of 95% to identify
separate time-separated search cluster. Moreover, we define a period of at least one week as
a minimum time span between two clicks to separate a sequence of clicks into two different
search clusters.
(3) All clicked products within such a search cluster are considered by the customer
as potential substitutes. We exploit this information by measuring the incidence how
often certain product pairs are clicked together. The resulting frequency tables for each
subsubcategory depict that some product pairs are clicked very frequently together and
other pair combinations can be observed only very rarely. We define the list of potential
substitutes as the top two percent percentile of these frequency tables. This is a rather
conservative measure of potential substitutes, which gives us a relatively low number of
substitutes. Repeating the exercise with a lower cutoff point resulted in very similar results.
1Geizhals maps its products hierarchically into categories, subcategories and subsubcategories to
describe the similarity between the goods. Using the lowest hierarchical level in our analysis guarantees
that only very similar products get into the customers’ search spells.
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